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ABSTRACT 
It is generally accepted in academic circles that the developed country capital markets with their advanced 
infra-structure, depth and liquidity are at a minimum Weak-Form efficient. 
Since the Weak-Form EMH proposes that current security prices immediately assimilate all historical 
information, it therefore also implies that technical analysis (which relies on charts and analysis of past 
price patterns to extrapolate future price movements) would be a futile exercise. Yet technical analysis 
has endured over time and is still an intensively and widely used investment analysis technique. 
This indicates a clear disconnect between technical analysis as employed by practitioners in the market 
and the technical analysis methodologies utilized by academics in prior Weak-Form EMH studies. 
The problem is prior technical analysis Weak-Form EMH studies were burdened with methodological 
weaknesses which severely handicapped the profit generating potential of technical analysis and suggest 
that previous Weak-Form EMH research findings were erroneous in being unable to reject the null Weak-
Form market efficiency hypothesis. 
This study addresses the problem by eliminating prior methodological weaknesses and utilizing high 
frequency intra-day data, the combination of qualitative and quantitative techniques and volume signals 
to develop a portfolio of Intermarket Momentum technical analysis strategies that generate significant 
excess profits. 
The objective of this study is therefore to provide evidence that contrary to prior research findings, the 
developed country capital markets are not Weak-Form efficient. 
The results show that the portfolio of Intermarket Momentum trading strategies generated returns in 
excess of the market with a significantly positive Alpha of 8.52% that allowed the rejection of the Null 
Hypothesis and the acceptance of the Alternative Hypothesis that the developed country capital markets 
are not Weak-Form efficient, thereby refuting the widely accepted EMH. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Key Words: Efficient Market Hypothesis; Weak-Form Market Efficiency; Technical Analysis; Charting; 
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1 ORIENTATION 
 
 Introduction 
The Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) has been a fertile ground for academic research over the past 50 
years: A Google search of the term “Efficient Market Hypothesis” reveals 1.25 million results and over 470 
000 peer reviewed Journal articles have been written. Prominent business school University professors 
Eugene Fama (University of Chicago), Paul Samuelson (Massachusetts Institute of Technology), Michael 
Jensen (Harvard University), Robert Shiller (Yale University), Burton Malkiel (Princeton University), and 
Andrew Lo (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) amongst others have dedicated significant portions 
of their academic careers into research that supports or refutes the EMH1. 
The Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) proposes that security prices at any point in time fully reflect all 
available information (Fama, 1970). As a consequence therefore, exploitable time lags and temporary 
pricing anomalies should not exist, which from a practical point of view implies that no market participant 
should be able to consistently generate abnormal returns in excess of the market. 
Despite over half a century of research, there is surprisingly still no consensus and the EMH remains to 
this day a “hypothesis” and has yet to develop into a theorem – a testimony to the contentious nature of 
the opposing research results which have only served to harden the resolve of proponents for and against 
the EMH. 
 
 Research Question 
Notwithstanding the opposing research results, it is generally accepted in academic circles (Brown, 2011; 
Ball, 2009; Malkiel 2005 & 2011) that the developed country capital markets with their advanced infra-
structure, depth and liquidity are at a minimum Weak-Form efficient. 
This view is supported by recent research findings (Pukthuanthong-Le and Thomas, 2008; and Neely, 
Weller & Ulrich, 2009) that show the significant erosion of trading rule profits as of the mid-1990s, and 
numerous technical analysis studies (Levy, 1971; Osler and Chang, 1995; Omrane and Van Oppens, 2008; 
Fama and Blume, 1966; Lee and Sodoikhuu, 2012; Van Landingham, 1980; Dempsey, Hudson & Keasey, 
1996; Chen, Huang & Lai, 2011; Jensen and Benington, 1970; Chu, 2003; Coe and Laosethakul, 2010; 
Sehgal and Gupta, 2007; Chong, Cheung & Wong, 2010; Chen and Metghalchi, 2012; Lam and Chong, 
2006; Fisher and Statman, 2006; Fyfe, Marney & Tarbert, 1999; Ready, 2002; Miles and Smith, 2010) that 
all support the Weak-Form EMH. 
Since the Weak-Form EMH proposes that current security prices immediately assimilate all historical 
information, it therefore also implies that technical analysis (which relies on charts and analysis of past 
price patterns to extrapolate future price movements) would be a futile exercise. 
                                                          
1 Eugene Fama and Robert Shiller were joint recipients of the 2013 Nobel Prize in Economics for their EMH research and the empirical analysis 
of asset prices. 
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Following the above-mentioned empirical studies which all support the Weak-Form EMH, technical 
analysis should prove to be a worthless activity, yet technical analysis has endured over time and is still 
an intensively and widely used investment analysis technique. In fact, in an extensive survey of 200 foreign 
exchange and international fund managers, Gehrig and Menkhoff (2006) found that technical analysts 
make up the largest group among foreign exchange traders and the second largest group among 
international fund managers. 
This is a puzzling phenomenon, and begs the question:  
Why would the majority of investment fund managers stubbornly persist in utilizing the apparently 
worthless endeavor of technical analysis? 
And perhaps more importantly, 
Why would investment banks and mutual funds continue to pay their fund managers multi-million-
dollar compensation packages to pursue the nugatory practice of technical analysis? 
This indicates a clear disconnect between technical analysis as employed by practitioners in the market 
and the technical analysis methodologies utilized by academics in prior Weak-Form EMH studies. 
 
 Research Problem 
The problem is that all previous technical analysis EMH research neglected to exploit intermarket technical 
analysis, the powerful combination of qualitative and quantitative techniques, high frequency intra-day 
strategies and volume confirmation signals in addition to focusing exclusively on individual domestic stock 
or currency markets. 
These issues cumulatively result in methodological weaknesses which severely handicap the profit 
generating potential of technical analysis and suggest that previous Weak-Form EMH research findings 
were erroneous in being unable to reject the null Weak-Form market efficiency hypothesis. 
 
 Research Objective 
The objective of this study is to utilize high frequency intra-day data, the combination of qualitative and 
quantitative techniques and volume signals to develop intermarket technical analysis strategies that 
generate significant excess profits and consequently show that contrary to prior research findings, the 
developed country capital markets are not Weak-Form efficient. 
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 Significance of the Study 
 
 Modern Finance Theory 
The Modern Finance Theory paradigm created over 50 years ago, of which the EMH is the cornerstone, 
would be challenged and this would encourage future research in Behavioral Finance and strengthen the 
case for a paradigm shift in price formation theory. 
 
 Bank Regulation 
Empirical evidence of market inefficiency and consequent inability of the market to manage prices and 
risk, will strengthen the case of government bureaucrats pushing for more stringent global regulatory 
standards on the necessary level of bank capital, liquidity and leverage requirements and overall banking 
industry regulation in the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis. 
 
 Allocation of Resources 
Inefficient capital markets will send inaccurate signals to private and institutional investors regarding their 
capital investment decisions amongst the nation’s private and public companies, and firms will receive 
inaccurate price signals to guide their strategic production and investment decisions. This will result in the 
sub-optimal allocation of the nation’s resources in unproductive companies, which will have a significant 
detrimental long term effect on economic growth and prosperity. 
 
 Long-Term Investment Strategy 
From a long term investment strategy perspective, global capital market inefficiency dictates that it would 
be a wise choice to select a professional investment manager who is able to capitalize on global market 
inefficiencies by diversifying and trading internationally, thereby generating returns in excess of the 
market and a much needed larger nest egg upon retirement. 
 
 Business Leadership 
The EMH as the cornerstone of Modern Finance Theory and technical analysis as an intensively and 
widely used investment analysis technique, together constitute vital elements of Financial Management 
which remains a core foundation course of all Master of Business Administration (MBA) programs2. In 
addition, top business schools place more than 40% of their MBA graduates in the finance industry – 
former Merrill Lynch CEO’s John Thain and Stanley O’Neal, Lehman Brothers CEO Richard Fuld, and ex 
Citigroup CEO Vikram Pandit are all card-carrying MBA graduates (Holland, 2009). 
                                                          
2 Source: www.wikipedia.org 
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The banking and investment banking industry are the lifeblood of an economy, the failure of which 
would pose a systemic risk to which the 2008 world financial crisis bears testimony. Not surprisingly, 
financial industry executives are the preeminent business leaders in our society responsible for guiding 
the economy through a constantly changing global business environment. 
 
 Limitations 
The availability of historical high frequency intra-day data on the TradeStation platform limited the data 
test period to 2008 – 2013. This data period does however encompass the extreme bear market of 2008 
resulting from the world financial crisis, and the 2009 – 2013 bull market that followed the market bottom 
in March 2009. 
Importantly for this study, the bull and bear market cycles imbedded in this previous six-year market data 
period presented a stern test of the robustness and ability of the inter-market technical analysis trading 
strategies to generate returns in excess of the market and thereby refute the EMH. Additionally, this 
variety of market environments was beneficial in appraising the applicability of the results to diverse 
market conditions. 
 
 Delimitations 
There is a direct positive correlation between the frequency of intra-day data and the number of trades 
generated by technical analysis strategies. Due to the need to analyze each individual trade identified by 
the inter-market strategy from a qualitative charting perspective in order to filter out those trades not 
supported by a chart pattern or a trendline breakout, the high frequency intra-day data utilized was 
limited to 240-minute data in order to generate a manageable number of trades for the purpose of this 
report. 
 
 Ethics 
Data snooping bias refers to the problem that arises when researchers test technical analysis trading rules 
already proven profitable on part or all of the previously tested dataset (Neely and Weller, 2011). As 
described by (Ready, 2002), researchers testing popular trading rules might be introducing a form of data 
snooping bias into their studies, as the popularity of these rules is no doubt the result of their long term 
effectiveness on that same dataset. 
Pukthuanthong-Le and Thomas (2008: 32) advise that “to avoid a data-snooping bias, a trading rule must 
be chosen before any data tests are run”. The Momentum and Inter-market technical analysis trading 
rules selected for this study were developed in 1978 and 1997 respectively, more than ten years prior to 
the 2008 – 2013 data period over which they were evaluated thereby eliminating the risk of introducing 
data snooping bias into the study. 
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Researchers that test ex poste trading rule strategies additionally introduce the risk of data mining bias 
into the study results, whereby the trading rules are developed and tested on the same body of data (Fyfe, 
Marney & Tarbert, 1999; Menkhoff and Taylor, 2007). 
The ex ante nature of this study whereby the technical analysis trading rules were developed on a prior 
dataset then tested on a much later 2008 – 2013 data period, therefore also eliminated the risk of data 
mining bias. 
 
 Summary 
Despite over half a century of EMH research, there is surprisingly still no consensus and time has only 
served to harden the resolve of proponents for and against the EMH. 
Notwithstanding the opposing research results over the past 50 years, it is generally accepted in academic 
circles that the developed country capital markets with their advanced infra-structure, depth and liquidity 
are at a minimum Weak-Form efficient. 
Since the Weak-Form EMH proposes that current security prices immediately assimilate all historical 
information, it therefore also implies that technical analysis (which relies on charts and analysis of past 
price patterns to extrapolate future price movements) would be a futile exercise. However technical 
analysis has endured over time and is still an intensively and widely used investment analysis technique. 
This indicates a clear disconnect between technical analysis as employed by practitioners in the market 
and the technical analysis methodologies utilized by academics in prior Weak-Form EMH studies. 
The literature review uncovered methodological weaknesses which severely handicap the profit 
generating potential of technical analysis and suggest that previous Weak-Form EMH research findings 
were erroneous in being unable to reject the null Weak-Form market efficiency hypothesis. 
This study therefore proposes that by eliminating prior methodological weaknesses and utilizing high 
frequency intra-day data, the combination of qualitative and quantitative techniques, and volume signals 
to develop inter-market technical analysis strategies, it is possible to generate significant excess profits 
and consequently show that contrary to prior research findings, the developed country capital markets 
are not Weak-Form efficient. 
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 Organization of the Study 
 
Chapter 1 is the orientation which provides an introduction, the research question, the research 
problem, the research objective, the significance of the study, the limitations and delimitations, ethics 
and summary. 
Chapter 2 is the literature review which describes the background and origin of the EMH, the 
underlying theory, and the seminal papers that have shaped the EMH debate. The literature review then 
focuses on the Weak-Form EMH and technical analysis, identifying those technical analysis studies that 
failed to reject the null Weak-Form market efficiency hypothesis. 
Chapter 3 outlines the research question and research problem in more detail. 
Chapter 4 describes the methodology and details the Null Hypothesis which supports the Weak-
Form EMH: 𝑯𝟎 : α ≤ 0 and the Alternative Hypothesis which implies that the developed country capital 
markets are not Weak-Form efficient: 𝑯𝟏 : α > 0 
Chapter 5  identifies the data collection and analysis utilized to develop the Intermarket Momentum 
trading strategies. 
Chapter 6 analyzes the results and tests the hypothesis. 
Chapter 7 concludes and provides recommendations for future research. 
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 Origin 
Simply stated, the EMH proposes that security prices at any point in time fully reflect all available 
information (Fama, 1970), which from a practical point of view implies that no market participant should 
be able to consistently generate abnormal returns in excess of the market. 
The EMH has its origin in the groundbreaking doctoral thesis Theorie de la Speculation of French 
mathematician Louis Bachelier in 1900. He was the first person to use advanced mathematical techniques 
to develop a formula that expresses the probability of stock market price movements and the valuation 
of options (rentes) on the Paris Bourse. In his remarkable thesis which was way ahead of its time, Bachelier 
also developed the mathematics for Brownian Motion five years before Einstein, and his option pricing 
formula was astonishingly similar to the Nobel prize winning Black-Scholes option pricing model 
developed seventy-three years later by Fisher Black and Myron Scholes (Davis and Etheridge, 2006). 
Bachelier (1900:34) also deduced in his thesis that “The mathematical expectation of the speculator is 
zero” – this laid the foundation upon which the Efficient Market Hypothesis was later built. 
Incredibly Bachelier’s thesis lay dormant for over half a century until its rediscovery by Yale statistics 
professor L.J. Savage in 1955. Savage then sent out postcards to his colleagues in economics and finance 
enquiring of them if they had read the work of Louis Bachelier - one of which landed on the desk of 
Professor Paul Samuelson at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Davis and Etheridge, 2006). 
Motivated by Bachelier’s work, Samuelson later went on to develop a general stochastic model of price 
change (Samuelson, 1965) which posits that future price differences are independent of previous period’s 
price differences and will essentially follow a random walk. 
This theme was expanded upon by University of Chicago Booth School of Business Professor Eugene Fama 
in his doctoral thesis (Fama, 1965) where for the first time an “efficient” market is described as a market 
where there are large numbers of rational, profit-maximizers actively competing such that at any point in 
time, the actual prices of securities instantaneously fully reflect all known information. Fama then 
concludes that the random walk hypothesis is built upon the premise of this “efficient” market by 
proposing that as new information hits the market, actual prices will randomly over-adjust as often as 
they will under-adjust to this new information, and the time lag in the complete adjustment of actual 
prices to this new information will also be random as market participants sometimes anticipate the news 
and other times react following the news. As a result, the successive prices of stocks are independent and 
essentially follow a random walk. 
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 Classical EMH Taxonomy 
Fama (1970:388) later recognized that the EMH as defined in “security prices at any point in time fully 
reflect all available information” was too broad in scope to lend itself to rigorous empirical testing. Fama 
therefore proposed that the EMH be categorized into three information subsets which will allow the 
determination of the information level at which point the EMH breaks down: 
 
 Weak Form EMH  
The Weak-Form EMH proposes that security prices at any point in time reflect all past historical 
information. The weak form EMH therefore implies that technical analysis (which relies on charts of past 
price patterns to predict future price movements) would be of no value. 
 
 Semi-Strong Form EMH 
The Semi-Strong Form EMH proposes that security prices at any point in time reflect not only historical 
information, but all publically available current information. The semi-strong form EMH therefore implies 
that in addition to technical analysis, fundamental analysis (which relies on an analysis of all publically 
available past and current information to determine the intrinsic value of a security as a predictor of the 
future price) would also be of no value. 
 
 Strong Form EMH  
The Strong Form EMH proposes that security prices at any point in time reflect not only past and current 
public information, but also monopolistic private insider information. The strong form EMH therefore 
proposes that access to corporate “inside information” would bear no trading advantage to the holder of 
such information. 
 
 The Underlying Theory 
The main principle behind the EMH is that stock prices at any one time “fully reflect” all available 
information and thereby optimize resource allocation by providing accurate production-investment 
signals to firms and investors. This ideal market environment where prices always “fully reflect” all 
available information is described as being “efficient” (Fama, 1970). In an efficient market, if prices drift 
away from their intrinsic equilibrium levels, traders immediately pounce on the opportunity and arbitrage 
forces move prices back to their equilibrium levels. 
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 The “Fair Game” Model 
The underlying theory of the EMH is the “Fair Game” model first posited by Bachelier (1900) that the 
expected return of the speculator is zero, where expected returns can be described notationally as: 
𝑬(𝒓
𝒋,𝒕+𝟏 
Ф𝒕 ) = 
𝑬(𝑷𝒋,𝒕+𝟏 𝜱𝒕)−𝑷𝒋,𝒕
𝑷𝒋,𝒕
    (2.1) 
and 
𝑬(𝑷
𝒋,𝒕+𝟏 
Ф𝒕 ) = [1+𝑬(𝒓𝒋,𝒕+𝟏  Ф𝒕 )]𝑷𝒋,𝒕   (2.2) 
where 
E is the expected value operator 
𝑷𝒋,𝒕 is the price of security 𝑗 at time 𝑡 
𝑷𝒋,𝒕+𝟏is the price of security 𝑗 at time t + 1 
𝒓𝒋,𝒕+𝟏 is the one − period expected return 
(𝑃𝑗,𝑡+1 − 𝑃𝑗,𝑡)
𝑃𝑗,𝑡
⁄  
Ф𝒕 is the information set “fully reflected” in the price at time t 
Under the assumption that conditions of market equilibrium can be expressed in terms of expected 
returns, the “Fair Game” model has an important empirical implication in that it “rules out the possibility 
of trading systems based only on information in Ф𝑡  earning expected returns in excess of equilibrium 
expected returns” (Fama, 1970: 385). 
If 𝑿𝒋,𝒕+𝟏 is the excess return of security j at time t+1 such that 
𝑿𝒋,𝒕+𝟏 = 𝑷𝒋,𝒕+𝟏 – E(𝑷𝒋,𝒕+𝟏   Ф𝒕)   (2.3) 
where 
𝑷𝒋,𝒕+𝟏 is the observed price of security j at time t+1 
E(𝑷𝒋,𝒕+𝟏   Ф𝒕) is the expected price of security j at time t+1 based on the information set Ф𝑡 
Then by definition the “Fair Game” model states that the expected excess return of security j at time t+1 
based on the information set Ф𝑡 is equal to zero, expressed notationally as 
𝑬(𝑿𝒋,𝒕+𝟏   Ф𝒕) = 0   (2.4) 
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 The Martingale Model 
The Martingale model is closely related but less restrictive than the “Fair Game” model and states that 
the stochastic sequence {𝑃𝑗,𝑡} for security j follows a martingale with respect to the information sequence 
{Ф𝑡 } if the following property holds (Fama, 1970): 
𝑬(𝑷𝒋,𝒕+𝟏 Ф𝒕) = 𝑷𝒋,𝒕   (2.5) 
The Martingale model therefore simply states that the best forecast of the next period’s price 𝑃𝑗,𝑡+1 
based on the information set Ф𝑡 , is the current price 𝑃𝑗,𝑡. This has an important empirical implication for 
Weak-Form tests of the EMH, since it implies that historical prices have no predictive value and that 
technical analysis is therefore a worthless exercise. 
It follows from (2.5) that by definition then 
𝑬(𝑷𝒋,𝒕+𝟏) - 𝑷𝒋,𝒕 = 0   (2.6) 
which simply means that the Martingale model only holds if 𝑃𝑗,𝑡 is also a “Fair Game”(LeRoy, 1989). 
 
 The Random Walk Model 
The Random Walk model hypothesizes that price changes are initiated by new information hitting the 
market, and since this new information arises in an unpredictable fashion it implies that successive price 
changes are independent and essentially follow a random walk through time (Fama, 1970). 
It follows from the Random Walk model that if successive price changes are independent and random, 
then both technical and fundamental analysis will be of no predictive value and will not be able to 
generate excess returns. 
The Random Walk model therefore also supports the “Fair Game” model by implying that excess returns 
will equal zero and that the stock market is consequently a “fair game”. This bears an important empirical 
implication for tests of the Semi-Strong Form EMH. 
 
The Random Walk model can be expressed as: 
𝒇(𝒓𝒋,𝒕+𝟏 Ф𝒕) = 𝒇(𝒓𝒋,𝒕+𝟏)   (2.7) 
which states that the conditional and marginal probability distributions of an independent random 
variable are identical (Fama, 1970). 
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 The Empirical Evidence 
The EMH has stimulated voluminous academic research over the last half century. Consequently, the 
objective here is to focus on the seminal papers that have shaped the EMH debate. 
 
 Weak-Form EMH 
Empirical studies of the Weak Form EMH rely on statistical tests to determine whether successive security 
price changes are independent and essentially follow a random walk, from which it is inferred that the 
market is “efficient”. This also implies that security prices have no memory, and therefore historical prices 
have no bearing on future prices thereby rendering technical analysis to be a worthless exercise. 
Alternative Weak Form EMH studies therefore test the hypothesis by comparing returns generated by 
technical analysis trading techniques to a naïve buy-and-hold policy. 
Initial studies, Samuelson (1965); and Fama (1965), supported the hypothesis that successive security 
price changes are independent and follow a random walk. Fama and Blume (1966:240) then showed that 
the Alexandrian filter rules3 were unable to outperform a buy-and-hold strategy after taking transaction 
costs such as brokerage commissions and spreads into account, and therefore confirmed previous 
statistical serial correlation tests that indicated independence of successive price changes and that “the 
random walk model is an adequate description of price behavior”. 
However more powerful computer technology and more frequent historical stock price data intervals 
allowing more precise statistical inference led to the first cracks in the random walk characteristic of 
efficient markets. LeRoy (1973) showed that under conditions of investor risk-aversion it can be 
theoretically proven that the Martingale property fails. His findings were later supported by Lucas (1978) 
who showed that in a theoretical one-good exchange economy, asset prices need not possess the 
Martingale property and follow a random sequence. 
This anomalous evidence regarding the EMH led a defiant Jensen (1978: 95) to famously declare that 
“there is no other proposition in economics which has more solid empirical evidence supporting it than 
the Efficient Market Hypothesis”, but he did admit that taken together the scattered pieces of anomalous 
evidence would challenge future acceptance of the EMH and the methodological procedures used. 
Not surprisingly ten years later, using a more advanced volatility based specification test, Lo and 
MacKinlay (1988) were able to reject the Random Walk Hypothesis for weekly stock returns. Additionally, 
in a cornerstone technical analysis study, Brock, Lakonishok & LeBaron (1992) found strong support for 
variants of simple moving average and trading range breakout technical strategies when tested on the 
Dow Jones Index between 1897 and 1986. 
 
 
                                                          
3 Simple mechanical trading rule developed by Sydney Alexander. 
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 Semi-Strong Form EMH 
Empirical studies of the Semi-Strong Form EMH test the hypothesis from two different angles: event 
studies to determine the speed at which security prices adjust to and reflect current information, or tests 
to determine whether trading strategies utilizing fundamental analysis consistently generate abnormal 
returns in excess of the market. 
Jensen (1967) developed a risk-adjusted measure of portfolio performance (which aptly is now known as 
Jensen’s Alpha) to analyze the performance of 115 mutual funds (mutual fund managers utilize all 
publically known information to trade and manage their investment portfolios), and concluded that on 
average mutual funds were not able to outperform a naïve buy-and-hold policy. Fama, Fisher, Jensen & 
Roll (1969) performed the first event study to determine the speed at which security prices adjust to the 
new information of a stock split. They concluded that the stock market is “efficient” in that it adjusts very 
rapidly to the news of a stock split, in the majority of cases instantaneously after the announcement. 
 
2.4.2.1 Size, Value, Seasonality & Excess Volatility Anomalies 
Their evidence however was not supported by later researchers spearheaded by amongst others Basu 
(1977); French (1980); Grossman and Stiglitz (1980); Shiller (1981); Keim (1983); Keim and Stambaugh 
(1984); and Ariel (1987) who all found evidence of market capitalization (size), value, seasonality and 
excess volatility anomalies in stock price time series contrary to the random walk and martingale 
properties of the EMH. 
Basu (1977) discovered a “value” anomaly when he found that portfolios made up of low price-earnings 
(P/E) ratio stocks (low value stocks) outperformed high P/E ratio stock portfolios (high value stocks), which 
suggested that P/E ratio information was not fully reflected in stock prices and inefficiencies existed which 
afforded traders the opportunity to earn abnormal returns. 
The first calendar-based seasonal anomaly was unearthed by French (1980) who analyzed the daily 
returns to the S&P 500 stocks over a 24-year period and found that the mean return to Monday was 
significantly negative whilst the other four days Tuesday through Friday were positive. He concluded that 
the negative Monday returns were a result of the “weekend effect” of companies delaying the release of 
bad news until the weekend to allow the market time to digest the information. The negative Monday 
returns were therefore an indication of market inefficiency. Subsequent studies (Keim and Stambaugh 
1984) confirmed French’s “weekend effect” findings even when additional time periods were included in 
the analysis. 
Whilst investigating and confirming the “size effect” of small capitalization stocks outperforming large 
capitalization stocks, Keim (1983) discovered what has become known as the “January effect” when he 
found that fifty percent of the size anomaly could be attributed to the month of January. Ariel (1987) then 
added more impetus to the calendar-based anomalies by uncovering a puzzling “monthly effect” when he 
showed that mean stock returns were only positive in the first half of calendar months. 
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A disturbing excess volatility anomaly in stock market prices was uncovered by Shiller (1981) who found 
that stock market price changes over the past century were statistically five to thirteen times too high to 
be attributed to subsequent new dividend information. This implies that price changes occur due to 
unexplained reasons other than subsequent new information, which calls into question the entire 
underpinnings of the EMH. 
2.4.2.2 The “Impossibility” of the EMH 
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) argued that it is impossible for markets to be informationally efficient in the 
real world where information is costly: if prices fully reflected all available information, informed traders 
who expended resources to obtain that information would not earn a return and be compensated for 
their efforts. An unrealistic theoretical world of costless information was therefore a necessary condition 
for efficient markets but even then the markets would not be in equilibrium as traders would realize that 
additional profits could be earned by expending resources and becoming more informed. Fama (1991) 
later agreed with this view and proposed an economically more sensible version of the EMH which stated 
that prices reflect information to the point where the marginal profits of trading that information do not 
exceed the marginal costs of acquiring it. 
In addition, Oppenheimer and Schlarbaum (1981) found strong contradictory evidence against the EMH 
by showing that positive abnormal risk-adjusted rates of return were available to investors who followed 
the value based fundamental analysis stock selection criteria developed by Columbia University professor 
Benjamin Graham4. 
 
2.4.2.3 The Behavioral Finance Challenge 
More salt was rubbed in the EMH wound created by the contradictory size, value, seasonal and excess 
volatility evidence with the groundbreaking paper by De Bondt and Thaler (1985). Their findings heralded 
the beginning of Behavioral Finance, which provides a theoretical challenge to the EMH by questioning 
the rationality assumption of investors underpinning the EMH and suggesting that cognitive psychology 
better describes investor behavior. De Bondt and Thaler postulated that traders are human beings with 
feelings and emotions which result in irrational trading decisions such as the overreaction to market news. 
This overreaction results in price trends and in extreme cases even market bubbles and crashes. The 
hypothesis was tested that traders view past winners (stocks that have outperformed the market) as 
overpriced and past losers (stocks that have underperformed the market) as underpriced, and then 
basically overreact to this information. Their findings supported the overreaction hypothesis with a 
portfolio of prior “losers” outperforming the market by 19.6% and a portfolio of prior “winners” 
underperforming the market by 5% in the 36 months following portfolio formation. In addition, their 
                                                          
4 One of Benjamin Graham’s most famous students is legendary billionaire investor Warren Buffett, who has followed Graham’s investment 
principles his entire career. Buffett’s long term trading success raises serious questions regarding the Semi-strong Form EMH and he has been 
quoted as saying: “I would be a bum on the street with a tin cup if the markets were efficient” to which he later added that “the market is only 
efficient as a mechanism of transferring wealth from the uninformed investor to the informed investor” 
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findings supported the seasonal “January effect” with most of the excess returns being realized in the 
month of January. 
Motivated by the work of DeBondt and Thaler on the overreaction effect and its potential impact on 
contrarian trading strategies, Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) decided to study the impact of over and under 
reaction to the alternative relative strength strategy of buying past winners and selling past losers. Their 
findings indicated initial significantly positive returns in the first 12 months, followed by substantially 
negative returns thereafter in years 2 and 3. This was the first evidence of short-term momentum and 
long-term mean reversion in stock price time series, a serious blow to the EMH. 
 
2.4.2.4 Support for the EMH 
At the time, the lone island in this sea of contradictory size, value, seasonal and behavioral finance 
evidence was Eun and Shim (1989) who managed to find support for the EMH by using vector 
autoregressive analysis to show that the relative speed at which international markets reacted to US 
market shocks proved that international stock markets were informationally efficient. 
Shortly thereafter in his second review paper, Fama (1991) attempted to defend the EMH by positing the 
joint hypothesis problem: tests of the EMH are in fact not only testing market efficiency but also the 
equilibrium asset pricing model used to statistically analyze the findings. A rejection of the EMH could 
therefore actually mean a rejection of a misspecified asset pricing model or both. This became known as 
the “bad model” problem (Fama, 1991). Fama also suggested that the seasonality anomalies may be due 
to data mining and errors in the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) historical data base utilized 
in all the seasonality studies. Later in his third review paper, Fama (1998) made the related point that 
most anomalies were the result of the research methodology used and disappeared with a change in 
technique. This view was supported by Malkiel (2003) who added that transaction costs would also offset 
any potential profits that traders could actively glean from the uncovered anomalies. However, Jegadeesh 
and Titman (2001) argued that their later study using nine additional years of out-of-sample data still 
showed short term momentum and the persistence of this anomaly. 
Fama (1998) also defended the EMH against the Behavioral Finance findings of De Bondt and Thaler (1985) 
and Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) by positing that overreaction by market participants occurred as 
frequently as underreaction, and this random split of overreaction versus underreaction was actually 
consistent with market efficiency. 
Atkins and Dyl (1993) also challenged the outperformance due to the overreaction effect postulated by 
De Bondt and Thaler (1985) on the basis that previous overreaction studies assumed that traders could 
buy and sell at the database closing prices. Atkins and Dyl argued that in reality traders had to buy at the 
quoted ask price and sell at the quoted bid price, and posited that the bid-ask spread would have a 
detrimental effect on earnings of the overreaction strategy of buying past losers and selling past winners. 
After taking the bid-ask spread into account, Atkins and Dyl (1993: 95) indeed found that the cumulative 
abnormal returns generated by the overreaction strategy were less than the bid-ask spread, thereby 
leading them to conclude that contrary to previous overreaction effect studies, no profitable trading 
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opportunities were present due to the size of the bid-ask spread and “no compelling evidence of market 
inefficiency is found”. 
On a similar note, Boldt and Arbit (1984: 31) argued for market efficiency on the basis of the information 
synthesizing effect of “The Law of Large Numbers” whereby “the error in a consensus declines with the 
square root of the number of independent opinions reflected in the consensus”. In the case of the stock 
market, this would imply that the individual pricing errors of thousands of traders would at any point in 
time cancel each other out, such that “the resulting consensus becomes a powerful predictor of future 
value”. 
Roll (1994: 71) also noted that after 25 years of market efficiency research as an academic and 10 years 
as a practicing money manager, even empirically robust size, value and seasonality anomalies were 
extremely difficult to exploit in a real world trading environment, lamenting that he has “never yet found 
one that worked in practice, in the sense that it returned more after cost than a buy-and-hold strategy.” 
Subsequent studies by Metcalf and Malkiel (1994); Malkiel (1995); and Chan, et al. (1997) lent some much 
needed further support to the EMH. The results of a Wall Street Journal newspaper contest that pitted a 
portfolio of stocks selected by experts against a portfolio of stocks randomly selected by throwing darts 
created a lot of publicity at the time. Metcalf and Malkiel (1994) analyzed the results and found that 
although the “expert” portfolio beat the “dart” portfolio and the market, statistical tests showed that the 
additional return earned by the “expert” portfolio could be wholly attributed to the riskier stocks selected 
by the experts and the publicity effect of the contest which stimulated public buying of the expert selected 
stocks. Metcalf and Malkiel (1994:374) therefore concluded that the statistical tests “provide strong 
support” for the EMH and (tongue in cheek) “stock picking by darts continues to be a respectable 
investment tool.” 
Malkiel (1995) studied Equity Mutual Fund returns in the period 1971 to 1991 using the updated Lipper 
database which accounted for survivorship bias and his findings supported the earlier work of Jensen 
(1968): mutual funds underperform the market even gross of management fees, and more importantly, 
there is no evidence of performance persistence with little correlation between funds that outperform in 
one year and funds that outperform in the next, thereby strengthening the belief that “securities markets 
are remarkably efficient” (Malkiel 1995: 571). 
The earlier work of Eun and Shim (1989) regarding international market efficiency was confirmed by Chan, 
et al. (1997), who tested eighteen major international stock markets using a unit root test and found that 
individually, they all followed a random walk and were thus weak-form efficient. However, in a more 
stringent trading rules study of 24 international stock market indexes utilizing momentum, oscillation and 
relative strength indicators, Chu (2003) found only the 10 most developed countries to be weak-form 
efficient. Not surprisingly Chu was able to show significantly positive excess profits in the underdeveloped 
financial markets of the emerging market countries and concluded that they were still inefficient. 
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2.4.2.5 Bubbles and the EMH 
The internet dot com bubble that developed in the late 1990’s and then burst in the year 2000 presented 
another challenge to the EMH as it was difficult to reconcile the unrealistic valuations afforded to internet 
stocks with the workings of a rational efficient market. Behavioralists asserted that the bubble was due to 
irrational exuberance, the herding effect of market participants and the feedback effects fueled by word-
of-mouth and the media (Shiller 2003). 
However, Blanchard and Watson (1982) proposed that there may well be rational deviations of asset 
prices from their fundamental values resulting in the formation of rational bubbles, under conditions 
where market participants believe there are extraneous events influencing the asset price in addition to 
the fundamentals. Malkiel (2003) later supported this viewpoint when he argued that one can only 
recognize a bubble in hindsight and that at the time market participants were behaving rationally in 
assigning high valuations to dot com stocks as they believed that the internet was heralding the beginning 
of a “new economy” and a paradigm shift in the way business would be conducted.  
Shortly thereafter, the housing and credit bubble which ultimately resulted in the global financial crash of 
2008 presented another blow to the EMH with critics blaming the EMH for the crisis under the premise 
that blind faith in efficient markets led to reduced government regulation of the financial markets (Ball, 
2009; and Brown, 2011). This factor facilitated the creation of high risk sub-prime mortgage CDO’s to 
which banks worldwide had trillions of dollars’ exposure, and which ultimately led to the housing and 
credit bubble. 
Ball however defended the EMH by arguing that bubbles have always existed, many of them occurring 
before the EMH was even posited by Fama in 1965. Malkiel (2011: 51) also continued to defend the EMH 
by arguing that none of the anomalous evidence against the EMH offered ex ante consistently profitable 
arbitrage opportunities, and therefore concluded that the “financial markets are remarkably efficient, and 
that EMH remains a most useful hypothesis approximating how our financial markets actually work”. 
Brown (2011:95) even went on to suggest that financial institutions, comforted in the belief that the EMH 
had no real practical implications, borrowed heavily to invest in CDO’s and since this leverage was a 
leading factor in the 2008 global financial crisis, “one might take the view that it was the failure to believe 
the EMH that was in fact responsible for the crisis”. 
 
 Strong-Form EMH 
There is little evidence to support the Strong Form EMH as insider trading is illegal and strictly enforced 
by the legal system in most countries. Consequently, there is thus a lack of reliable data on insider trading 
thereby rendering it impractical to empirically test the Strong Form EMH and it is generally accepted in 
academic circles that the Strong Form EMH is not “an exact description of reality” (Fama, 1970: 409). 
The recent 11-year sentence of high profile billionaire, Galleon hedge fund founder Raj Rajaratnam (USA 
Today, 2011) in New York for illegal insider trading bears testimony to the low tolerance of the courts for 
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perpetrators of insider trading and hints at the obvious (illegal) advantages to be gleaned by trading on 
insider information, all of which flies in the face of the Strong Form EMH. 
In addition, a recent television news report (CBS 60 Minutes, 2011) alleges that Washington Congressmen, 
due to their immunity from Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Insider Trading laws, have been 
not only abusing their access to corporate lobbyists in Washington to obtain insider information but also 
their non-public knowledge of pending corporate legislation to engage in stock trades for their personal 
accounts that have earned them abnormal returns on average 12% in excess of the market. This would 
naturally be convincing evidence against the Strong Form EMH. 
It can be argued however that the performance of hedge funds & mutual funds, with their resources and 
contacts within the upper echelons of corporate management, can be viewed as a proxy for “insider 
trading” and that their underperformance as a group (Jensen, 1967; Malkiel, 1995; and Morningstar, 
2011) strengthens the case for even the strong form EMH. 
 
 EMH Synopsis 
The EMH reached the height of its dominance in academic circles around the 1970s. Beginning in the 
1980’s however, faith in the EMH was eroded by the discovery of a succession of anomalies regarding 
capitalization, value, seasonality, behavioral and excess volatility inconsistencies. Thereafter the evidence 
has been mixed and time has only served to harden the resolve of proponents for and against the EMH. 
Ironically, in order to hold the EMH relies on the daily trading actions of market participants who 
inherently believe that pricing anomalies do exist and that the markets are not efficient. 
Additionally, the hypothesis does have a glaring weakness in the context of its formulation as it is based 
on the assumption that all market participants are rational, profit-maximizing agents that trade on 
information only, but in reality they are simply human beings with emotions of fear and greed that 
sometimes behave irrationally and get caught up in the hysteria of crowds (Nichols, 1993). To complicate 
matters even further, market participants are characterized by diverse backgrounds, languages and 
cultures and therefore they interpret information differently (Gouws, 2003). 
Having said that however, there does seem to be consensus in the fact that the collective wisdom of the 
market will eventually prevail and drive prices to their intrinsic equilibrium levels, but the question 
remains as to whether the anomalies observed en route afford market participants the opportunity to 
earn excess profits. 
 
 Weak-Form EMH Focus 
Notwithstanding the opposing research results over the past 50 years, it is generally accepted in academic 
circles (Brown, 2011; Ball, 2009; Malkiel 2005 & 2011) that the developed country capital markets with 
their advanced infra-structure, depth and liquidity are at a minimum Weak-Form efficient. In their review 
paper, Park and Irwin (2007) confirmed this viewpoint by concluding that technical trading rules only 
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yielded economic profits in the US stock markets until the late 1980’s, and in the foreign exchange markets 
only until the early 1990’s. Their conclusion is supported by more recent research findings 
(Pukthuanthong-Le and Thomas, 2008; and Neely, Weller & Ulrich, 2009) that show the significant erosion 
of trading rule profits as of the mid-1990s. 
In terms of the Weak-Form EMH as proposed by Fama (1970), security prices at any point in time reflect 
all past historical information and as a consequence therefore the best estimate of a future price is the 
current price. 
The majority of Weak-Form EMH research studies (Samuelson, 1965; Fama, 1965; and Mabhunu, 2004) 
primarily focused on statistical serial correlation and runs tests aimed at proving that a stock market time 
series follows a statistically random walk from which it is inferred that the market is Weak-Form efficient. 
However, as posited by Brown (2011:87) a random walk alone is not a “necessary nor sufficient condition 
to establish a violation of the EMH.” He concludes that it is necessary to “show the profitability of a trading 
strategy based on information available at the time the trades are made.” In addition, as noted by Fama 
(1965), the complicated technical chart patterns utilized in technical analysis to predict future prices are 
geometric in nature and not captured in a simple linear statistical random walk test. 
 
 Technical Analysis 
Since the Weak-Form EMH proposes that current security prices immediately assimilate all historical 
information, it therefore also implies that technical analysis (which relies on charts and analysis of past 
price patterns to extrapolate future price movements) would be a futile exercise.  
As an alternative Weak-Form EMH test, technical analysis is therefore challenged to generate significant 
excess returns in order to invalidate the hypothesis. This form of test also follows Brown (2011) and 
Malkiel (2003), who both propose that the real acid test of market efficiency is one that measures the 
ability of traders to consistently generate excess returns. 
 
 Background 
Technical analysis can trace its roots back to mid-18th century Japan where Munehisa Homma, a rice 
merchant, pioneered the use of candlestick charts – an analysis technique still popular among technical 
analysts today (Silber, 2010). 
Later at the turn of the 20th century, Charles Dow (co-founder of the benchmark Dow Jones Index) 
formulated a technical analysis approach to stock market movements still widely followed on Wall Street 
and known today as the Dow Theory. Simply stated according to Dow, a movement in the Industrial 
average can only be confirmed if it is accompanied, and preceded, by a movement in the Transport 
average. If this movement coincides with high volume, it is a signal that a trend is developing and should 
persist until such time that the two averages diverge - a warning signal of a trend reversal (Silber, 2010). 
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Over the past 100 years, computer technology advancements stimulated the evolvement of technical 
analysis with the development of complex charts and indicators leading to the founding of the Market 
Technicians Association (MTA) in New York in 1973 and the professional Chartered Market Technician 
(CMT) designation in 1985 (Silber, 2010). 
Although often derided by academics since it flies in the face of the EMH even in its weakest form, 
technical analysis has endured over time and is still an intensively and widely used investment analysis 
technique by practitioners known as technical analysts or chartists (Menkhoff and Taylor, 2007). In an 
extensive survey of 200 foreign exchange and international fund managers, Gehrig and Menkhoff (2006) 
found that technical analysts make up the largest group among foreign exchange traders and the second 
largest group among international fund managers. 
 
 Principles 
Technical analysis is based on three guiding principles (Neely, 1997): 
The price history incorporates all relevant information about the asset, thereby rendering fundamental 
economic analysis superfluous. 
Prices move in trends – “trade with the trend” or “the trend is your friend” are common technical analysis 
maxims. 
History repeats itself – traders tend to react the same way when confronted with the same conditions. 
 
 Methods 
Technical analysis can be performed in a qualitative manner, where charts of historical price patterns are 
utilized to predict future price movements, or it can be strictly quantitative, where price forecasts are 
made by mechanical trading rules or indicators constructed through a mathematical analysis of historical 
prices. In practice, technical analysts will often employ a combination of qualitative and quantitative 
methods (Menkhoff and Taylor, 2007). 
Notwithstanding the plethora of complex and exotic indicators that have developed alongside 
advancements in computer technology, a branch of technical analysis that has gained in importance is 
that of intermarket analysis, where the technical analysis of one markets price history is used to take 
positions in another related market (Neely, 1997). 
 Qualitative Charting 
Charting involves the subjective identification of patterns in historical price data which are then used to 
project future price movements. In order to be effective, charting relies on the repetition of easily 
identifiable patterns and the principle that traders tend to react in the same way when confronted with 
the same conditions. Charting therefore takes advantage of market psychology and the predictable 
Evidence that Weak-Form Capital Market Efficiency Does Not Hold 2015 
 
Page | 30  
 
behavior of traders with the result that the chart pattern then becomes a self-fulfilling prophesy 
(Menkhoff and Taylor, 2007). 
An alternative charting technique utilizes prior price peaks and troughs to draw trendlines of support and 
resistance. The validity of the trendline is determined by the price touching, but not violating, the 
trendline on three or more occasions. If the price does penetrate and close outside of a confirmed support 
or resistance trendline, this is a signal of a tradable price breakout (Neely, 1997). 
Subjective qualitative chart patterns are non-linear and therefore difficult to quantify and formulate 
mathematically, therefore not surprisingly a literature review has revealed a paucity of rigorous research 
aimed at determining the effectiveness of qualitative charting and its resultant potential to generate 
significant profits and thereby invalidate the Weak-Form EMH. 
The first empirical study of chart patterns was undertaken by Levy (1971), who tested the predictive 
significance of thirty-two possible forms of five-point chart patterns (i.e. patterns with two highs and three 
lows, or two lows and three highs). The thirty-two patterns identified were variations of popular chart 
patterns, namely channels, wedges, triangles, head and shoulders, inverse head and shoulders, triple tops 
and triple bottoms. Each of these historical price patterns has implications for future price behavior as 
they enable the chartist to predict future price movement subsequent to the formation of the pattern. 
Using simplifying assumptions for pattern specification and recognition, Levy (1971: 318) tested the 
patterns on the daily closing prices of 548 NYSE stocks over a five-year period from 1964 – 1969 and found 
that “after taking trading costs into account, none of the thirty-two patterns showed any evidence of 
profitable forecasting ability in either (bullish or bearish) direction”. 
In a later study, Osler and Chang (1995) focused solely on the predictive power of the head and shoulders 
pattern, since it was cited by practitioners as being the most reliable of all chart patterns. The primary 
features of the head and shoulders pattern consist of three consecutive peaks with the highest (the head) 
in the middle. The left and right peaks are known as “shoulders” and the straight line connecting the 
troughs separating the head from the left and right shoulders is known as the “neckline”. Price penetrating 
the neckline of a head and shoulders pattern offers the chartist a trade entry position as it signals a trend 
reversal with the price continuing to move in the direction of the new trend. 
Utilizing more advanced computer technology to overcome the simplifying assumptions inherent in the 
earlier Levy study, Osler and Chang were able to specify detailed parameters in a pattern identification 
computer based algorithm that captured the head and shoulders pattern features as specified in 
published technical analysis manuals. In addition, contrary to Levy and more in line with accepted practice, 
they were able to program an explicit trade entry based on price penetrating and closing outside of the 
neckline, and test a number of endogenous and exogenous trade exits. 
The head and shoulders trading rule algorithm was then tested on twenty years of daily exchange rate 
data for six major currencies between 1973 and 1994 and the results were inconclusive. After adjusting 
for transaction costs, interest rate differentials and risk, the head and shoulders pattern appeared to have 
predictive power for only two out of the six currencies leading Osler and Chang (1995: 38) to conclude 
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that “much more research is needed before there will be any consensus regarding the predictive value of 
visual chart patterns in general, or the head and shoulders pattern, in particular”. 
Following Osler and Chang, a pattern recognition algorithm was also utilized by Omrane and Van Oppens 
(2008) to detect twelve patterns in six months of Euro/Dollar exchange rate data. Omrane and Van 
Oppens improved on prior studies by using high frequency intra-day five-minute data and building high 
and low prices, in addition to closing prices, into their algorithm. A Monte Carlo simulation was run to 
compute the statistical significance of the results which supported the earlier findings of Levy and Osler 
and Chang. Only two patterns out of the sample of twelve exhibited significant profitability which was 
however too small to cover the transaction costs and Omrane and Van Oppens therefore concluded that 
although chart patterns seem to exist in the Euro/Dollar exchange rate data, trading rules related to them 
seem unprofitable. 
 
 Quantitative Mechanical Rules & Indicators 
Mechanical rules and indicators utilize the objective mathematical analysis of historical prices to provide 
explicit buy or sell signals, thereby removing the subjectivity of the trader and the emotions of fear and 
greed that could potentially be detrimental to the trading strategy. 
Mechanical rules either exploit definite trends in the price data, known as “trend following” or 
“momentum” indicators; or instances where the market is consolidating and moving sideways in a range, 
known as “oscillators” or “range trading” indicators. 
Trend following indicators are based on the principle that prices move in trends, and attempt to profit 
from the premise that once prices breakout from a trading range they will trend and continue to move in 
that direction. 
Range trading indicators are effective in a non-trending sideways moving market where the price 
oscillates around a median level, by indicating overbought and oversold levels which are signals that the 
price has deviated too far from the median and that a price reversal back to the median level is imminent 
(Menkhoff and Taylor, 2007). 
Quantitative mechanical rules lend themselves to effective mathematical formulation, consequently there 
have been numerous academic mechanical rule tests of the Weak-Form EMH utilizing one or more of the 
most popular technical indicators. The focus here will be on those studies that failed to reject the Weak-
Form EMH null hypothesis. 
 
2.8.2.1 Trend Following: Filter Rule 
The first known technical analysis test of the EMH in the literature was performed by Alexander (1961), 
who developed a filter rule with the purpose of masking short term price fluctuations in an attempt to 
identify long term price trends. Thereafter known as the Alexandrian Filter Rule, it clearly dictates long 
and short positions in the market by means of a price movement percentage filter, such that if the market 
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moves up x %, initiate a long position and stay long until the market moves down x %, at which point sell 
and go short and stay short until the market moves up x % again, whilst ignoring price moves less than 
x%. 
The filter rule can be expressed mathematically as (Menkhoff and Taylor, 2007): 
 
Buy:  100
(𝑺𝒕  − {𝑺𝒕−𝒊    |𝒊=𝐦𝐢𝐧 [𝒊 > 𝟎|(𝑺𝒕−𝒊− 𝑺𝒕) < 𝟎 & (𝑺𝒕−𝒊 − 𝑺𝒕−𝟏−𝒊    ) < 𝟎]})
{𝑺𝒕−𝒊 | 𝒊=𝐦𝐢𝐧 [𝒊 > 𝟎|(𝑺𝒕−𝒊− 𝑺𝒕) < 𝟎 & (𝑺𝒕−𝒊 − 𝑺𝒕−𝟏−𝒊    ) < 𝟎]}
 > x%,  and 
 
Sell:  100
({𝑺𝒕−𝒊  |𝒊=𝐦𝐢𝐧 [𝒊 > 𝟎|(𝑺𝒕−𝒊− 𝑺𝒕)> 𝟎 & (𝑺𝒕−𝒊 − 𝑺𝒕−𝟏−𝒊    )> 𝟎]}− 𝑺𝒕  )
{𝑺𝒕−𝒊 | 𝒊=𝐦𝐢𝐧 [𝒊 > 𝟎|(𝑺𝒕−𝒊− 𝑺𝒕)> 𝟎 & (𝑺𝒕−𝒊 − 𝑺𝒕−𝟏−𝒊    )> 𝟎]}
 > x% 
 
Alexander (1961) tested filter sizes between 5 and 50% on the S&P Index between 1897 and 1959, and 
found that the smaller filters yielded (before commissions) higher returns than buy-and-hold. However, 
Alexander (1961: 23) admitted that “from a practical standpoint these profits would be substantially 
reduced, but by no means eliminated, by the payment of commissions” and challenged the reader to 
compute an allowance for commissions, thereby rendering his results inconclusive. 
Fama and Blume (1966) took up Alexander’s challenge and re-calculated the Alexandrian Filter Rules 
taking clearinghouse fees and broker commissions into account, and found that these trading costs 
substantially reduced the returns of the filters thereby erasing the advantage of the filters over buy and 
hold. The failure of the filters to outperform buy-and-hold led Fama and Blume (1966: 240) to conclude 
that “for practical purposes the random-walk model is an adequate description of price behavior”. 
Lee and Sodoikhuu (2012) tested the Alexandrian filter rules on 7 years of foreign exchange data for the 
Euro (EUR), Japanese Yen (JPY) and British Pound (GBP) between 2003 and 2009, and found that the 
foreign exchange market is efficient thereby confirming the earlier findings of Fama and Blume. 
Van Landingham (1980) tested three simple buy-sell filters on the NYSE during a relatively short sample 
period of 1972 – 1975, utilizing the 20 day moving average of a standard array of predictive indicators 
including new highs for the year, new lows for the year, the number of advancing / declining stocks, and 
the total volume of odd-lot purchases / short sales. Despite the simplifying assumptions of no dividends 
and taxes, and no differential risk between the trader and the buy-and hold portfolios, Van Landingham 
(1980: 353) found that “no combination of technical indicators and filter rules seemed capable of 
consistently beating the market”, thereby also supporting the efficient market finding of Fama and Blume. 
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2.8.2.2 Trend Following: Moving Average (MA) Crossover 
A short run moving average crossing over a long run moving average from below (above) provides a buy 
(sell) signal as it indicates that price is breaking out of a trading range and initiating a trend in the direction 
of the breakout. The Moving Average crossover can be expressed as (Menkhoff and Taylor, 2007): 
Buy Signal:  𝑴𝑨𝒕−𝟏(m) < 𝑴𝑨𝒕−𝟏(n) and 𝑴𝑨𝒕(m) > 𝑴𝑨𝒕(n),    m < n 
Sell Signal:  𝑴𝑨𝒕−𝟏(m) > 𝑴𝑨𝒕−𝟏(n) and 𝑴𝑨𝒕(m) < 𝑴𝑨𝒕(n),    m < n 
where 
MA is the moving average, and 
𝑴𝑨𝒕(j) 
𝟏
𝒋
 ∑ 𝑷𝒕−𝒊
𝒋−𝟏
𝒊=𝟎 ,    j = m,n 
The Moving Average (MA) crossover was used by Dempsey, Hudson & Keasey (1996) to test the Weak-
Form efficiency of the United Kingdom (U.K.) stock market by applying the same simple technical trading 
rules as Brock, et al., (1992) to the daily series of the Financial Times Industrial Ordinary Index (FT) from 
1935 – 1994. The objective of the study was to determine whether the strong positive results found by 
Brock, et al. supporting technical analysis on the Dow Jones Index between 1897 and 1986 were replicable 
on U.K. data. 
The Brock, et al. technical trading rules tested were the Variable Moving Average (VMA), whereby buy 
(sell) signals are initiated when the short run moving average is above (below) the long run moving 
average; the Fixed Moving Average (FMA), whereby buy (sell) signals are initiated when the short run 
moving average crosses the long run moving average from below (above); and the Trading Range Breakout 
(TRB) which is essentially a filter rule, whereby buy (sell) signals are generated by the price level 
penetrating above (below) the predefined previous period high (low). 
Although variants of the trading rules showed significant predictive ability when applied to the U.K. data, 
Dempsey, et al. (1996: 1131) found that the Brock, et al. trading rules would not be able to generate 
excess returns in the presence of trading commissions and the bid-ask spread, concluding that contrary 
to the positive results found by Brock, et al. on the Dow Jones Index, in terms of the U.K. stock market 
“the present results are seen as supporting the weak form efficiency of financial markets”. 
The findings of Dempsey, et al. were later confirmed in the Taiwan stock market by Chen, Huang & Lai 
(2011) by testing the Brock, et al. moving average and filter rules on daily data between 1971 and 2006. 
In an improvement on the robustness of earlier study results, Chen, et al. also applied two powerful 
bootstrapping tests, White’s Reality Check and Hansen’s Superior Performance Ability, to adjust for data 
snooping bias, and a one-day lag adjustment was introduced to accommodate for non-synchronous 
trading bias. Finally, transaction costs were taken into account and this triad of bootstrapping, non-
synchronous trading and transaction costs significantly reduced trading rule profits to the extent that 
Chen, et al., (2011: 210) were able to conclude that “the Taiwan stock market in fact stands for market 
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efficiency and results show that economical profits cannot be rendered from technical analysis in this 
market”. 
 
2.8.2.3 Trend Following: Momentum Indicator (MOM) 
The Momentum (MOM) indicator is defined simply as the difference between the closing prices of two 
trading days, thus the N day Momentum is calculated by subtracting the closing price at t - N from the 
closing price at time t (Chong, Cheung & Wong, 2010): 
𝑴𝑶𝑴𝑵(𝒕) = 𝑷𝒕 - 𝑷𝒕−𝑵 
The MOM trading rules are defined as follows: 
Buy:  MOM(t-1) < 0 and MOM(t) > 0 
Sell: MOM(t-1) > 0 and MOM(t) < 0 
Thus, a buy (sell) signal is triggered when the MOM crosses the zero line from below (above). 
Pukthuanthong-Le and Thomas (2008) tested simple trend following Momentum (MOM) and Moving 
Average (MA) crossover trading rules on currency futures of the major liquid currency pairs over the 1975 
– 2006 period. The use of currency futures over spot currency rates in their study eliminates the need for 
overnight interest rates and spot interbank deposits, as currency futures reflect the contemporaneous 
interest differential between the foreign currency and the base currency. 
Their results showed that profitability to trend following trading rules in the major currency markets 
steadily declined over time and then vanished in the post 2000 period. Pukthuanthong-Le and Thomas 
(2008: 37) posited that this erosion in profits was due to arbitrage forces as traders learnt and adapted 
their strategies and led them to conclude that “the currency markets became weak-form efficient 
sometime during the late 1990s and have remained so since 2000”. 
This result was later confirmed by Neely, Weller & Ulrich (2009: 486), who tested the moving average and 
filter rules of earlier studies ex poste on later out-of-sample data and found that “by the mid-1990s, profit 
opportunities had largely disappeared for these popular classes of rules”. 
 
2.8.2.4 Range Trading: Relative Strength Indicator (RSI) 
In a non-trending sideways moving market, the Relative Strength Indicator (RSI) oscillator is effective in 
indicating overbought / oversold conditions and imminent price reversals. The RSI measures the strength 
of “up” movements relative to the strength of “down” movements for the most recent period of n days, 
using the following formula (Coe and Laosethakul, 2010): 
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𝑹𝑺𝑰𝒕 = [
𝑼𝒕
𝒏−𝟏
𝑫𝒕
𝒏−𝟏+ 𝑼𝒕
𝒏−𝟏] x 100 where 
𝑼𝒕  is the average of the closing prices for those days where the price increases from the previous day 
𝑫𝒕 is the average of the closing prices for those days where the price declines from the previous day 
t ranges from 0 - n-1 
The RSI is normalized to lie between 0 and 100, where an RSI > 70 indicates an overbought condition 
thereby signaling an imminent downward price correction, and an RSI < 30 is indicative of an oversold 
condition and signals an imminent upward price correction. 
 
2.8.2.5 Range Trading: Stochastic Oscillator (K) 
Similar to the RSI, the Stochastic Oscillator indicates overbought and oversold conditions in a non-
trending sideways moving market. The Stochastic Oscillator (K) compares the value of current closing 
prices with the intra-day price range over an n day trading period, and can be expressed as (Coe and 
Laosethakul, 2010): 
𝑲𝒕 = [
𝑷𝒕 − 𝑳𝒕
𝒏−𝟏
𝑯𝒕
𝒏−𝟏− 𝑳𝒕
𝒏−𝟏] x 100  where 
𝑷𝒕 is the current closing price 
𝑯𝒕 is the highest high, and 
𝑳𝒕 is the lowest low 
As in the case of the RSI, a Stochastic Oscillator value > 70 indicates an overbought condition and a value 
< 30 that of an oversold condition. 
Jensen and Benington (1970) tested a “relative strength” trading rule based on the ratio of a stock price 
to its 27-week average, whereby equal dollar amounts would be invested in X % of the securities in the 
sample with the highest ratios and going forward, those securities in the sample with the lowest ratios 
below a hurdle rank K would be sold and the proceeds immediately invested in the X% of securities with 
the highest ratios. 
The relative strength rule was tested extensively over seven non-overlapping five year periods on between 
three to five randomly selected samples of 200 NYSE securities within each time period. Net of transaction 
costs, they find that the trading rules on average earned returns that were equivalent to or less than the 
buy-and-hold policy. 
However, after accounting for the higher risk inherent in the trading rule portfolios utilizing the CAPM, 
Jensen and Benington (1970: 481) found that the “relative strength” trading rules net of transaction costs 
earned on average considerably less than the equivalent risk buy-and-hold policy, leading them to 
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conclude that “the behavior of security prices on the NYSE is remarkably close to that predicted by the 
efficient market theories of security price behavior”. 
A later Relative Strength Indicator (RSI) test was conducted by Chu (2003), who used the daily closing 
prices on 24 country indexes and the Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) world index during the 
five-year period 1989 – 2004 to test Relative Strength, Momentum and Oscillation strategies. 
Chu (2003: 27) also found the ten developed country indexes to be weak-form efficient as “there are 
inadequate evidences to prove the existence of excessive profits beyond the buy-and-hold strategy”. 
These results were confirmed by Coe and Laosethakul (2010) who even combined the RSI with three other 
technical indicators. Trading rules generated by the RSI, Stochastic Oscillator, a moving average of the 
Stochastic Oscillator and an arithmetic Moving Average were tested by Coe and Laosethakul on 576 stocks 
that comprise the S&P 100, the NASDAQ 100 and the S&P Midcap 400 in an investigation of the Weak-
Form efficiency of the US stock market. 
The trading rules were tested on the daily high, low, and closing price data over a 9 ½ year period between 
January 2000 and June 2009 and the results compared against a naïve buy-and-hold strategy. Despite not 
taking the profit eroding effects of transaction costs into consideration, Coe and Laosethakul still found 
that on average the trading rules resulted in a disappointing loss of $2.40 per share compared to a $4.47 
average gain per share using a passive buy-and-hold strategy, concluding that “since technical trading 
rules cannot be used to consistently beat a long-term buy and hold strategy, we recommend that investors 
first use fundamental analysis to select stocks and then apply a technical trading rule to enhance potential 
trading gains”. 
 
2.8.2.6 Trend Following: Moving Average Convergence Divergence (MACD) 
The Moving Average Convergence Divergence (MACD) is a popular trend following indicator and can be 
expressed as the difference between the 26 day exponential moving average (EMA) and the 12 day EMA, 
where the MACD signal line is the 9 day EMA of the MACD, such that (Chong, Cheung & Wong, 2010): 
𝑴𝑨𝑪𝑫(𝒕) = 𝑬𝑴𝑨𝑴(𝒕) - 𝑬𝑴𝑨𝑵(𝒕)   where 
M = 26 days 
N = 12 days,  and 
EMA is the N day exponential moving average defined as: 
𝑬𝑴𝑨𝑵(𝒕) = 𝒂𝑷(𝒕) + (𝟏 − 𝒂)𝑬𝑴𝑨𝑵(𝒕−𝟏) 
𝑬𝑴𝑨𝑵(1) = P(1) 
a = 𝟐 𝑵⁄  
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The MACD trading rules are defined as follows: 
Buy:  MACD(t-1) < signal line(t-1) and MACD(t) > signal line(t) 
Sell: MACD(t-1) > signal line(t-1) and MACD(t) < signal line(t) 
Thus, a buy (sell) signal is generated when the MACD crosses its signal line from below (above). 
The MACD was utilized by Sehgal and Gupta (2007) who investigated the economic feasibility of technical 
analysis in the Indian stock market by applying nine trend following and price oscillator technical 
indicators (including the MACD, MA and RSI) to seventy-five large companies listed on the BSE-100 Index. 
Utilizing 6 years of daily price data and sorting for industry and fundamental size and value factors, Sehgal 
and Gupta (2007: 11) nevertheless found that none of the indicators outperformed simple buy-and-hold 
after accounting for transaction costs and slippage, leading them to conclude that “our results seem to 
confirm with the efficient market hypothesis”. This was a surprising result, as India is still classified as an 
emerging market economy. 
In a more expansive emerging market study, Chong, Cheung & Wong (2010) investigated the stock market 
efficiency of the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India & China) emerging market countries by utilizing four popular 
technical indicators, namely the Moving Average Convergence Divergence (MACD), Simple Moving 
Average (SMA), the Relative Strength Indicator (RSI) and the Momentum Indicator (MOM). 
The annualized rate of return generated by trading rules associated with these indicators was calculated 
on the daily closing prices of the BRIC indexes between 1995 and 2008 and compared to the buy-and-hold 
return. Chong, et al. confirmed the earlier result of Sehgal and Gupta regarding the efficiency of the BSE 
100 Index, as the oldest stock markets (Brazil and India) were shown to be relatively efficient, while the 
markets of Russia and China were inefficient with many trading rules generating excess returns. 
This result supports the thesis that market efficiency improves with maturity, however it should be noted 
that Chong, et al. did not adjust the trading rule returns for risk or transaction costs. These two issues 
could conceivably erode away the excess returns and render inconclusive the inefficient result found in 
the Russian and Chinese stock markets. 
 
2.8.2.7 Trend Following: The Parabolic Stop and Reverse (SAR) 
The Parabolic SAR is a trend following indicator that plots below the price in an up trend, and above the 
price in a down trend. A switch in the SAR plot from above to below the price (or vice versa) is a signal of 
a change in the direction of the trend, hence the name “stop and reverse”. The Parabolic SAR can be 
calculated by (Chen and Metghalchi, 2012): 
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𝑺𝑨𝑹𝒕+𝟏 = 𝑺𝑨𝑹𝒕 + AF*(𝑬𝑷𝒕 −𝑺𝑨𝑹𝒕) where 
 
𝑺𝑨𝑹𝒕 and 𝑺𝑨𝑹𝒕+𝟏 represent the current period and the next period’s SAR values, respectively 
𝑬𝑷𝒕 is the Extreme Point, representing the highest (lowest) price reached during the current up (down) 
trend 
AF is the Acceleration Factor, increased by 0.02 each time a new EP is recorded and capped at 0.2 
 
Price trending above (below) the Parabolic SAR indicates a buy (sell) signal. 
 
Chen and Metghalchi (2012) employed the Parabolic Stop and Reverse (SAR) in addition to the Moving 
Average (MA), Moving Average Convergence Divergence (MACD), Directional Movement Index (DMI), 
Relative Strength Indicator (RSI) and Stochastic Oscillator (K) indicators to test the Weak-Form efficiency 
of the Brazilian stock index (BOVESPA) over a 15-year period between 1996 and 2011. 
The buy-sell differences of all 32 trading rules generated by single, double or triple indicator combinations 
failed to beat the buy and hold strategy and resulted in insignificant t-tests. Chen and Metghalchi were 
therefore able to confirm the earlier finding of Chong et al. and strongly support the Weak-Form EMH in 
the Brazilian stock market (BOVESPA). 
 
2.8.2.8 Trend Following: The Directional Movement Index (DMI) & Average Directional 
Movement Index (ADX) 
The +DMI and the –DMI represent upward and downward price movements as a fraction of the trading 
range over a period of N-days (Lam and Chong, 2006): 
+𝑫𝑴𝑰𝑵(𝒕) = 
∑ +𝑫𝑴𝒊
𝒕
𝒊=𝒕−𝑵+𝟏
∑ 𝑻𝑹𝒊
𝒕
𝒊=𝒕−𝑵+𝟏
  
and 
−𝑫𝑴𝑰𝑵(𝒕) = 
∑ −𝑫𝑴𝒊
𝒕
𝒊=𝒕−𝑵+𝟏
∑ 𝑻𝑹𝒊
𝒕
𝒊=𝒕−𝑵+𝟏
  
where 
TR is the Trading Range defined as 𝑇𝑅𝑡 = max{𝑃(𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ)𝑡 - 𝑃(𝐿𝑜𝑤)𝑡, 𝑃(𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ)𝑡 - 𝑃𝑡−1, 𝑃𝑡−1 - 𝑃(𝐿𝑜𝑤)𝑡} 
and 
+𝑫𝑴𝒕 = {
𝑷𝑯𝒕 − 𝑷𝑯𝒕−𝟏  {
𝑷𝑯𝒕 − 𝑷𝑯𝒕−𝟏 > 𝟎 𝒂𝒏𝒅
𝑷𝑯𝒕 −𝑷𝑯𝒕−𝟏 > 𝑷𝑳𝒕−𝟏 − 𝑷𝑳𝒕 
}
𝟎      𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒘𝒊𝒔𝒆                                                                  
 
 
−𝑫𝑴𝒕 = {
𝑷𝑳𝒕−𝟏 − 𝑷𝑳𝒕  {
𝑷𝑳𝒕−𝟏 −𝑷𝑳𝒕 > 𝟎 𝒂𝒏𝒅
𝑷𝑳𝒕−𝟏 −𝑷𝑳𝒕 > 𝑷𝑯𝒕 − 𝑷𝑯𝒕−𝟏 
}
𝟎      𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒘𝒊𝒔𝒆                                                                  
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The N day ADX at time t is defined as an N-day simple moving average of the N-day DX (Lam and Chong, 
2006): 
 
𝑨𝑫𝑿𝑵(𝒕) = 
∑ 𝑫𝑿𝑵(𝒊)
𝒕
𝒊=𝒕−𝑵+𝟏
𝑵
 
 
where 
 
𝑫𝑿𝑵(𝒕) = |
(+𝑫𝑴𝑰𝑵(𝒕))−(−𝑫𝑴𝑰𝑵(𝒕))
(+𝑫𝑴𝑰𝑵(𝒕))+(−𝑫𝑴𝑰𝑵(𝒕))
| x 100 
 
The ADX measures the strength of the trend and ranges from 0 to 100, where an ADX ≥ 20 is considered 
to indicate a strong trend. 
 
The DMI is used in conjunction with the ADX to generate the following trading rules: a buy signal is 
triggered if the +DMI crosses over the –DMI, and a sell signal is triggered if the –DMI crosses over the 
+DMI, with the ADX ≥ 20 indicating a strong trend and acting as a conditional filter (Lam and Chong, 2006): 
 
Buy: +𝑫𝑴𝑰𝑵(𝒕−𝟏) < −𝑫𝑴𝑰𝑵(𝒕−𝟏) and +𝑫𝑴𝑰𝑵(𝒕) > −𝑫𝑴𝑰𝑵(𝒕) 
 
Sell:  −𝑫𝑴𝑰𝑵(𝒕−𝟏) < +𝑫𝑴𝑰𝑵(𝒕−𝟏) and −𝑫𝑴𝑰𝑵(𝒕) > +𝑫𝑴𝑰𝑵(𝒕) 
 
and ADX ≥ 20 
 
The Directional Movement Index (DMI) in combination with the Average Directional Movement Index 
(ADX) was applied by Lam and Chong (2006) to the Hang Seng, KOSPI, Nikkei 225, TWSE, UK and US stock 
markets over a 15-year period ending in 2003 utilizing intra-day high, intra-day low and daily closing prices. 
The methodology used the trading rule whereby the +DMI crossing over the –DMI indicated a buy signal, 
and the –DMI crossing over the +DMI indicated a sell signal, with the ADX ≥ 20 indicating a strong trend 
and acting as a conditional filter. Without accounting for transaction costs and the bid-ask spread, Lam 
and Chong still found the DMI trading rules underperformed buy-and-hold in the US and UK stock markets. 
 
2.8.2.9 Market Timing: P/E and Dividend Yield Ratios 
Fisher and Statman (2006) performed a study where historical median price per share / earnings per share 
(P/E) and dividend per share / price per share (Dividend Yield) ratios were utilized as market timing trading 
rules. 
The methodology signaled a switch from stocks into treasury bills when the stock market P/E ratio 
exceeded its historical average and the dividend yield dropped below its historical average (both indicate 
that the market is overvalued), and a switch back into stocks from treasury bills when the P/E ratio fell 
below its historical average and the dividend yield rose above its long term average (an indication that the 
market is undervalued). 
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Fisher and Statman tested a range of critical P/E and dividend yield ratios on the US, UK, German and 
Japanese markets between 1970 and 2002 and found that in general, market timers using the preceding 
period mean P/E and dividend yield ratios would have accumulated far less than a simple buy-and-hold 
investor, thereby confirming market efficiency. 
 
2.8.2.10 Genetic Programming 
In order to overcome the potential problem of data snooping bias and the small number of mechanical 
rule variants tested by prior researchers, Fyfe, Marney & Tarbert (1999) utilized a genetic programming 
approach to generate the fittest mechanical rule that would maximize profits subject to a 1% transaction 
cost. 
The data tested was a seventeen-year closing price series of a property investment company in the UK 
market, and the only successful rule that generated returns in excess of a naïve buy-and-hold strategy was 
in fact simply a timing variant of the buy-and-hold rule. Fyfe, et al., (1999: 183) therefore concluded that 
this result did “not provide sufficient grounds for the rejection of the efficient market hypothesis”. 
This result was confirmed by Ready (2002), who also utilized a genetic-algorithm approach to construct 
the best fit trading rules on daily closing price data of the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) over the 
1945 – 1962 period. These trading rules were then tested over the subsequent 1963 – 1986 period and 
the returns were found to only roughly match the buy-and-hold benchmark. 
In a later study, Miles and Smith (2010) expanded on the previous genetic programming approach studies 
of Fyfe, et al. and Ready, by applying more stringent thresholds to select the trading rules to be tested 
out-of-sample in order to improve their fitness. However, despite the improved robustness of their 
methodology, Miles and Smith still found that the rules did not outperform a simple buy-and-hold 
strategy. 
 
 Summary 
Empirical evidence to date of qualitative charting and a plethora of exotic quantitative indicators and 
mechanical rules confirm the inability of trading rules generated by technical analysis to beat a naïve 
buy-and-hold strategy and invalidate the Weak-Form EMH. 
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3 RESEARCH QUESTION 
 
Following the prior technical analysis studies which all support the Weak-Form EMH, technical analysis 
should prove to be a futile exercise, yet technical analysis has endured over time and is still an intensively 
and widely used investment analysis technique. In fact, in an extensive survey of 200 foreign exchange 
and international fund managers, Gehrig and Menkhoff (2006) found that technical analysts make up the 
largest group among foreign exchange traders and the second largest group among international fund 
managers. 
This is a puzzling phenomenon, and begs the question:  
Why would the majority of investment fund managers stubbornly persist in utilizing the apparently 
worthless endeavor of technical analysis?  
and perhaps more importantly,  
Why would investment banks and mutual funds continue to pay their fund managers multi-million-
dollar compensation packages to pursue the nugatory practice of technical analysis?  
This indicates a clear disconnect between technical analysis as employed by practitioners in the market 
and the technical analysis methodologies utilized by academics in prior Weak-Form EMH studies. 
 
 Problem Statement 
The literature review has uncovered the following methodological weaknesses which suggest that 
previous technical analysis research findings were erroneous in being unable to reject the null Weak-Form 
market efficiency hypothesis: 
 
 Focus on Absolute Efficiency of Individual Capital Markets 
All the prior technical analysis research focused exclusively on absolute tests supporting or rejecting the 
Weak-Form EMH with respect to an individual domestic stock or foreign exchange market. This was an 
entirely logical consequence of the fact that the majority of traders were restricted to trading their 
domestic markets due to geographical, technological, logistical and legal barriers - only a privileged few 
large institutional investors had the resources and capabilities to place limited international trades. Most 
studies also utilized data on the US stock market and the US dollar exchange rate since the US market is 
the deepest and most competitive financial market thereby providing the sternest test of the EMH. 
However, in the past decade, the traditional domestic open-outcry pit stock market trading floor has 
become obsolete and has been replaced by linked international electronic exchanges, online trading 
platforms and high speed internet and data communications. This technological revolution has created a 
global trading marketplace which offers not only large institutional investors, but also small private traders 
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enhanced information dissemination and the opportunity to place and simultaneously execute daily 
trades in multiple global capital markets. 
With the advent of this new global trading environment, the challenge of geopolitical, legislative, 
language, culture and currency differences could however conceivably act as a barrier to global 
information flows and result in exploitable pricing inefficiencies that will not be visible in an absolute 
individual capital market test. As posited by Blitz & Van Vliet (2008: 37), “capital markets are micro 
efficient, but global macro inefficient”. 
In addition, the EMH was originally formulated with respect to capital assets in general, yet its validity is 
tested almost exclusively in individual stock or foreign exchange market analyses. These methodological 
weaknesses are accentuated in the current global trading environment, thereby highlighting the need for 
a more integrated capital market efficiency approach which can be achieved through inter-market 
technical analysis. 
As defined by Neely (1997), intermarket analysis involves the technical analysis of one capital market’s 
price history in order to take a position in a related capital market and in today’s global trading 
environment is therefore ideally positioned to enable a more integrated capital market efficiency 
approach. 
Yet none of the prior technical analysis studies utilized inter-market analysis and all focused myopically 
on an individual domestic stock or foreign exchange market. 
 
 Qualitative or Quantitative Studies 
Academics utilizing daily closing price data series are in most cases limited to testing quantitative 
mechanical trading rules which can be formulated mathematically. Consequently, they are unable to test 
subjective qualitative chart patterns which are non-linear and thus difficult to quantify, thereby sacrificing 
the information that a skilled chartist might discern from the data and the ability to determine the return 
generating potential of this form of technical analysis (Neely, 1997). 
Additionally, as confirmed by Menkhoff and Taylor (2007), in practice technical analysts rely on a 
combination of qualitative and quantitative methods to generate their trading signals, nonetheless all 
prior technical analysis studies relied exclusively on either qualitative charting or quantitative mechanical 
rule methodologies, and none employed the more robust combination of qualitative and quantitative 
techniques. 
 
 Daily Closing Price Data Series 
All previous technical analysis studies were restricted to utilizing daily closing price data bases, however 
as confirmed by Neely (1997) and Menkhoff and Taylor (2007), price fluctuations are smoothed out in 
long term daily, weekly or monthly price data series thereby rendering technical analysis less effective. In 
reality, long term daily data series are more applicable to fundamental analysis that utilizes 
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macroeconomic and firm specific microeconomic data as a basis to determine long term trading positions 
that last weeks, months and in some cases even years. 
Technical analysis is therefore most effective as a short horizon intra-day trading technique where short 
term price fluctuations and trends are more easily discernible. Consequently, none of the prior technical 
analysis studies, which were limited to long term daily closing price data series, were therefore able to 
test more effective high frequency intra-day technical analysis strategies. 
 
 Volume Confirmation 
Charles Dow was the first to propose the principle that a movement in the Dow Transport and Industrial 
Averages can only be confirmed if accompanied by high volume. In practice, technical analysts also assert 
that it is vital to use volume signals to confirm price movements (Osler and Chang, 1995), yet none of the 
prior technical analysis studies utilized volume as a confirmation filter in their trading rule methodologies. 
 
 Summary 
Following the prior technical analysis studies which all support the Weak-Form EMH, technical analysis 
should prove to be a futile exercise, yet technical analysis has endured over time and is still an intensively 
and widely used investment analysis technique. 
This indicates a clear disconnect between technical analysis as employed by practitioners in the market 
and the technical analysis methodologies utilized by academics in prior Weak-Form EMH studies. 
The problem is that all previous technical analysis EMH research neglected to exploit inter-market 
technical analysis, the powerful combination of qualitative and quantitative techniques, high frequency 
intra-day strategies and volume confirmation signals in addition to focusing exclusively on individual 
domestic stock or currency markets. 
These issues cumulatively result in methodological weaknesses which severely handicap the profit 
generating potential of technical analysis and suggest that previous Weak-Form EMH research findings 
were erroneous in being unable to reject the null Weak-Form market efficiency hypothesis. 
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4 METHODOLOGY 
 
The Weak-Form EMH proposes that security prices at any point in time reflect all past historical 
information. Security prices therefore have no memory and the best estimate of a future price is the 
current price. 
The weak form EMH therefore implies that technical analysis (which relies on charts and analysis of past 
price patterns to predict future price movements) would be of no value and cannot generate returns in 
excess of the market. 
Following the literature review of prior research which all supported the Weak-Form EMH, technical 
analysis should prove to be a worthless activity, yet technical analysis has endured over time and is still 
an intensively and widely used investment analysis technique. In fact, in an extensive survey of 200 foreign 
exchange and international fund managers, Gehrig and Menkhoff (2006) found that technical analysts 
make up the largest group among foreign exchange traders and the second largest group among 
international fund managers. 
This indicates a clear disconnect between technical analysis as employed by practitioners in the market 
and the technical analysis methodologies utilized by academics in prior Weak-Form EMH studies. 
The problem is that all previous technical analysis EMH research neglected to exploit inter-market 
technical analysis, the powerful combination of qualitative and quantitative techniques, high frequency 
intra-day strategies and volume confirmation signals in addition to focusing exclusively on individual 
domestic stock or currency markets. 
These issues cumulatively result in methodological weaknesses which severely handicap the profit 
generating potential of technical analysis and suggest that previous Weak-Form EMH research findings 
were erroneous in being unable to reject the null Weak-Form market efficiency hypothesis. 
 
 Hypothesis 
This study therefore proposes that by eliminating prior methodological weaknesses and utilizing high 
frequency intra-day data, the combination of qualitative and quantitative techniques and volume signals 
to develop intermarket technical analysis strategies, it is possible to generate significant excess profits 
and consequently show that contrary to prior research findings, the developed country capital markets 
are not Weak-Form efficient. 
 
Following Jensen (1967) and Malkiel (1995), the risk-adjusted portfolio excess performance can be 
measured through the traditional CAPM model: 
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𝑹𝑰𝑷 − 𝑹𝑭 = α + 𝜷 ( 𝑹𝑴𝑲𝑻− 𝑹𝑭 ) + ε 
where: 
𝑹𝑰𝑷 is the return on the Intermarket Portfolio 
𝑹𝑭 is the risk-free rate of return as represented by the 3 month US Treasury Bill yield 
𝑹𝑴𝑲𝑻 is the return on the market as represented by the S&P 500 Stock Index (SP) 
 𝜷 is the Intermarket Portfolio Beta  
ε is the random error term 
α is the intercept and designates Jensen’s Alpha5, simply abbreviated as Alpha. A positive Alpha (α) implies 
risk-adjusted performance in excess of the market that can be attributed to the portfolio manager. A naïve 
buy-and-hold policy can be expected to yield an Alpha (α) of zero and a manager underperforming the 
market will yield a negative Alpha (α). 
 
 The Null Hypothesis 
The Null Hypothesis supports the Weak-Form EMH by stating, given all publicly available historical 
information, that a portfolio of Intermarket strategies cannot generate returns in excess of the market, 
thereby implying that the developed country capital markets are Weak-Form efficient: 
 
𝑯𝟎 : α ≤ 0 
 
 The Alternative Hypothesis 
The Alternative Hypothesis states that a significantly positive Alpha α indicates risk-adjusted performance 
in excess of the market which implies that the developed country capital markets are not Weak-Form 
efficient: 
 
𝑯𝟏 : α > 0 
 
 
                                                          
5 The eponymous Jensen’s Alpha was first used as a measure of mutual fund performance by Harvard Business School professor Michael Jensen 
in 1968. 
Evidence that Weak-Form Capital Market Efficiency Does Not Hold 2015 
 
Page | 46  
 
 Measurement Instruments 
 
 TradeStation Trading Platform 
The TradeStation online trading platform was utilized to provide accurate market data and the ability to 
trade all major asset classes (Stocks, Bonds, Commodities and Forex) globally on a single platform, and is 
therefore ideally suited to testing inter-market technical analysis strategies. TradeStation received the 
Barron’s Magazine 2011, 2012 and 2013 awards for best online broker and best trading platform. 
 
 EasyLanguage 
EasyLanguage, the built in programming language facility in TradeStation, enabled the development, back-
testing and automation of trading strategy codes based on user defined trading strategies. 
 
 CSI Correlation Lab 
The CSI Correlation Lab software analyzes over 5 billion market pairs each day, and computes the level of 
correlation between such pairs over periods of daily information that range from 2 years to 30 years into 
the past. The CSI Correlation Lab software was thus utilized to confirm the Inter-market relationships that 
formed the foundation of the Inter-market momentum trading strategies. 
 
 IBM SPSS Statistics Software 
The data was statistically analyzed and the regression analysis performed utilizing the IBM SPSS Statistical 
Software package. 
 
 Measurement Techniques 
Following the research objective of this study, high frequency intra-day data, the combination of 
qualitative and quantitative techniques and volume signals were utilized to develop intermarket technical 
analysis strategies that generate significant excess profits and consequently show that the developed 
country capital markets are not Weak-Form efficient. 
 
 Intermarket Analysis 
Intermarket analysis, where the technical analysis of one markets price history is used to take positions in 
another related market (Neely, 1997), is ideally positioned to enable a more integrated global capital 
market efficiency approach that would expose pricing inefficiencies arising from geopolitical, legislative, 
language, culture and currency barriers to global information flows. The intermarket analysis trading 
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strategies were built on the basis of the intermarket relationships identified by Ruggiero (1997) – 
information that would thereafter be well known and available to traders over the past fifteen years. 
 
 Momentum Indicator (MOM) 
The trend following Momentum Indicator (MOM) represented the technical analysis used in the inter-
market analysis strategies to identify price breakouts and the development of price trends in the traded 
market under the technical analysis maxim “momentum precedes price”. Additionally, there is also strong 
empirical support (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993) for asset prices to exhibit short term momentum. 
The standard Momentum Indicator (MOM) trading rules as defined below were utilized to identify trade 
entries, trade entry filters, and trade exits in all of the inter-market trading strategies: 
Buy:  MOM(t-1) < 0 and MOM(t) > 0 
Sell: MOM(t-1) > 0 and MOM(t) < 0 
Thus, a buy (sell) signal is triggered when the MOM crosses the zero line from below (above). 
The Momentum Indicator was developed by J. Welles Wilder6 in the late 1970’s and has since been used 
extensively by technical analysis practitioners.  As in the case of Inter-market analysis, these trading rules 
were formulated prior to the time period in this study over which they were tested, and therefore 
represented information that was well known and readily available to traders during the test period.  
 
 High Frequency Data 
As confirmed by Neely (1997) and Menkhoff and Taylor (2007), price fluctuations are smoothed out in 
long term daily, weekly or monthly price data series thereby rendering technical analysis less effective. 
Therefore, high frequency 240-minute intra-day data was utilized for both the dependent traded market 
and the independent intermarket data in order to more effectively detect short term price fluctuations 
and trends. 
 
 Volume 
In practice, technical analysts assert that it is vital to use volume signals to confirm price movements (Osler 
and Chang, 1995). Volume can be measured by a Volume Oscillator 7  indicator that calculates the 
difference between a fast 28 day moving average of volume and a slow 14 day moving average of volume, 
and the result is then plotted as a histogram. The histogram fluctuates above and below a zero line, with 
positive values above the zero line indicating high volume and market conviction. 
                                                          
6 6 Source: www.investopedia.com 
 
7 Source: www.metastock.com 
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Consequently, a Volume Oscillator indicator was applied to the traded market and built into the 
EasyLanguage trading code to act as a volume confirmation filter and ensure that trades are only entered 
into when the Volume Oscillator value is greater than zero. This is an indication of high volume which 
suggests that there is enough market support to drive the asset price in the direction of the trend. 
 
 Qualitative Charting 
Finally, each individual trade identified by the intermarket strategy was analyzed from a qualitative 
charting perspective in order to filter out those trades not supported by a chart pattern or a trendline 
breakout. As posited by Neely (1997), subjective qualitative chart patterns are non-linear and thus difficult 
to quantify, but excluding chart analysis would not only sacrifice the information that a skilled chartist 
might discern from the data, but also the ability to determine the return generating potential of this form 
of technical analysis. Additionally, as confirmed by Menkhoff and Taylor (2007), in practice technical 
analysts rely on a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods to generate their trading signals. 
 
 Ex Ante Study 
The Intermarket Momentum strategies were therefore developed utilizing technical analysis momentum 
trading rules and inter-market relationships formulated and identified on data prior to the time period in 
this study over which they were tested, and therefore represented information that was well known and 
readily available to traders during the test period. 
The ex ante nature of this study is in contrast to most technical analysis studies that test trading rules ex 
post on prior historical data. 
This ex ante study therefore more closely follows Brown (2011: 87), who posited that in order to establish 
a violation of the EMH it is necessary to “show the profitability of a trading strategy based on information 
available at the time the trades are made.” 
 
 Strategy Automation 
For each respective Intermarket Momentum trading strategy, EasyLanguage was utilized to develop a 
trading strategy code that would build in and automate the trade entry rules, intermarket and volume 
confirmation trade entry filters, and the trade exit rules. 
The trading strategy codes were then inserted into their respective TradeStation workspaces whereupon 
they automatically execute on the workspace data. 
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 Strategy Performance Testing 
TradeStation generates accurate trade lists and strategy performance reports by allowing the user to input 
realistic market related trade strategy properties into the trading strategy code. 
The following trade strategy properties were built into each trading strategy code: 
 
4.5.1.1 Broker Commission: 
The actual broker commissions charged per trade by TradeStation to place and execute buy and sell 
Futures orders were built into the trading strategy codes: 
Australian Dollar (AD):   $ 1.60 per contract 
Canadian Dollar (CD):   $ 1.60 per contract 
South African Rand (RA):  $ 1.60 per contract 
Norwegian Krone (NOK):  $ 1.60 per contract 
Commodity Index (GI):   $ 1.35 per contract 
Gold (GC):    $ 1.45 per contract 
Silver (SI):    $ 1.45 per contract 
Platinum (PL):    $ 1.45 per contract 
Crude Oil (CL):    $ 1.45 per contract 
30 Year US Treasury Bond (US):   $ 1.60 per contract 
 
4.5.1.2 Slippage: 
Slippage refers to the difference in price between the time an order is placed and when it is actually 
executed due to the time lag experienced before another trader takes the other side of a buy or sell trade, 
thereby effectively filling the order. Positive slippage occurs when the final execution price is better than 
the requested price, but in most cases, slippage is negative and results in disadvantageous prices. It is 
therefore built in as a cost per trade and following Ruggiero (1997), slippage of $ 50.00 per trade is a 
realistic estimate of slippage costs over an extended trading period. 
 
4.5.1.3 Trade Size: 
Approximately 10% of the portfolio capital was invested in each individual trade which translated into an 
initial trade size of $ 100 000.00 per trade or the equivalent number of Futures contracts. 
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4.5.1.4 Interest Rate: 
Interest Rate refers to the interest earned on trading capital while not actively in a trade. In the light of 
the historically low 0 – 0.25% Federal Reserve Funds Rate since the 2008 Financial Crisis, TradeStation not 
surprisingly offers a credit interest rate of 0.0% on incremental trading capital balances over $ 10 000.00. 
Therefore, a 0% interest rate was built into the trading strategy codes. 
 
 Portfolio Construction 
A naïve investment portfolio comprising ten Intermarket Momentum strategies was constructed with an 
initial capital of $ 1 million. In order to adhere with prudent investment portfolio risk management 
guidelines, approximately 10% of the portfolio capital was invested in each individual trade which 
translated into an initial trade size of $ 100 000.00 per trade. 
The traditional CAPM model was used to calculate the risk-adjusted return on the Intermarket Momentum 
portfolio and test the Null Hypothesis that the portfolio of Intermarket strategies cannot generate returns 
in excess of the market, thereby implying that the developed country capital markets are Weak-Form 
efficient. 
 
 Summary 
Following the research objective of this study, Intermarket relationships, the Momentum indicator 
trading rules, high frequency intra-day data, qualitative charting and volume signals were utilized to 
develop a portfolio of ten Intermarket Momentum trading strategies. 
The Momentum indicator trading rules and Intermarket relationships utilized in the development of the 
trading strategies were formulated and identified on data prior to the time period in this study over which 
the strategies were tested, and therefore represented information that was well known and readily 
available to traders during the test period. 
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5 DATA 
 
 Data Collection 
TradeStation provides an extensive historical database of up to 60 years of clean and accurate daily, 
intraday and tick data for Indices, Stocks, Options, Futures and Forex as outlined in Table 5-1. 
The availability of years and even decades of accurate historical data enables the back-testing of trading 
strategies across bull and bear market cycles. This is a valuable characteristic of the TradeStation historical 
database since as noted by Ruggiero (1997), in order to construct a robust trading strategy, it is 
recommended that the data set include both a bull and a bear market. 
TradeStation's superior data accuracy8 is maintained by using three filtering mechanisms - as a first layer 
of defense, erroneous data is caught in real-time by automated filtering mechanisms.  As a second layer 
of defense, data is corrected in real-time by the financial exchanges themselves, and as a third layer of 
defense, data is manually maintained in-house by using an expert team of market data professionals. 
 
Table 5-1:   TradeStation Historical Market Data 
 DAILY 
 
INTRADAY 
 
TICK 
 
US Stocks & ETFs 43+ Years 20+ Years 6 Months 
US Stock Options, 
Index Options, & 
Futures Options 
Entire Contract Life  
US Futures 61+ Years 27+ Years 
 
US Indices 40+ Years* 27+ Years 
German Stocks 11+ Years 11+ Years 
Eurex Stocks 12+ Years 12+ Years 
German Indices 12+ Years 12+ Years 
Forex 40+ Years 8+ Years 
Source: www.tradestation.com 
 
                                                          
8 Source: www.tradestation.com 
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 Data Analysis 
 
 Trading the Commodity Currencies 
Intermarket relationships as identified by Ruggiero (1997) were utilized to develop Intermarket 
Momentum trading strategies for the commodity currencies - the currencies of commodity rich countries 
whose economies rely heavily on their commodity exports, such as Australia (Australian Dollar), Canada 
(Canadian Dollar), South Africa (Rand) and Norway (Norwegian Krone). 
 
5.2.1.1 The Trade Strategy Premise 
The US Dollar is the international reserve currency therefore commodities are priced and traded in US 
Dollars worldwide. In periods of dollar weakness, commodity producers will raise prices to compensate 
for the eroded value of their dollar denominated commodity receipts. Conversely, in periods of dollar 
strength commodity prices will fall therefore in general one can expect that the US Dollar will exhibit a 
strong negative correlation with Commodity prices and the price of Gold. 
Ruggiero (1997: 21) illustrates with the aid of graphs the intermarket relationship that clearly shows the 
US Dollar being negatively correlated with Commodities and Gold. 
Consequently, fluctuations in commodity prices will have a direct valuation effect on the commodity 
currencies. A rise in commodity prices will increase demand for the commodity currencies from importing 
nations, resulting in an appreciation of the commodity currencies in the global foreign exchange markets. 
Based on the inverse relationship between the US Dollar and commodities, it therefore follows that a 
depreciation in the US Dollar will result in rising commodity prices and an appreciation of the commodity 
currencies. The converse is also true: an appreciation of the US Dollar will lower commodity prices and 
depreciate the commodity currencies. 
Ruggiero (1997) also identifies a positive relationship between US Treasury Bonds and foreign currencies 
on the basis of the inverse relationship between bond prices and yields - as US Treasury Bond prices rise, 
bond yields fall with the result that interest rates also decline making US Dollar based assets less attractive 
to investors. The US Dollar therefore declines and foreign currencies gain a competitive edge - this results 
in an expected positive intermarket relationship between 30 year US Treasury Bonds, 10 year US Treasury 
Notes, the Eurodollar (a measure of short-term interest rates), and the commodity currencies. 
The afore-mentioned negative intermarket correlations between the US Dollar (DX) and Commodities 
(GI), Gold (GC), and the commodity currencies Australian Dollar (AD), Canadian Dollar (CD), South African 
Rand (RA) and Norwegian Krone (NOK); and the positive intermarket correlations between the commodity 
currencies and Commodities (GI), Gold (GC) and US Treasury Bonds (US) were confirmed by the correlation 
lab software of CSI Commodity Systems Inc. as detailed over-page in Table 5-2: 
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Table 5-2:   Correlation Coefficients - Commodity Currencies Intermarket Relationships 
NO. OF YEARS BACK MARKET MARKET 
CORRELATION 
COEFFICIENT 
15 Years DX GI -0.89 
15 Years DX GC -0.88 
15 Years DX AD -0.94 
15 Years DX CD -0.93 
5 Years DX RA -0.66 
10 Years DX NOK -0.92 
15 Years GI AD +0.91 
15 Years GI CD +0.95 
2 Years GI RA +0.48 
10 Years GI NOK +0.88 
15 Years GC AD +0.93 
15 Years GC CD +0.92 
2 Years GC RA +0.61 
10 Years GC NOK +0.67 
15 Years US AD +0.72 
15 Years US CD +0.78 
10 Years US NOK +0.44 
Source: CSI Commodity Systems Inc. 
 
 The Australian Dollar Strategy 
Australia is globally one of the largest producers of agricultural, metal and mineral commodities, therefore 
one would expect a strong positive relationship between the Australian Dollar, Commodities and Gold. 
Consequently, following the negative correlation between the US Dollar and Commodities, one would also 
expect a strong negative relationship between the US Dollar and the Australian Dollar. 
As previously detailed, a rise in US Treasury Bond prices will drive down bond yields and interest rates 
thereby making US Dollar based assets less attractive to investors. International capital then flows into 
foreign assets, the US Dollar therefore declines and foreign currencies gain a competitive edge with the 
Australian Dollar being one of the main beneficiaries due to its traditionally strong economy and stable 
political climate. This results in an expected positive inter-market relationship between the Australian 
Dollar and 30 year US Treasury Bonds, 10 year US Treasury Notes, and the Eurodollar (a measure of short-
term interest rates). 
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5.2.2.1 The Trade Data 
The above identified intermarket relationships form the dependent traded market and independent 
intermarket data utilized in the development of an Intermarket Momentum trading strategy for the 
Australian Dollar. 
The trade data are detailed below in Table 5-3: 
 
Table 5-3:   Traded Market and Intermarket Data - Australian Dollar Strategy 
DEPENDENT TRADED MARKET 
 
TRADESTATION 
SYMBOL 
INTRA-DAY 
HISTORICAL DATA 
Australian Dollar Custom Continuous Futures Contract AD As of 05/02/2001 
INDEPENDENT INTER-MARKET 
CURRENCIES 
TRADESTATION 
SYMBOL 
INTRA-DAY 
HISTORICAL DATA 
US Dollar Index Custom Continuous Futures Contract DX As of 09/23/2004 
Canadian Dollar Custom Continuous Futures Contract CD As of 05/02/2001 
South African Rand Custom Continuous Futures Contract RA As of 12/01/2004 
Norwegian Krone Custom Continuous Futures Contract NOK As of 11/10/2003 
INDEPENDENT INTER-MARKET 
COMMODITIES 
TRADESTATION 
SYMBOL 
INTRA-DAY 
HISTORICAL DATA 
S&P GSCI Commodity Index GI As of 08/16/2001 
Gold Custom Continuous Contract GC As of 10/22/2002 
INDEPENDENT INTER-MARKET 
BONDS 
TRADESTATION 
SYMBOL 
INTRA-DAY 
HISTORICAL DATA 
30 Yr. US Treasury Bond Custom Continuous Futures Contract US As of 10/25/2002 
10 Yr. US Treasury Note Custom Continuous Futures Contract TY As of 09/30/2002 
Eurodollar Custom Continuous Futures Contract ED As of 09/27/1994 
Source: The Author, 2013 
 
5.2.2.2 The Data Sample Period 
Test set: Intra-day 240-minute data from May 2, 2001 – December 31, 2012 
Live set: Intra-day 240-minute data from January 1, 2013 – present 
 
5.2.2.3 The Trade Entry Rules 
Breakout and price trend movements in the dependent traded market were identified by the standard 
Momentum (MOM) Indicator trading rule whereby a buy (sell) signal is triggered when the MOM crosses 
the zero line from below (above). Therefore, the following long and short MOM based trade entry rules 
were developed for the Australian Dollar (AD): 
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Buy:  AD MOM(t-1) < 0 and AD MOM(t) > 0 
If the Australian Dollar Momentum crosses over the zero line from below, initiate a long position (buy) 
the dependent traded market Australian Dollar. 
Sell: AD MOM(t-1) > 0 and AD MOM(t) < 0 
If the Australian Dollar Momentum crosses under the zero line from above, initiate a short position (sell 
short) the dependent traded market Australian Dollar. 
 
5.2.2.4 Entry Rule Filters 
Australian Dollar intermarket correlations, volume confirmation and qualitative charting analysis were 
used to build trade entry rule filters to ensure that trades will only be entered into during those periods 
where Australian Dollar price movement is supported by price trends in the independent intermarkets, 
high volume in the Australian Dollar market and a supporting chart pattern or trendline breakout. 
Intermarket Correlations: 
Table 5-4:   Intermarket Correlation Coefficients – Australian Dollar (AD) 
 AD DX CD RA NOK GI GC US TY ED 
AD 1.00          
DX -0.94 1.00         
CD +0.96* -0.93 1.00        
RA +0.33 -0.66 +0.46 1.00       
NOK +0.84 -0.92 +0.88 +0.42 1.00      
GI +0.91 -0.89 +0.95* +0.48 +0.88 1.00     
GC +0.93 -0.88 +0.92 +0.61 +0.67 +0.92 1.00    
US +0.72 -0.76 +0.78 -0.19 +0.44 +0.82 +0.91 1.00   
TY +0.74 -0.70 +0.70 -0.13 +0.39 +0.75 +0.86 +0.96* 1.00  
ED +0.58 -0.50 +0.51 +0.14 +0.52 +0.55 +0.71 +0.78 +0.89 1.00 
Source: CSI Commodity Systems Inc. 
 
As illustrated above in Table 5-4, the intermarket correlations between the Australian Dollar (AD) and the 
US Dollar Index (DX), the Commodity Currencies (CD, RA and NOK), Commodities (GI), Gold (GC), and US 
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Treasury Bonds (US, TY and ED) were utilized to build trade entry rule filters as follows: an Australian 
Dollar long position was only initiated if it was supported by rising price momentum (MOM > 0) in the 
positively correlated independent intermarkets: 
Commodity Currencies 
 Canadian Dollar (CD) - Correlation Coefficient +0.96 
 South African Rand (RA) - Correlation Coefficient +0.33 
 Norwegian Krone (NOK) - Correlation Coefficient +0.84 
Commodities 
 S&P GSCI Commodity Index (GI) - Correlation Coefficient +0.91 
 Gold (GC) - Correlation Coefficient +0.93 
US Treasury Bonds 
 30 Yr. US Treasury Bond (US) - Correlation Coefficient +0.72 
 10 Yr. US Treasury Note (TY) – Correlation Coefficient +0.74 
 Eurodollar (ED) - Correlation Coefficient +0.58 
and falling price momentum (MOM < 0) in the negatively correlated independent intermarkets: 
US Dollar Index (DX) - Correlation Coefficient -0.94 
Conversely, an Australian Dollar short position was only initiated if it was supported by falling price 
momentum (MOM < 0) in the positively correlated independent intermarkets and rising price momentum 
(MOM > 0) in the negatively correlated independent intermarkets. 
Volume: 
A volume confirmation filter was utilized to ensure that Australian Dollar long and short positions were 
only initiated when there was high volume in the Australian Dollar market (AD Volume Oscillator > 0) 
which suggests that there is enough market support to continue driving the Australian Dollar price in the 
direction of the momentum trend. 
Qualitative Charting: 
Each individual Australian Dollar trade identified by the intermarket strategy was analyzed from a 
qualitative charting perspective in order to filter out those trades not supported by a chart pattern or a 
trendline breakout. 
Therefore, 
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Only initiate an Australian Dollar (AD) long position if: 
The US Dollar Index (DX) MOM < 0 
The South African Rand (RA) MOM > 0 
The Canadian Dollar (CD) MOM > 0 
The Norwegian Krone (NOK) MOM > 0 
The Commodity Index (GI) MOM > 0 
Gold (GC) MOM > 0 
The 30 year US Treasury Bond (US) MOM > 0 
The 10 year US Treasury Note (TY) MOM > 0 
The Eurodollar (ED) MOM > 0 
The Australian Dollar Volume Oscillator (Volume Osc) > 0 and 
Finally, each individual long trade identified by the intermarket strategy was analyzed from a qualitative 
charting perspective in order to filter out those trades not supported by a chart pattern or a trendline 
breakout. 
Only initiate an Australian Dollar (AD) short position if: 
The US Dollar Index (DX) MOM > 0  
The South African Rand (RA) MOM < 0 
The Canadian Dollar (CD) MOM < 0 
The Norwegian Krone (NOK) MOM < 0 
The Commodity Index (GI) MOM < 0 
Gold (GC) MOM < 0 
The 30 year US Treasury Bond (US) MOM < 0 
The 10 year US Treasury Note (TY) MOM < 0 
The Eurodollar (ED) MOM < 0 
The Australian Dollar Volume Oscillator (Volume Osc) > 0 and 
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Finally, each individual short trade identified by the intermarket strategy was analyzed from a qualitative 
charting perspective in order to filter out those trades not supported by a chart pattern or a trendline 
breakout. 
 
5.2.2.5 Trade Exit Rules 
The Australian Dollar Momentum Indicator was used to signal trend reversals and the necessity to exit 
the trade position. 
In a long Australian Dollar (AD) position: 
If the Australian Dollar (AD) MOM crosses below the zero line, sell to close out the position. 
 
In a short Australian Dollar (AD) position: 
If the Australian Dollar (AD) MOM crosses above the zero line, buy to cover and close out the position. 
 
5.2.2.6 Setting Up the Australian Dollar Strategy TradeStation Workspace 
Intra-day 240-minute data charts of the Australian Dollar (AD), South African Rand (RA), the Canadian 
Dollar (CD), the Norwegian Krone (NOK), the Commodity Index (GI), the US Dollar Index (DX), Gold (GC), 
the 30 year US Treasury Bond (US), the 10 year US Treasury Note (TY), and the Eurodollar (ED) for the 
period May 2, 2001 – Present were inserted into a TradeStation workspace. 
An Australian Dollar Volume Oscillator (Volume Osc) was applied in a sub-graph below the main chart, as 
illustrated by a snapshot of the TradeStation Workspace in Figure 5-1 overpage: 
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Figure 5-1:   Australian Dollar Strategy - TradeStation Workspace 
 
Source: TradeStation, 2013 
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 The Canadian Dollar Strategy 
Canada has vast resources of oil, natural gas and timber, therefore the Canadian Dollar is highly sensitive 
to commodity prices and experiences the same inter-market relationships as its commodity currency 
partner, the Australian Dollar. 
 
5.2.3.1 The Trade Data 
The intermarket relationships identified for the Australian Dollar also form the dependent traded market 
and independent inter-market data utilized in the development of an Intermarket Momentum trading 
strategy for the Canadian Dollar. 
The trade data are detailed below in Table 5-5: 
Table 5-5:   Traded Market and Intermarket Data - Canadian Dollar Strategy 
DEPENDENT TRADED MARKET 
 
TRADESTATION 
SYMBOL 
INTRA-DAY 
HISTORICAL DATA 
Canadian Dollar Custom Continuous Futures Contract CD As of 05/02/2001 
INDEPENDENT INTER-MARKET 
CURRENCIES 
TRADESTATION 
SYMBOL 
INTRA-DAY 
HISTORICAL DATA 
US Dollar Index Custom Continuous Futures Contract DX As of 09/23/2004 
Australian Dollar Custom Continuous Futures Contract AD As of 05/02/2001 
South African Rand Custom Continuous Futures Contract RA As of 12/01/2004 
Norwegian Krone Custom Continuous Futures Contract NOK As of 11/10/2003 
INDEPENDENT INTER-MARKET 
COMMODITIES 
TRADESTATION 
SYMBOL 
INTRA-DAY 
HISTORICAL DATA 
S&P GSCI Commodity Index GI As of 08/16/2001 
Gold Custom Continuous Contract GC As of 10/22/2002 
INDEPENDENT INTER-MARKET 
BONDS 
TRADESTATION 
SYMBOL 
INTRA-DAY 
HISTORICAL DATA 
30 Yr. US Treasury Bond Custom Continuous Futures Contract US As of 10/25/2002 
10 Yr. US Treasury Note Custom Continuous Futures Contract TY As of 09/30/2002 
Eurodollar Custom Continuous Futures Contract ED As of 09/27/1994 
Source: The Author, 2013 
 
5.2.3.2 The Data Sample Period 
Test set: Intra-day 240-minute data from May 2, 2001 – December 31, 2012 
Live set: Intra-day 240-minute data from January 1, 2013 – present 
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5.2.3.3 The Trade Entry Rules 
Breakout and price trend movements in the dependent traded market were identified by the standard 
Momentum (MOM) Indicator trading rule, resulting in the following long and short MOM based trade 
entry rules for the Canadian Dollar (CD): 
Buy:  CD MOM(t-1) < 0 and CD MOM(t) > 0 
If the Canadian Dollar Momentum crosses over the zero line from below, initiate a long position (buy) the 
dependent traded market Canadian Dollar. 
Sell: CD MOM(t-1) > 0 and CD MOM(t) < 0 
If the Canadian Dollar Momentum crosses under the zero line from above, initiate a short position (sell 
short) the dependent traded market Canadian Dollar. 
 
5.2.3.4 Entry Rule Filters 
Canadian Dollar intermarket correlations, volume confirmation and qualitative charting analysis were 
used to build trade entry rule filters to ensure that trades will only be entered into during those periods 
where Canadian Dollar price movement is supported by price trends in the independent intermarkets, 
high volume in the Canadian Dollar market and a supporting chart pattern or trendline breakout. 
Intermarket Correlations: 
Table 5-6:   Intermarket Correlation Coefficients – Canadian Dollar (CD) 
 CD DX AD RA NOK GI GC US TY ED 
CD 1.00          
DX -0.93 1.00         
AD +0.96* -0.93 1.00        
RA +0.46 -0.66 +0.33 1.00       
NOK +0.88 -0.92 +0.84 +0.42 1.00      
GI +0.95* -0.89 +0.91 +0.48 +0.88 1.00     
GC +0.92 -0.88 +0.93 +0.61 +0.67 +0.92 1.00    
US +0.78 -0.76 +0.72 -0.19 +0.44 +0.82 +0.91 1.00   
TY +0.70 -0.70 +0.74 -0.13 +0.39 +0.75 +0.86 +0.96* 1.00  
ED +0.51 -0.50 +0.58 +0.14 +0.52 +0.55 +0.71 +0.78 +0.89 1.00 
Source: CSI Commodity Systems Inc. 
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As illustrated in Table 5-6, the intermarket correlations between the Canadian Dollar (CD) and the US 
Dollar Index (DX), the Commodity Currencies (AD, RA and NOK), Commodities (GI), Gold (GC), and US 
Treasury Bonds (US, TY and ED) were utilized to build trade entry rule filters whereby a Canadian Dollar 
long position was only initiated if it was supported by rising price momentum (MOM > 0) in the positively 
correlated independent intermarkets and falling price momentum (MOM < 0) in the negatively correlated 
independent intermarkets. Conversely, a Canadian Dollar short position was only initiated if it was 
supported by falling price momentum (MOM < 0) in the positively correlated independent intermarkets 
and rising price momentum (MOM > 0) in the negatively correlated independent intermarkets. 
Volume: 
A volume confirmation filter was utilized to ensure that Canadian Dollar long and short positions were 
only initiated when there was high volume in the Canadian Dollar market (CD Volume Oscillator > 0) which 
suggests that there is enough market support to continue driving the Canadian Dollar price in the direction 
of the momentum trend. 
Qualitative Charting: 
Each individual Canadian Dollar trade identified by the intermarket strategy was analyzed from a 
qualitative charting perspective in order to filter out those trades not supported by a chart pattern or a 
trendline breakout. 
Therefore, 
Only initiate a Canadian Dollar (CD) long position if: 
The US Dollar Index (DX) MOM < 0  
The Australian Dollar (AD) MOM > 0 
The South African Rand (RA) MOM > 0 
The Norwegian Krone (NOK) MOM > 0 
The Commodity Index (GI) MOM > 0 
Gold (GC) MOM > 0 
The 30 year US Treasury Bond (US) MOM > 0 
The 10 year US Treasury Note (TY) MOM > 0 
The Eurodollar (ED) MOM > 0 
The Canadian Dollar Volume Oscillator (Volume Osc) > 0 and 
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Finally, each individual long trade identified by the intermarket strategy was analyzed from a qualitative 
charting perspective in order to filter out those trades not supported by a chart pattern or a trendline 
breakout. 
Only initiate a Canadian Dollar (CD) short position if: 
The US Dollar Index (DX) MOM > 0  
The Australian Dollar (AD) MOM < 0 
The South African Rand (RA) MOM < 0 
The Norwegian Krone (NOK) MOM < 0 
The Commodity Index (GI) MOM < 0 
Gold (GC) MOM < 0 
The 30 year US Treasury Bond (US) MOM < 0 
The 10 year US Treasury Note (TY) MOM < 0 
The Eurodollar (ED) MOM < 0 
The Canadian Dollar Volume Oscillator (Volume Osc) > 0 and 
Finally, each individual short trade identified by the inter-market strategy was analyzed from a qualitative 
charting perspective in order to filter out those trades not supported by a chart pattern or a trendline 
breakout. 
 
5.2.3.5 Trade Exit Rules 
The Canadian Dollar Momentum Indicator was used to signal trend reversals and the necessity to exit the 
trade position. 
In a long Canadian Dollar (CD) position: 
If the Canadian Dollar (CD) MOM crosses below the zero line, sell to close out the position. 
In a short Canadian Dollar (CD) position: 
If the Canadian Dollar (CD) MOM crosses above the zero line, buy to cover and close out the position. 
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5.2.3.6 Setting Up the Canadian Dollar Strategy TradeStation Workspace 
Intra-day 240-minute data charts of the Canadian Dollar (CD), the Australian Dollar (AD), South African 
Rand (RA), the Norwegian Krone (NOK), the Commodity Index (GI), the US Dollar Index (DX), Gold (GC), 
the 30 year US Treasury Bond (US), the 10 year US Treasury Note (TY), and the Eurodollar (ED) for the 
period May 2, 2001 – Present were inserted into a TradeStation workspace. 
A Canadian Dollar Volume Oscillator (Volume Osc) was applied in a sub-graph below the main chart, as 
illustrated by a snapshot of the TradeStation Workspace in Figure 5-2 below: 
 
Figure 5-2:   Canadian Dollar Strategy - TradeStation Workspace 
 
Source: TradeStation, 2013 
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 The South African Rand Strategy 
South Africa is blessed with vast resources of mineral commodities. Although gold production has declined 
in the past two decades, South Africa is still the world’s largest producer of gold behind China, accounts 
for 77% of the world’s supply of platinum, is the third largest producer of coal, and is a significant player 
in the diamond, iron ore and chromium industries9. Not surprisingly therefore, the South African Rand is 
closely linked to commodity prices and experiences the same intermarket relationships as the other 
commodity currencies. 
 
5.2.4.1 The Trade Data 
The commodity currency inter-market relationships also form the dependent traded market and 
independent inter-market data utilized in the development of an Intermarket Momentum trading strategy 
for the South African Rand. 
The trade data are detailed below in Table 5-7: 
Table 5-7:   Traded Market and Intermarket Data - South African Rand Strategy 
DEPENDENT TRADED MARKET 
 
TRADESTATION 
SYMBOL 
INTRA-DAY 
HISTORICAL DATA 
South African Rand Custom Continuous Futures Contract RA As of 12/01/2004 
INDEPENDENT INTER-MARKET 
CURRENCIES 
TRADESTATION 
SYMBOL 
INTRA-DAY 
HISTORICAL DATA 
US Dollar Index Custom Continuous Futures Contract DX As of 09/23/2004 
Australian Dollar Custom Continuous Futures Contract AD As of 05/02/2001 
Canadian Dollar Custom Continuous Futures Contract CD As of 05/02/2001 
Norwegian Krone Custom Continuous Futures Contract NOK As of 11/10/2003 
INDEPENDENT INTER-MARKET 
COMMODITIES 
TRADESTATION 
SYMBOL 
INTRA-DAY 
HISTORICAL DATA 
S&P GSCI Commodity Index GI As of 08/16/2001 
Gold Custom Continuous Contract GC As of 10/22/2002 
INDEPENDENT INTER-MARKET 
BONDS 
TRADESTATION 
SYMBOL 
INTRA-DAY 
HISTORICAL DATA 
30 Yr. US Treasury Bond Custom Continuous Futures Contract US As of 10/25/2002 
10 Yr. US Treasury Note Custom Continuous Futures Contract TY As of 09/30/2002 
Eurodollar Custom Continuous Futures Contract ED As of 09/27/1994 
Source: The Author, 2013 
5.2.4.2 The Data Sample Period 
Test set: Intra-day 240-minute data from December 1, 2004 – December 31, 2012 
Live set: Intra-day 240-minute data from January 1, 2013 – present 
                                                          
9 Source: CommodityHQ.com 
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5.2.4.3 The Trade Entry Rules 
Breakout and price trend movements in the dependent traded market were identified by the standard 
Momentum (MOM) Indicator trading rule, resulting in the following long and short MOM based trade 
entry rules for the South African Rand (RA): 
Buy:  RA MOM(t-1) < 0 and RA MOM(t) > 0 
If the South African Rand Momentum crosses over the zero line from below, initiate a long position (buy) 
the dependent traded market South African Rand. 
Sell: RA MOM(t-1) > 0 and RA MOM(t) < 0 
If the South African Rand Momentum crosses under the zero line from above, initiate a short position (sell 
short) the dependent traded market South African Rand. 
 
5.2.4.4 Entry Rule Filters 
South African Rand intermarket correlations, volume confirmation and qualitative charting analysis were 
used to build trade entry rule filters to ensure that trades will only be entered into during those periods 
where South African Rand price movement is supported by price trends in the independent intermarkets, 
high volume in the South African Rand market and a supporting chart pattern or trendline breakout. 
Intermarket Correlations: 
Table 5-8:   Intermarket Correlation Coefficients – South African Rand (RA) 
 RA DX AD CD NOK GI GC US TY ED 
RA 1.00          
DX -0.66 1.00         
AD +0.33 -0.94 1.00        
CD +0.46 -0.93 +0.96* 1.00       
NOK +0.42 -0.92 +0.84 +0.88 1.00      
GI +0.48 -0.89 +0.91 +0.95* +0.88 1.00     
GC +0.61 -0.88 +0.93 +0.92 +0.67 +0.92 1.00    
US -0.19 -0.76 +0.72 +0.78 +0.44 +0.82 +0.91 1.00   
TY -0.13 -0.70 +0.74 +0.70 +0.39 +0.75 +0.86 +0.96* 1.00  
ED +0.14 -0.50 +0.58 +0.51 +0.52 +0.55 +0.71 +0.78 +0.89 1.00 
Source: CSI Commodity Systems Inc. 
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As illustrated in Table 5-8, the intermarket correlations between the South African Rand (RA) and the US 
Dollar Index (DX), the Commodity Currencies (AD, CD and NOK), Commodities (GI), Gold (GC), and US 
Treasury Bonds (US, TY and ED) were utilized to build trade entry rule filters whereby a South African Rand 
long position was only initiated if it was supported by rising price momentum (MOM > 0) in the positively 
correlated independent intermarkets and falling price momentum (MOM < 0) in the negatively correlated 
independent intermarkets. Conversely, a South African Rand short position was only initiated if it was 
supported by falling price momentum (MOM < 0) in the positively correlated independent intermarkets 
and rising price momentum (MOM > 0) in the negatively correlated independent intermarkets.10 
Volume: 
A volume confirmation filter was utilized to ensure that South African Rand long and short positions were 
only initiated when there was high volume in the South African Rand market (RA Volume Oscillator > 0) 
which suggests that there is enough market support to continue driving the South African Rand price in 
the direction of the momentum trend. 
Qualitative Charting: 
Each individual South African Rand trade identified by the intermarket strategy was analyzed from a 
qualitative charting perspective in order to filter out those trades not supported by a chart pattern or a 
trendline breakout. 
Therefore, 
Only initiate a South African Rand (RA) long position if: 
The US Dollar Index (DX) MOM < 0  
The Australian Dollar (AD) MOM > 0 
The Canadian Dollar (CD) MOM > 0 
The Norwegian Krone (NOK) MOM > 0 
The Commodity Index (GI) MOM > 0 
Gold (GC) MOM > 0 
The 30 year US Treasury Bond (US) MOM > 0 
The 10 year US Treasury Note (TY) MOM > 0 
                                                          
10 Unlike its commodity currency partners, surprisingly the South African Rand exhibited a weak correlation to US Treasury Bonds. However, for 
the purpose of this study, a positive RA / US Treasury Bond correlation will be utilized as a trade entry filter due to the positive correlation 
between RA and its commodity currency partners and their correspondingly strong positive correlation to US Treasury Bonds. 
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The Eurodollar (ED) MOM > 0 
The South African Rand Volume Oscillator (Volume Osc) > 0 and 
Finally, each individual long trade identified by the intermarket strategy was analyzed from a qualitative 
charting perspective in order to filter out those trades not supported by a chart pattern or a trendline 
breakout. 
Only initiate a South African Rand (RA) short position if: 
The US Dollar Index (DX) MOM > 0  
The Australian Dollar (AD) MOM < 0 
The Canadian Dollar (CD) MOM < 0 
The Norwegian Krone (NOK) MOM < 0 
The Commodity Index (GI) MOM < 0 
Gold (GC) MOM < 0 
The 30 year US Treasury Bond (US) MOM < 0 
The 10 year US Treasury Note (TY) MOM < 0 
The Eurodollar (ED) MOM < 0 
The South African Rand Volume Oscillator (Volume Osc) > 0 and 
Finally, each individual short trade identified by the intermarket strategy was analyzed from a qualitative 
charting perspective in order to filter out those trades not supported by a chart pattern or a trendline 
breakout. 
 
5.2.4.5 Trade Exit Rules 
The South African Rand Momentum Indicator was used to signal trend reversals and the necessity to exit 
the trade position. 
In a long South African Rand (RA) position: 
If the South African Rand (RA) MOM crosses below the zero line, sell to close out the position. 
In a short South African Rand (RA) position: 
If the South African Rand (RA) MOM crosses above the zero line, buy to cover and close out the position. 
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5.2.4.6 Setting Up the South African Rand Strategy TradeStation Workspace 
Intra-day 240-minute data charts of the South African Rand (RA), Australian Dollar (AD), Canadian Dollar 
(CD), the Norwegian Krone (NOK), the Commodity Index (GI), the US Dollar Index (DX), Gold (GC), the 30 
year US Treasury Bond (US), the 10 year US Treasury Note (TY), and the Eurodollar (ED) for the period 
December 1, 2004 – Present were inserted into a TradeStation workspace. 
A South African Rand Volume Oscillator (Volume Osc) was applied in a sub-graph below the main chart, 
as illustrated by a snapshot of the TradeStation Workspace in Figure 5-3 below: 
 
Figure 5-3:   South African Rand Strategy - TradeStation Workspace 
 
Source: TradeStation, 2013 
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 The Norwegian Krone Strategy 
Norway has an abundance of natural resources with offshore oil exploration and production playing a 
major role. Since the discovery of oil and gas reserves in the 1960s, Norway has developed into the world’s 
third largest oil exporter elevating its currency, the Norwegian Krone, into the realm of the commodity 
currencies11. 
 
5.2.5.1 The Trade Data 
The commodity currency inter-market relationships form the dependent traded market and independent 
inter-market data utilized in the development of an Intermarket Momentum trading strategy for the 
Norwegian Krone. 
The trade data are detailed below in Table 5-9: 
Table 5-9:   Traded Market and Intermarket Data - Norwegian Krone Strategy 
DEPENDENT TRADED MARKET 
 
TRADESTATION 
SYMBOL 
INTRA-DAY 
HISTORICAL DATA 
Norwegian Krone Custom Continuous Futures Contract NOK As of 11/10/2003 
INDEPENDENT INTER-MARKET 
CURRENCIES 
TRADESTATION 
SYMBOL 
INTRA-DAY 
HISTORICAL DATA 
US Dollar Index Custom Continuous Futures Contract DX As of 09/23/2004 
Australian Dollar Custom Continuous Futures Contract AD As of 05/02/2001 
Canadian Dollar Custom Continuous Futures Contract CD As of 05/02/2001 
South African Rand Custom Continuous Futures Contract RA As of 12/01/2004 
INDEPENDENT INTER-MARKET 
COMMODITIES 
TRADESTATION 
SYMBOL 
INTRA-DAY 
HISTORICAL DATA 
S&P GSCI Commodity Index GI As of 08/16/2001 
Gold Custom Continuous Contract GC As of 10/22/2002 
INDEPENDENT INTER-MARKET 
BONDS 
TRADESTATION 
SYMBOL 
INTRA-DAY 
HISTORICAL DATA 
30 Yr. US Treasury Bond Custom Continuous Futures Contract US As of 10/25/2002 
10 Yr. US Treasury Note Custom Continuous Futures Contract TY As of 09/30/2002 
Eurodollar Custom Continuous Futures Contract ED As of 09/27/1994 
Source: The Author, 2013 
5.2.5.2 The Data Sample Period 
Test set: Intra-day 240-minute data from November 10, 2003 – December 31, 2012 
Live set: Intra-day 240-minute data from January 1, 2013 – present 
                                                          
11 Source: www.norway.org 
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5.2.5.3 The Trade Entry Rules 
Breakout and price trend movements in the dependent traded market were identified by the standard 
Momentum (MOM) Indicator trading rule, resulting in the following long and short MOM based trade 
entry rules for the Norwegian Krone (NOK): 
Buy:  NOK MOM(t-1) < 0 and NOK MOM(t) > 0 
If the Norwegian Krone Momentum crosses over the zero line from below, initiate a long position (buy) 
the dependent traded market Norwegian Krone. 
Sell: NOK MOM(t-1) > 0 and NOK MOM(t) < 0 
If the Norwegian Krone Momentum crosses under the zero line from above, initiate a short position (sell 
short) the dependent traded market Norwegian Krone. 
 
5.2.5.4 Entry Rule Filters 
Norwegian Krone intermarket correlations, volume confirmation and qualitative charting analysis were 
used to build trade entry rule filters to ensure that trades will only be entered into during those periods 
where Norwegian Krone price movement is supported by price trends in the independent intermarkets, 
high volume in the Norwegian Krone market and a supporting chart pattern or trendline breakout. 
Intermarket Correlations: 
Table 5-10:   Intermarket Correlation Coefficients – Norwegian Krone (NOK) 
 NOK DX AD CD RA GI GC US TY ED 
NOK 1.00          
DX -0.92 1.00         
AD +0.84 -0.94 1.00        
CD +0.88 -0.93 +0.96* 1.00       
RA +0.42 -0.66 +0.33 +0.46 1.00      
GI +0.88 -0.89 +0.91 +0.95* +0.48 1.00     
GC +0.67 -0.88 +0.93 +0.92 +0.61 +0.92 1.00    
US +0.44 -0.76 +0.72 +0.78 -0.19 +0.82 +0.91 1.00   
TY +0.39 -0.70 +0.74 +0.70 -0.13 +0.75 +0.86 +0.96* 1.00  
ED +0.52 -0.50 +0.58 +0.51 +0.14 +0.55 +0.71 +0.78 +0.89 1.00 
Source: CSI Commodity Systems Inc. 
Evidence that Weak-Form Capital Market Efficiency Does Not Hold 2015 
 
Page | 72  
 
As illustrated in Table 5-10, the intermarket correlations between the Norwegian Krone (NOK) and the US 
Dollar Index (DX), the Commodity Currencies (AD, CD and RA), Commodities (GI), Gold (GC), and US 
Treasury Bonds (US, TY and ED) were utilized to build trade entry rule filters whereby a Norwegian Krone 
long position was only initiated if it was supported by rising price momentum (MOM > 0) in the positively 
correlated independent intermarkets and falling price momentum (MOM < 0) in the negatively correlated 
independent intermarkets. Conversely, a Norwegian Krone short position was only initiated if it was 
supported by falling price momentum (MOM < 0) in the positively correlated independent intermarkets 
and rising price momentum (MOM > 0) in the negatively correlated independent intermarkets. 
Volume: 
A volume confirmation filter was utilized to ensure that Norwegian Krone long and short positions were 
only initiated when there was high volume in the Norwegian Krone market (NOK Volume Oscillator > 0) 
which suggests that there is enough market support to continue driving the Norwegian Krone price in the 
direction of the momentum trend. 
Qualitative Charting: 
Each individual Norwegian Krone trade identified by the intermarket strategy was analyzed from a 
qualitative charting perspective in order to filter out those trades not supported by a chart pattern or a 
trendline breakout. 
Therefore, 
Only initiate a Norwegian Krone (NOK) long position if: 
The US Dollar Index (DX) MOM < 0  
The Australian Dollar (AD) MOM > 0 
The Canadian Dollar (CD) MOM > 0 
The South African Rand (RA) MOM > 0 
The Commodity Index (GI) MOM > 0 
Gold (GC) MOM > 0 
The 30 year US Treasury Bond (US) MOM > 0 
The 10 year US Treasury Note (TY) MOM > 0 
The Eurodollar (ED) MOM > 0 
The Norwegian Krone Volume Oscillator (Volume Osc) > 0 and 
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Finally, each individual long trade identified by the intermarket strategy was analyzed from a qualitative 
charting perspective in order to filter out those trades not supported by a chart pattern or a trendline 
breakout. 
Only initiate a Norwegian Krone short position if: 
The US Dollar Index (DX) MOM > 0  
The Australian Dollar (AD) MOM < 0 
The Canadian Dollar (CD) MOM < 0 
The South African Rand (RA) MOM < 0 
The Commodity Index (GI) MOM < 0 
Gold (GC) MOM < 0 
The 30 year US Treasury Bond (US) MOM < 0 
The 10 year US Treasury Note (TY) MOM < 0 
The Eurodollar (ED) MOM < 0 
The Norwegian Krone Volume Oscillator (Volume Osc) > 0 and 
Finally, each individual short trade identified by the intermarket strategy was analyzed from a qualitative 
charting perspective in order to filter out those trades not supported by a chart pattern or a trendline 
breakout. 
 
5.2.5.5 Trade Exit Rules 
The Norwegian Krone Momentum Indicator was used to signal trend reversals and the necessity to exit 
the trade position. 
In a long Norwegian Krone (NOK) position: 
If the Norwegian Krone (NOK) MOM crosses below the zero line, sell to close out the position. 
In a short Norwegian Krone (NOK) position: 
If the Norwegian Krone (NOK) MOM crosses above the zero line, buy to cover and close out the position. 
 
5.2.5.6 Setting Up the Norwegian Krone Strategy TradeStation Workspace 
Intra-day 240-minute data charts of the Norwegian Krone (NOK), Australian Dollar (AD), Canadian Dollar 
(CD), the South African Rand (RA), the Commodity Index (GI), the US Dollar Index (DX), Gold (GC), the 30 
Evidence that Weak-Form Capital Market Efficiency Does Not Hold 2015 
 
Page | 74  
 
year US Treasury Bond (US), the 10 year US Treasury Note (TY), and the Eurodollar (ED) for the period 
November 10, 2003 – Present were inserted into a TradeStation workspace. 
A Norwegian Krone Volume Oscillator (Volume Osc) was applied in a sub-graph below the main chart, as 
illustrated by a snapshot of the TradeStation Workspace in Figure 5-4 below: 
 
Figure 5-4:   Norwegian Krone Strategy - TradeStation Workspace 
 
Source: TradeStation, 2013 
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 The Commodity Index Trading Strategy 
Previously identified Commodity Currency Intermarket relationships were utilized to develop an 
Intermarket Momentum trading strategy for the S&P GSCI Commodity Index (GI) – a world production 
weighted broad based index of commodities. 
 
5.2.6.1 The Trade Strategy Premise 
The most important commodity intermarket is its relationship to the international reserve currency the 
US Dollar, which results in commodities being priced and traded in US Dollars worldwide. In periods of 
dollar weakness, commodity producers will raise prices to compensate for the eroded value of their dollar 
denominated commodity receipts. Conversely, in periods of dollar strength commodity prices will fall 
therefore in general one can expect that the US Dollar will exhibit a strong negative correlation with 
Commodity prices. 
This also results in a strong negative relationship between the US Dollar and the price of Gold (GC), 
therefore it follows that the Commodity Index will be positively correlated to the Gold (GC) price which is 
further reinforced by the fact that Gold is an important component of the Commodity Index. 
Additionally, fluctuations in commodity prices will have a direct valuation effect on the commodity 
currencies. A rise in commodity prices will increase demand for the commodity currencies from importing 
nations, resulting in an appreciation of the commodity currencies in the global foreign exchange markets. 
Consequently, a positive intermarket relationship is expected between the commodity index and the 
commodity currencies. 
Ruggiero (1997) also identifies a positive relationship between US Treasury Bonds and the commodity 
currencies based on the inverse relationship between bond prices and yields and the resulting 
international capital flows. On the basis of the positive intermarket relationship between the commodity 
index and the commodity currencies, it may therefore be deduced that the commodity index will also 
exhibit a positive intermarket relationship to US Treasury Bonds. 
The afore-mentioned negative intermarket correlation between the Commodity Index (GI) and the US 
Dollar (DX), and the positive intermarket correlations between the Commodity Index (GI) and Gold (GC), 
the commodity currencies - Australian Dollar (AD), Canadian Dollar (CD), South African Rand (RA) and 
Norwegian Krone (NOK) – 30 Year US Treasury Bonds (US), 10 Year US Treasury Notes (TY) and the 
Eurodollar (ED) were confirmed by the correlation lab software of CSI Commodity Systems Inc. as detailed 
over-page in Table 5-11: 
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Table 5-11:   Correlation Coefficients - Commodity Index Intermarket Relationships 
NO. OF YEARS BACK MARKET MARKET CORRELATION COEFFICIENT 
15 Years GI DX -0.89 
15 Years GI GC +0.92 
15 Years GI AD +0.91 
15 Years GI CD +0.95 
2 Years GI RA +0.48 
10 Years GI NOK +0.88 
15 Years GI US +0.82 
15 Years GI TY +0.75 
15 Years GI ED +0.55 
Source: CSI Commodity Systems Inc. 
 
5.2.6.2 The Trade Data 
The above identified intermarket relationships form the dependent traded market and independent 
intermarket data utilized in the development of an Intermarket Momentum trading strategy for the 
Commodity Index (GI) as detailed below in Table 5-12: 
 
Table 5-12:   Traded Market and Intermarket Data - Commodity Index Strategy 
DEPENDENT TRADED MARKET 
 
TRADESTATION 
SYMBOL 
INTRA-DAY 
HISTORICAL DATA 
S&P GSCI Commodity Index GI As of 08/16/2001 
INDEPENDENT INTER-MARKET 
CURRENCIES 
TRADESTATION 
SYMBOL 
INTRA-DAY 
HISTORICAL DATA 
US Dollar Index Custom Continuous Futures Contract DX As of 09/23/2004 
Australian Dollar Custom Continuous Futures Contract AD As of 05/02/2001 
Canadian Dollar Custom Continuous Futures Contract CD As of 05/02/2001 
South African Rand Custom Continuous Futures Contract RA As of 12/01/2004 
Norwegian Krone Custom Continuous Futures Contract NOK As of 11/10/2003 
INDEPENDENT INTER-MARKET 
COMMODITIES 
TRADESTATION 
SYMBOL 
INTRA-DAY 
HISTORICAL DATA 
Gold Custom Continuous Contract GC As of 10/22/2002 
INDEPENDENT INTER-MARKET 
BONDS 
TRADESTATION 
SYMBOL 
INTRA-DAY 
HISTORICAL DATA 
30 Yr. US Treasury Bond Custom Continuous Futures Contract US As of 10/25/2002 
10 Yr. US Treasury Note Custom Continuous Futures Contract TY As of 09/30/2002 
Eurodollar Custom Continuous Futures Contract ED As of 09/27/1994 
Source: The Author, 2013 
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5.2.6.3 The Data Sample Period 
Test set: Intra-day 240-minute data from August 16, 2001 – December 31, 2012 
Live set: Intra-day 240-minute data from January 1, 2013 – present 
 
5.2.6.4 The Trade Entry Rules 
Breakout and price trend movements in the dependent traded market were identified by the standard 
Momentum (MOM) Indicator trading rule whereby a buy (sell) signal is triggered when the MOM crosses 
the zero line from below (above). Therefore, the following long and short MOM based trade entry rules 
were developed for the Commodity Index (GI): 
Buy:  GI MOM(t-1) < 0 and GI MOM(t) > 0 
If the Commodity Index Momentum crosses over the zero line from below, initiate a long position (buy) 
the dependent traded market Commodity Index (GI). 
Sell: GI MOM(t-1) > 0 and GI MOM(t) < 0 
If the Commodity Index Momentum crosses under the zero line from above, initiate a short position (sell 
short) the dependent traded market Commodity Index (GI). 
 
5.2.6.5 Entry Rule Filters 
Commodity Index intermarket correlations, volume confirmation and qualitative charting analysis were 
used to build trade entry rule filters to ensure that trades will only be entered into during those periods 
where Commodity Index price movement is supported by price trends in the independent intermarkets, 
high volume in the Commodity Index market and a supporting chart pattern or trendline breakout. 
Intermarket Correlations: 
Table 5-13:   Intermarket Correlation Coefficients – Commodity Index (GI) 
 GI DX AD CD RA NOK GC US TY ED 
GI 1.00          
DX -0.89 1.00         
AD +0.91 -0.94 1.00        
CD +0.95* -0.93 +0.96* 1.00       
RA +0.48 -0.66 +0.33 +0.46 1.00      
NOK +0.88 -0.92 +0.84 +0.88 +0.42 1.00     
GC +0.92 -0.88 +0.93 +0.92 +0.61 +0.67 1.00    
US +0.82 -0.76 +0.72 +0.78 -0.19 +0.44 +0.91 1.00   
TY +0.75 -0.70 +0.74 +0.70 -0.13 +0.39 +0.86 +0.96* 1.00  
ED +0.55 -0.50 +0.58 +0.51 +0.14 +0.52 +0.71 +0.78 +0.89 1.00 
Source: CSI Commodity Systems Inc. 
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As illustrated in Table 5-13, the intermarket correlations between the Commodity Index (GI) and the US 
Dollar Index (DX), the Commodity Currencies (AD, CD, RA and NOK), Gold (GC), and US Treasury Bonds 
(US, TY and ED) were utilized to build trade entry rule filters whereby a Commodity Index long position 
was only initiated if it was supported by rising price momentum (MOM > 0) in the positively correlated 
independent intermarkets and falling price momentum (MOM < 0) in the negatively correlated 
independent intermarkets. Conversely, a Commodity Index short position was only initiated if it was 
supported by falling price momentum (MOM < 0) in the positively correlated independent intermarkets 
and rising price momentum (MOM > 0) in the negatively correlated independent intermarkets. 
Volume: 
A volume confirmation filter was utilized to ensure that Commodity Index long and short positions were 
only initiated when there was high volume in the Commodity Index market (GI Volume Oscillator > 0) 
which suggests that there is enough market support to continue driving the Commodity Index price in the 
direction of the momentum trend. 
Qualitative Charting: 
Each individual Commodity Index trade identified by the intermarket strategy was analyzed from a 
qualitative charting perspective in order to filter out those trades not supported by a chart pattern or a 
trendline breakout. 
Therefore, 
Only initiate a Commodity Index (GI) long position if: 
The US Dollar Index (DX) MOM < 0  
The Australian Dollar (AD) MOM > 0 
The Canadian Dollar (CD) MOM > 0 
The South African Rand (RA) MOM > 0 
The Norwegian Krone (NOK) MOM > 0 
Gold (GC) MOM > 0 
The 30 year US Treasury Bond (US) MOM > 0 
The 10 year US Treasury Note (TY) MOM > 0 
The Eurodollar (ED) MOM > 0 
The Commodity Index (GI) Volume Oscillator (Volume Osc) > 0 and 
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Finally, each individual long trade identified by the intermarket strategy was analyzed from a qualitative 
charting perspective in order to filter out those trades not supported by a chart pattern or a trendline 
breakout. 
Only initiate a Commodity Index (GI) short position if: 
The US Dollar Index (DX) MOM > 0  
The Australian Dollar (AD) MOM < 0 
The Canadian Dollar (CD) MOM < 0 
The South African Rand (RA) MOM < 0 
The Norwegian Krone (NOK) MOM < 0 
Gold (GC) MOM < 0 
The 30 year US Treasury Bond (US) MOM < 0 
The 10 year US Treasury Note (TY) MOM < 0 
The Eurodollar (ED) MOM < 0 
The Commodity Index (GI) Volume Oscillator (Volume Osc) > 0 and 
Finally, each individual short trade identified by the intermarket strategy was analyzed from a qualitative 
charting perspective in order to filter out those trades not supported by a chart pattern or a trendline 
breakout. 
 
5.2.6.6 Trade Exit Rules 
The Commodity Index (GI) Momentum Indicator was used to signal trend reversals and the necessity to 
exit the trade position. 
In a long Commodity Index (GI) position: 
If the Commodity Index (GI) MOM crosses below the zero line, sell to close out the position. 
In a short Commodity Index (GI) position: 
If the Commodity Index (GI) MOM crosses above the zero line, buy to cover and close out the position. 
 
5.2.6.7 Setting Up the Commodity Index Strategy TradeStation Workspace 
Intra-day 240-minute data charts of the Commodity Index (GI), Australian Dollar (AD), Canadian Dollar 
(CD), the South African Rand (RA), Norwegian Krone (NOK), the US Dollar Index (DX), Gold (GC), the 30 
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year US Treasury Bond (US), the 10 year US Treasury Note (TY), and the Eurodollar (ED) for the period 
August 16, 2001 – Present were inserted into a TradeStation workspace. 
A Commodity Index (GI) Volume Oscillator (Volume Osc) was applied in a sub-graph below the main chart, 
as illustrated by a snapshot of the TradeStation Workspace in Figure 5-5 below: 
 
Figure 5-5:   Commodity Index Strategy - TradeStation Workspace 
 
Source: TradeStation, 2013 
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 Trading the Precious Metals 
Intermarket relationships as identified by Ruggiero (1997) were utilized to develop intermarket 
momentum trading strategies for the Precious Metals – Gold (GC), Silver (SI) and Platinum (PL). 
 
5.2.7.1 The Trade Strategy Premise 
Ruggiero (1997: 21) illustrates with the aid of graphs the intermarket relationship that clearly shows the 
Gold price being negatively correlated with the US Dollar due to the previously described international 
reserve currency characteristic of the US Dollar. 
It follows that Gold will also therefore be positively correlated to Commodities. This can also be elucidated 
by the fact that Commodities form the basic inputs that fuel the engine of an economy, therefore a rise 
in commodity prices will generally flow through the production chain and result in increased producer 
and consumer prices. Heightened inflationary expectations increase the demand for the store of value 
inflation hedge characteristic of gold. This chain of events initiated by a rise in Commodity prices results 
in an appreciating gold price reinforcing the positive relationship between the Gold price and 
Commodities. 
It was previously shown how a positive relationship between Commodities and US Treasury Bonds may 
be deduced from the positive correlation between the Commodity Currencies and US Treasury Bonds. 
Therefore, one can further deduce an expected positive correlation between Gold and US Treasury Bonds 
which can also be clarified by the link between rising bond prices and the store of value inflation hedge 
characteristic of Gold. As bond prices rise, bond yields and interest rates fall – in a low interest rate 
environment, companies prosper thus raising future inflation expectations which consequently stimulate 
the demand for Gold as an inflation hedge. 
The nature of Gold mining stocks to predict and lead the Gold price at major turning points was explained 
by Ruggiero (1997) as arising from the fact that Gold stocks are highly leveraged to the price of Gold. For 
example, a 9% rise in the Gold price from $ 1100 to $ 1200 per ounce will result in a 100% increase in the 
profit of a Gold mining company with a production cost of $ 1000. This predictive positive correlation was 
confirmed by charts depicting the price of Gold versus the Philadelphia Gold and Silver Index (XAU) - a 
capitalization weighted index of the 16 leading precious metal mining companies involved in the mining 
and production of gold and silver (Ruggiero, 1997: 24). 
 
Finally, Ruggiero (1997: 23) illustrates the close correlation between the Precious Metals – Gold, Silver 
and Platinum, with Silver and Platinum leading and being predictive of Gold at major turning points. This 
correlation is due to the fact that apart from their industrial usage, the Precious Metals - Gold, Silver and 
Platinum, more importantly all derive value due to their function as hedges against inflation and a store 
of value. Their market prices therefore not surprisingly move together very closely, and the above noted 
intermarket relationships for Gold will also therefore apply to Silver and Platinum. 
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The afore-mentioned negative intermarket correlation between Gold (GC) and the US Dollar (DX); and the 
positive intermarket correlations between Gold (GC) and Commodities (GI), 30 Year US Treasury Bonds 
(US), 10 Year US Treasury Notes (TY), Eurodollar (ED), Philadelphia Gold and Silver Index (XAU) and the 
Precious Metals – Silver (SI) and Platinum (PL) were confirmed by the correlation lab software of CSI 
Commodity Systems Inc. as detailed below in Table 5-14: 
 
Table 5-14:   Correlation Coefficients - Precious Metals Intermarket Relationships 
NO. OF YEARS BACK MARKET MARKET 
CORRELATION 
COEFFICIENT 
15 Years GC DX -0.88 
15 Years GC GI +0.92 
15 Years GC US +0.91 
15 Years GC TY +0.86 
15 Years GC ED +0.71 
15 Years GC XAU +0.92 
15 Years GC SI +0.95 
15 Years GC PL +0.93 
15 Years SI DX -0.90 
15 Years SI GI +0.91 
15 Years SI US +0.81 
15 Years SI TY +0.73 
15 Years SI ED +0.56 
15 Years SI XAU +0.92 
15 Years SI PL +0.91 
15 Years PL DX -0.89 
15 Years PL GI +0.97 
15 Years PL US +0.82 
15 Years PL TY +0.76 
15 Years PL ED +0.60 
15 Years PL XAU 0.93 
Source: CSI Commodity Systems Inc. 
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 The Gold Strategy 
 
5.2.8.1 The Trade Data 
The above identified Precious Metal intermarket relationships form the dependent traded market and 
independent inter-market data utilized in the development of an Intermarket Momentum trading strategy 
for Gold. 
The trade data are detailed below in Table 5-15: 
 
Table 5-15:   Traded Market and Intermarket Data - Gold Strategy 
DEPENDENT TRADED MARKET 
 
TRADESTATION 
SYMBOL 
INTRA-DAY 
HISTORICAL DATA 
Gold Custom Continuous Contract GC As of 10/22/2002 
INDEPENDENT INTER-MARKET 
CURRENCIES 
TRADESTATION 
SYMBOL 
INTRA-DAY 
HISTORICAL DATA 
US Dollar Index Custom Continuous Futures Contract DX As of 09/23/2004 
INDEPENDENT INTER-MARKET 
COMMODITIES 
TRADESTATION 
SYMBOL 
INTRA-DAY 
HISTORICAL DATA 
S&P GSCI Commodity Index GI As of 08/16/2001 
Silver Custom Continuous Contract  SI As of 09/20/2001 
Platinum Custom Continuous Contract PL As of 09/14/2001 
INDEPENDENT INTER-MARKET 
BONDS 
TRADESTATION 
SYMBOL 
INTRA-DAY 
HISTORICAL DATA 
30 Yr. US Treasury Bond Custom Continuous Futures Contract US As of 10/25/2002 
10 Yr. US Treasury Note Custom Continuous Futures Contract TY As of 09/30/2002 
Eurodollar Custom Continuous Futures Contract ED As of 09/27/1994 
INDEPENDENT INTER-MARKET 
STOCKS 
TRADESTATION 
SYMBOL 
INTRA-DAY 
HISTORICAL DATA 
Philadelphia Gold and Silver Index XAU As of 01/08/2001 
Source: The Author, 2013 
 
5.2.8.2 The Data Sample Period 
Test set: Intra-day 240-minute data from October 22, 2002 – December 31, 2012 
Live set: Intra-day 240-minute data from January 1, 2013 – present 
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5.2.8.3 The Trade Entry Rules 
Breakout and price trend movements in the dependent traded market were identified by the standard 
Momentum (MOM) Indicator trading rule whereby a buy (sell) signal is triggered when the MOM crosses 
the zero line from below (above). Therefore, the following long and short MOM based trade entry rules 
were developed for Gold (GC): 
Buy:  GC MOM(t-1) < 0 and GC MOM(t) > 0 
If the Gold Momentum crosses over the zero line from below, initiate a long position (buy) the dependent 
traded market Gold (GC). 
Sell: GC MOM(t-1) > 0 and GC MOM(t) < 0 
If the Gold Momentum crosses under the zero line from above, initiate a short position (sell short) the 
dependent traded market Gold (GC). 
 
5.2.8.4 Entry Rule Filters 
Gold intermarket correlations, volume confirmation and qualitative charting analysis were used to build 
trade entry rule filters to ensure that trades will only be entered into during those periods where Gold 
price movement is supported by price trends in the independent intermarkets, high volume in the Gold 
market and a supporting chart pattern or trendline breakout. 
Intermarket Correlations: 
Table 5-16:   Intermarket Correlation Coefficients – Gold (GC) 
 GC SI PL GI XAU DX US TY ED 
GC 1.00         
SI +0.95* 1.00        
PL +0.93 +0.91 1.00       
GI +0.92 +0.91 +0.97* 1.00      
XAU +0.92 +0.92 +0.93 +0.89 1.00     
DX -0.88 -0.90 -0.89 -0.89 -0.92 1.00    
US +0.91 +0.81 +0.82 +0.82 +0.78 -0.76 1.00   
TY +0.86 +0.73 +0.76 +0.75 +0.72 -0.70 +0.96* 1.00  
ED +0.71 +0.56 +0.60 +0.55 +0.56 -0.50 +0.78 +0.89 1.00 
Source: CSI Commodity Systems Inc. 
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As illustrated in Table 5-16, the intermarket correlations between Gold (GC) and Silver (SI), Platinum (PL), 
Commodities (GI), the Philadelphia Gold and Silver Index (XAU), the US Dollar Index (DX), and US Treasury 
Bonds (US, TY and ED) were utilized to build trade entry rule filters whereby a Gold long position was only 
initiated if it was supported by rising price momentum (MOM > 0) in the positively correlated independent 
intermarkets and falling price momentum (MOM < 0) in the negatively correlated independent 
intermarkets. Conversely, a Gold short position was only initiated if it was supported by falling price 
momentum (MOM < 0) in the positively correlated independent intermarkets and rising price momentum 
(MOM > 0) in the negatively correlated independent intermarkets. 
Volume: 
A volume confirmation filter was utilized to ensure that Gold long and short positions were only initiated 
when there was high volume in the Gold market (GC Volume Oscillator > 0) which suggests that there is 
enough market support to continue driving the Gold price in the direction of the momentum trend. 
Qualitative Charting: 
Each individual Gold trade identified by the intermarket strategy was analyzed from a qualitative charting 
perspective in order to filter out those trades not supported by a chart pattern or a trendline breakout. 
Therefore, 
Only initiate a Gold (GC) long position if: 
Silver (SI) MOM > 0 
Platinum (PL) MOM > 0 
The Commodity Index (GI) MOM > 0 
The Philadelphia Gold and Silver Index (XAU) MOM > 0 
The US Dollar Index (DX) MOM < 0 
The 30 year US Treasury Bond (US) MOM > 0 
The 10 year US Treasury Note (TY) MOM > 0 
The Eurodollar (ED) MOM > 0 
The Gold (GC) Volume Oscillator (Volume Osc) > 0 and 
Finally, each individual long trade identified by the intermarket strategy was analyzed from a qualitative 
charting perspective in order to filter out those trades not supported by a chart pattern or a trendline 
breakout. 
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Only initiate a Gold (GC) short position if: 
Silver (SI) MOM < 0 
Platinum (PL) MOM < 0 
The Commodity Index (GI) MOM < 0 
The Philadelphia Gold and Silver Index (XAU) MOM < 0 
The US Dollar Index (DX) MOM > 0 
The 30 year US Treasury Bond (US) MOM < 0 
The 10 year US Treasury Note (TY) MOM < 0 
The Eurodollar (ED) MOM < 0 
The Gold (GC) Volume Oscillator (Volume Osc) > 0 and 
Finally, each individual short trade identified by the intermarket strategy was analyzed from a qualitative 
charting perspective in order to filter out those trades not supported by a chart pattern or a trendline 
breakout. 
 
5.2.8.5 Trade Exit Rules 
The Gold (GC) Momentum Indicator was used to signal trend reversals and the necessity to exit the trade 
position. 
In a long Gold (GC) position: 
If the Gold (GC) MOM crosses below the zero line, sell to close out the position. 
In a short Gold (GC) position: 
If the Gold (GC) MOM crosses above the zero line, buy to cover and close out the position. 
 
5.2.8.6 Setting Up the Gold Strategy TradeStation Workspace 
Intra-day 240-minute data charts of Gold (GC), Silver (SI), Platinum (PL), the US Dollar Index (DX), the 
Commodity Index (GI), the Philadelphia Gold and Silver Index (XAU), the 30 year US Treasury Bond (US), 
the 10 year US Treasury Note (TY), and the Eurodollar (ED) for the period October 22, 2002 – Present were 
inserted into a TradeStation workspace. 
A Gold (GC) Volume Oscillator (Volume Osc) was applied in a sub-graph below the main chart, as illustrated 
by a snapshot of the TradeStation Workspace in Figure 5-6 over-page: 
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Figure 5-6:   Gold Strategy - TradeStation Workspace 
 
Source: TradeStation, 2013 
 
Evidence that Weak-Form Capital Market Efficiency Does Not Hold 2015 
 
Page | 88  
 
 The Silver Strategy 
 
5.2.9.1 The Trade Data 
The above identified Precious Metal intermarket relationships form the dependent traded market and 
independent inter-market data utilized in the development of an Intermarket Momentum trading strategy 
for Silver. 
The trade data are detailed below in Table 5-17: 
 
Table 5-17:   Traded Market and Intermarket Data - Silver Strategy 
DEPENDENT TRADED MARKET 
 
TRADESTATION 
SYMBOL 
INTRA-DAY 
HISTORICAL DATA 
Silver Custom Continuous Contract SI As of 09/20/2001 
INDEPENDENT INTER-MARKET 
CURRENCIES 
TRADESTATION 
SYMBOL 
INTRA-DAY 
HISTORICAL DATA 
US Dollar Index Custom Continuous Futures Contract DX As of 09/23/2004 
INDEPENDENT INTER-MARKET 
COMMODITIES 
TRADESTATION 
SYMBOL 
INTRA-DAY 
HISTORICAL DATA 
S&P GSCI Commodity Index GI As of 08/16/2001 
Gold Custom Continuous Contract  GC As of 10/22/2002 
Platinum Custom Continuous Contract PL As of 09/14/2001 
INDEPENDENT INTER-MARKET 
BONDS 
TRADESTATION 
SYMBOL 
INTRA-DAY 
HISTORICAL DATA 
30 Yr. US Treasury Bond Custom Continuous Futures Contract US As of 10/25/2002 
10 Yr. US Treasury Note Custom Continuous Futures Contract TY As of 09/30/2002 
Eurodollar Custom Continuous Futures Contract ED As of 09/27/1994 
INDEPENDENT INTER-MARKET 
STOCKS 
TRADESTATION 
SYMBOL 
INTRA-DAY 
HISTORICAL DATA 
Philadelphia Gold and Silver Index XAU As of 01/08/2001 
Source: The Author, 2013 
 
 
5.2.9.2 The Data Sample Period 
Test set: Intra-day 240-minute data from September 20, 2001 – December 31, 2012 
Live set: Intra-day 240-minute data from January 1, 2013 – present 
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5.2.9.3 The Trade Entry Rules 
Breakout and price trend movements in the dependent traded market were identified by the standard 
Momentum (MOM) Indicator trading rule whereby a buy (sell) signal is triggered when the MOM crosses 
the zero line from below (above). Therefore, the following long and short MOM based trade entry rules 
were developed for Silver (SI): 
Buy:  SI MOM(t-1) < 0 and SI MOM(t) > 0 
If the Silver Momentum crosses over the zero line from below, initiate a long position (buy) the dependent 
traded market Silver (SI). 
Sell: SI MOM(t-1) > 0 and SI MOM(t) < 0 
If the Silver Momentum crosses under the zero line from above, initiate a short position (sell short) the 
dependent traded market Silver (SI). 
 
5.2.9.4 Entry Rule Filters 
Silver intermarket correlations, volume confirmation and qualitative charting analysis were used to build 
trade entry rule filters to ensure that trades will only be entered into during those periods where Silver 
price movement is supported by price trends in the independent inter-markets, high volume in the Silver 
market and a supporting chart pattern or trendline breakout. 
Intermarket Correlations: 
Table 5-18:   Intermarket Correlation Coefficients – Silver (SI) 
 SI GC PL GI XAU DX US TY ED 
SI 1.00         
GC +0.95* 1.00        
PL +0.91 +0.93 1.00       
GI +0.91 +0.92 +0.97* 1.00      
XAU +0.92 +0.92 +0.93 +0.89 1.00     
DX -0.90 -0.88 -0.89 -0.89 -0.92 1.00    
US +0.81 +0.91 +0.82 +0.82 +0.78 -0.76 1.00   
TY +0.73 +0.86 +0.76 +0.75 +0.72 -0.70 +0.96* 1.00  
ED +0.56 +0.71 +0.60 +0.55 +0.56 -0.50 +0.78 +0.89 1.00 
Source: CSI Commodity Systems Inc. 
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As illustrated in Table 5-18, the intermarket correlations between Silver (SI), and Gold (GC), Platinum (PL), 
Commodities (GI), the Philadelphia Gold and Silver Index (XAU), the US Dollar Index (DX), and US Treasury 
Bonds (US, TY and ED) were utilized to build trade entry rule filters whereby a Silver long position was only 
initiated if it was supported by rising price momentum (MOM > 0) in the positively correlated independent 
intermarkets and falling price momentum (MOM < 0) in the negatively correlated independent 
intermarkets. Conversely, a Silver short position was only initiated if it was supported by falling price 
momentum (MOM < 0) in the positively correlated independent intermarkets and rising price momentum 
(MOM > 0) in the negatively correlated independent intermarkets. 
Volume: 
A volume confirmation filter was utilized to ensure that Silver long and short positions were only initiated 
when there was high volume in the Silver market (SI Volume Oscillator > 0) which suggests that there is 
enough market support to continue driving the Silver price in the direction of the momentum trend. 
Qualitative Charting: 
Each individual Silver trade identified by the intermarket strategy was analyzed from a qualitative charting 
perspective in order to filter out those trades not supported by a chart pattern or a trendline breakout. 
Therefore, 
Only initiate a Silver (SI) long position if: 
Gold (GC) MOM > 0 
Platinum (PL) MOM > 0 
The Commodity Index (GI) MOM > 0 
The Philadelphia Gold and Silver Index (XAU) MOM > 0 
The US Dollar Index (DX) MOM < 0 
The 30 year US Treasury Bond (US) MOM > 0 
The 10 year US Treasury Note (TY) MOM > 0 
The Eurodollar (ED) MOM > 0 
The Silver (SI) Volume Oscillator (Volume Osc) > 0 and 
Finally, each individual long trade identified by the intermarket strategy was analyzed from a qualitative 
charting perspective in order to filter out those trades not supported by a chart pattern or a trendline 
breakout. 
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Only initiate a Silver (SI) short position if: 
Gold (GC) MOM < 0 
Platinum (PL) MOM < 0 
The Commodity Index (GI) MOM < 0 
The Philadelphia Gold and Silver Index (XAU) MOM < 0 
The US Dollar Index (DX) MOM > 0 
The 30 year US Treasury Bond (US) MOM < 0 
The 10 year US Treasury Note (TY) MOM < 0 
The Eurodollar (ED) MOM < 0 
The Silver (SI) Volume Oscillator (Volume Osc) > 0 and 
Finally, each individual short trade identified by the intermarket strategy was analyzed from a qualitative 
charting perspective in order to filter out those trades not supported by a chart pattern or a trendline 
breakout. 
 
5.2.9.5 Trade Exit Rules 
The Silver (SI) Momentum Indicator was used to signal trend reversals and the necessity to exit the trade 
position. 
In a long Silver (SI) position: 
If the Silver (SI) MOM crosses below the zero line, sell to close out the position. 
In a short Silver (SI) position: 
If the Silver (SI) MOM crosses above the zero line, buy to cover and close out the position. 
 
5.2.9.6 Setting Up the Silver Strategy TradeStation Workspace 
Intra-day 240-minute data charts of Silver (SI), Gold (GC), Platinum (PL), the US Dollar Index (DX), the 
Commodity Index (GI), the Philadelphia Gold and Silver Index (XAU), the 30 year US Treasury Bond (US), 
the 10 year US Treasury Note (TY), and the Eurodollar (ED) for the period September 20, 2001 – Present 
were inserted into a TradeStation workspace. 
A Silver (SI) Volume Oscillator (Volume Osc) was applied in a sub-graph below the main chart, as illustrated 
by a snapshot of the TradeStation Workspace in Figure 5-7 over-page. The Precious Metal intermarket 
Evidence that Weak-Form Capital Market Efficiency Does Not Hold 2015 
 
Page | 92  
 
linkages were also clearly depicted and confirmed in Figure 5-7 by the break-out 240 minute candlesticks 
that occurred at 2pm on Wednesday September 18, 2013 upon the surprise announcement by Federal 
Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke that contrary to all expectations, the Quantitative Easing (QE) program 
would continue unabated and that there would be no taper. The continued Treasury Bond purchases (QE) 
by the Federal Reserve raises the demand for bonds and drives up their price (see the positive US, TY and 
ED candlesticks). Rising bond prices result in falling bond yields and interest rates, reducing the demand 
for dollar based assets and consequently driving down the Dollar Index (see negative DX candlestick). A 
depreciating Dollar pushes up Commodity prices (see positive GI, XAU, GC, SI and Pl candlesticks), and 
additionally the low interest rate environment spawned by the rising bond prices heightens inflation 
expectations and increases the demand for the inflation hedge characteristic of the Precious Metals (see 
positive GC, SI and PL candlesticks). 
 
Figure 5-7:   Silver Strategy - TradeStation Workspace 
 
Source: TradeStation, 2013 
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 The Platinum Strategy 
 
5.2.10.1 The Trade Data 
The above identified Precious Metal intermarket relationships form the dependent traded market and 
independent inter-market data utilized in the development of an Intermarket Momentum trading strategy 
for Platinum. 
The trade data are detailed below in Table 5-19: 
 
Table 5-19:   Traded Market and Intermarket Data - Platinum Strategy 
DEPENDENT TRADED MARKET 
 
TRADESTATION 
SYMBOL 
INTRA-DAY 
HISTORICAL DATA 
Platinum Custom Continuous Contract PL As of 09/14/2001 
INDEPENDENT INTER-MARKET 
CURRENCIES 
TRADESTATION 
SYMBOL 
INTRA-DAY 
HISTORICAL DATA 
US Dollar Index Custom Continuous Futures Contract DX As of 09/23/2004 
INDEPENDENT INTER-MARKET 
COMMODITIES 
TRADESTATION 
SYMBOL 
INTRA-DAY 
HISTORICAL DATA 
S&P GSCI Commodity Index GI As of 08/16/2001 
Silver Custom Continuous Contract  SI As of 09/20/2001 
Gold Custom Continuous Contract GC As of 10/22/2002 
INDEPENDENT INTER-MARKET 
BONDS 
TRADESTATION 
SYMBOL 
INTRA-DAY 
HISTORICAL DATA 
30 Yr. US Treasury Bond Custom Continuous Futures Contract US As of 10/25/2002 
10 Yr. US Treasury Note Custom Continuous Futures Contract TY As of 09/30/2002 
Eurodollar Custom Continuous Futures Contract ED As of 09/27/1994 
INDEPENDENT INTER-MARKET 
STOCKS 
TRADESTATION 
SYMBOL 
INTRA-DAY 
HISTORICAL DATA 
Philadelphia Gold and Silver Index XAU As of 01/08/2001 
Source: The Author, 2013 
 
5.2.10.2 The Data Sample Period 
Test set: Intra-day 240-minute data from September 14, 2001 – December 31, 2012 
Live set: Intra-day 240-minute data from January 1, 2013 – present 
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5.2.10.3 The Trade Entry Rules 
Breakout and price trend movements in the dependent traded market were identified by the standard 
Momentum (MOM) Indicator trading rule whereby a buy (sell) signal is triggered when the MOM crosses 
the zero line from below (above). Therefore, the following long and short MOM based trade entry rules 
were developed for Platinum (PL): 
Buy:  PL MOM(t-1) < 0 and PL MOM(t) > 0 
If the Platinum Momentum crosses over the zero line from below, initiate a long position (buy) the 
dependent traded market Platinum (PL). 
Sell: PL MOM(t-1) > 0 and PL MOM(t) < 0 
If the Platinum Momentum crosses under the zero line from above, initiate a short position (sell short) 
the dependent traded market Platinum (PL). 
 
5.2.10.4 Entry Rule Filters 
Platinum intermarket correlations, volume confirmation and qualitative charting analysis were used to 
build trade entry rule filters to ensure that trades will only be entered into during those periods where 
Platinum price movement is supported by price trends in the independent inter-markets, high volume in 
the Platinum market and a supporting chart pattern or trendline breakout. 
Intermarket Correlations: 
Table 5-20:   Intermarket Correlation Coefficients – Platinum (PL) 
 PL GC SI GI XAU DX US TY ED 
PL 1.00         
GC +0.93 1.00        
SI +0.91 +0.95* 1.00       
GI +0.97* +0.92 +0.91 1.00      
XAU +0.93 +0.92 +0.92 +0.89 1.00     
DX -0.89 -0.88 -0.90 -0.89 -0.92 1.00    
US +0.82 +0.91 +0.81 +0.82 +0.78 -0.76 1.00   
TY +0.76 +0.86 +0.73 +0.75 +0.72 -0.70 +0.96* 1.00  
ED +0.60 +0.71 +0.56 +0.55 +0.56 -0.50 +0.78 +0.89 1.00 
Source: CSI Commodity Systems Inc. 
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As illustrated in Table 5-20, the intermarket correlations between Platinum (PL) and Gold (GC), Silver (SI), 
Commodities (GI), the Philadelphia Gold and Silver Index (XAU), the US Dollar Index (DX), and US Treasury 
Bonds (US, TY and ED) were utilized to build trade entry rule filters whereby a Platinum long position was 
only initiated if it was supported by rising price momentum (MOM > 0) in the positively correlated 
independent intermarkets and falling price momentum (MOM < 0) in the negatively correlated 
independent intermarkets. Conversely, a Platinum short position was only initiated if it was supported by 
falling price momentum (MOM < 0) in the positively correlated independent intermarkets and rising price 
momentum (MOM > 0) in the negatively correlated independent intermarkets. 
Volume: 
A volume confirmation filter was utilized to ensure that Platinum long and short positions were only 
initiated when there was high volume in the Platinum market (PL Volume Oscillator > 0) which suggests 
that there is enough market support to continue driving the Platinum price in the direction of the 
momentum trend. 
Qualitative Charting: 
Each individual Platinum trade identified by the intermarket strategy was analyzed from a qualitative 
charting perspective in order to filter out those trades not supported by a chart pattern or a trendline 
breakout. 
Therefore, 
Only initiate a Platinum (PL) long position if: 
Gold (GC) MOM > 0 
Silver (SI) MOM > 0 
The Commodity Index (GI) MOM > 0 
The Philadelphia Gold and Silver Index (XAU) MOM > 0 
The US Dollar Index (DX) MOM < 0 
The 30 year US Treasury Bond (US) MOM > 0 
The 10 year US Treasury Note (TY) MOM > 0 
The Eurodollar (ED) MOM > 0 
The Platinum (PL) Volume Oscillator (Volume Osc) > 0 and 
Finally, each individual long trade identified by the intermarket strategy was analyzed from a qualitative 
charting perspective in order to filter out those trades not supported by a chart pattern or a trendline 
breakout. 
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Only initiate a Platinum (PL) short position if: 
Gold (GC) MOM < 0 
Silver (SI) MOM < 0 
The Commodity Index (GI) MOM < 0 
The Philadelphia Gold and Silver Index (XAU) MOM < 0 
The US Dollar Index (DX) MOM > 0 
The 30 year US Treasury Bond (US) MOM < 0 
The 10 year US Treasury Note (TY) MOM < 0 
The Eurodollar (ED) MOM < 0 
The Platinum (PL) Volume Oscillator (Volume Osc) > 0 and 
Finally, each individual short trade identified by the intermarket strategy was analyzed from a qualitative 
charting perspective in order to filter out those trades not supported by a chart pattern or a trendline 
breakout. 
 
5.2.10.5 Trade Exit Rules 
The Platinum (PL) Momentum Indicator was used to signal trend reversals and the necessity to exit the 
trade position. 
In a long Platinum (PL) position: 
If the Platinum (PL) MOM crosses below the zero line, sell to close out the position. 
In a short Platinum (PL) position: 
If the Platinum (PL) MOM crosses above the zero line, buy to cover and close out the position. 
 
5.2.10.6 Setting Up the Platinum Strategy TradeStation Workspace 
Intra-day 240-minute data charts of Platinum (PL), Gold (GC), Silver (SI), the US Dollar Index (DX), the 
Commodity Index (GI), the Philadelphia Gold and Silver Index (XAU), the 30 year US Treasury Bond (US), 
the 10 year US Treasury Note (TY), and the Eurodollar (ED) for the period September 14, 2001 – Present 
were inserted into a TradeStation workspace. 
A Platinum (PL) Volume Oscillator (Volume Osc) was applied in a sub-graph below the main chart, as 
illustrated by a snapshot of the TradeStation Workspace in Figure 5-8 over-page. 
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Figure 5-8:   Platinum Strategy - TradeStation Workspace 
 
Source: TradeStation, 2013 
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 The Crude Oil Trading Strategy 
Previously identified Commodity Currency and Commodity Intermarket relationships were utilized to 
develop an Intermarket Momentum trading strategy for Crude Oil (CL). 
 
5.2.11.1 The Trade Strategy Premise 
As the most important constituent of the energy commodity universe, Crude Oil is expected to be 
positively correlated to the Commodity Index (GI) and the Commodity Currencies, and negatively 
correlated to the international reserve currency in which commodities are priced and traded, the US 
Dollar. 
In accordance with the positive relationship between the Commodity Currencies and Bonds, Crude Oil 
therefore is also expected to exhibit a positive correlation to the 30 Year US Treasury Bond, 10 Year US 
Treasury Note and the Eurodollar. 
As in the case of Gold, Oil stocks are leveraged to the price of Crude Oil therefore the Amex Oil Stock Index 
(XOI) - a price weighted index of the leading companies involved in the exploration and production of Oil 
- leads the Crude Oil price at major turning points. This predictive positive correlation between Crude Oil 
(CL) and Oil Stocks (XOI) was illustrated by Ruggiero (1997: 26) using charts depicting the price of Crude 
Oil versus the XOI. 
 
The afore-mentioned Crude Oil intermarket correlations were confirmed by the correlation lab software 
of CSI Commodity Systems Inc. as detailed below in Table 5-21. Not surprisingly, the Crude Oil (CL) / South 
African Rand (RA) positive correlation was relatively weak (+0.23) in comparison to the other Commodity 
Currencies due to the paucity of Oil reserves in South Africa. 
 
Table 5-21:   Correlation Coefficients - Crude Oil Intermarket Relationships 
NO. OF YEARS BACK MARKET MARKET CORRELATION COEFFICIENT 
15 Years CL DX -0.88 
15 Years CL GI +0.99 
15 Years CL AD +0.90 
15 Years CL CD +0.94 
5 Years CL RA +0.23 
10 Years CL NOK +0.86 
15 Years CL XOI +0.92 
15 Years CL US +0.81 
15 Years CL TY +0.74 
15 Years CL ED +0.55 
Source: CSI Commodity Systems Inc. 
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5.2.11.2 The Trade Data 
The above identified intermarket relationships form the dependent traded market and independent inter-
market data utilized in the development of an Intermarket Momentum trading strategy for Crude Oil (CL) 
as detailed below in Table 5-22: 
 
Table 5-22:   Traded Market and Intermarket Data - Crude Oil Strategy 
DEPENDENT TRADED MARKET 
 
TRADESTATION 
SYMBOL 
INTRA-DAY 
HISTORICAL DATA 
Crude Oil Custom Continuous Contract CL As of 04/26/2002 
INDEPENDENT INTER-MARKET 
CURRENCIES 
TRADESTATION 
SYMBOL 
INTRA-DAY 
HISTORICAL DATA 
US Dollar Index Custom Continuous Futures Contract DX As of 09/23/2004 
Australian Dollar Custom Continuous Futures Contract AD As of 05/02/2001 
Canadian Dollar Custom Continuous Futures Contract CD As of 05/02/2001 
South African Rand Custom Continuous Futures Contract RA As of 12/01/2004 
Norwegian Krone Custom Continuous Futures Contract NOK As of 11/10/2003 
INDEPENDENT INTER-MARKET 
COMMODITIES 
TRADESTATION 
SYMBOL 
INTRA-DAY 
HISTORICAL DATA 
S&P GSCI Commodity Index GI As of 08/16/2001 
INDEPENDENT INTER-MARKET 
BONDS 
TRADESTATION 
SYMBOL 
INTRA-DAY 
HISTORICAL DATA 
30 Yr. US Treasury Bond Custom Continuous Futures Contract US As of 10/25/2002 
10 Yr. US Treasury Note Custom Continuous Futures Contract TY As of 09/30/2002 
Eurodollar Custom Continuous Futures Contract ED As of 09/27/1994 
INDEPENDENT INTER-MARKET 
STOCKS 
TRADESTATION 
SYMBOL 
INTRA-DAY 
HISTORICAL DATA 
Amex Oil Index XOI As of 01/18/2001 
Source: The Author, 2013 
 
5.2.11.3 The Data Sample Period 
Test set: Intra-day 240-minute data from April 26, 2002 – December 31, 2012 
Live set: Intra-day 240-minute data from January 1, 2013 – present 
 
Evidence that Weak-Form Capital Market Efficiency Does Not Hold 2015 
 
Page | 100  
 
5.2.11.4 The Trade Entry Rules 
Breakout and price trend movements in the dependent traded market were identified by the standard 
Momentum (MOM) Indicator trading rule whereby a buy (sell) signal is triggered when the MOM crosses 
the zero line from below (above). Therefore, the following long and short MOM based trade entry rules 
were developed for Crude Oil (CL): 
Buy:  CL MOM(t-1) < 0 and CL MOM(t) > 0 
If the Crude Oil Momentum crosses over the zero line from below, initiate a long position (buy) the 
dependent traded market Crude Oil (CL). 
Sell: CL MOM(t-1) > 0 and CL MOM(t) < 0 
If the Crude Oil Momentum crosses under the zero line from above, initiate a short position (sell short) 
the dependent traded market Crude Oil (CL). 
 
5.2.11.5 Entry Rule Filters 
Crude Oil intermarket correlations, volume confirmation and qualitative charting analysis were used to 
build trade entry rule filters to ensure that trades will only be entered into during those periods where 
Crude Oil price movement is supported by price trends in the independent intermarkets, high volume in 
the Crude Oil market and a supporting chart pattern or trendline breakout. 
Inter-market Correlations: 
Table 5-23:   Inter-market Correlation Coefficients – Crude Oil (CL) 
 CL DX AD CD RA NOK GI XOI US TY ED 
CL 1.00           
DX -0.88 1.00          
AD +0.90 -0.94 1.00         
CD +0.94 -0.93 +0.96* 1.00        
RA +0.23 -0.66 +0.33 +0.46 1.00       
NOK +0.86 -0.92 +0.84 +0.88 +0.42 1.00      
GI +0.99** -0.89 +0.91 +0.95* +0.48 +0.88 1.00     
XOI +0.92 -0.84 +0.85 +0.89 +0.12 +0.84 +0.92 1.00    
US +0.81 -0.76 +0.72 +0.78 -0.19 +0.44 +0.82 +0.67 1.00   
TY +0.74 -0.70 +0.74 +0.70 -0.13 +0.39 +0.75 +0.55 +0.96* 1.00  
ED +0.55 -0.50 +0.58 +0.51 +0.14 +0.52 +0.55 +0.35 +0.78 +0.89 1.00 
Source: CSI Commodity Systems Inc. 
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As illustrated in Table 5-23, the intermarket correlations between Crude Oil (CL) and the US Dollar Index 
(DX), the Commodity Currencies (AD, CD, RA and NOK), Commodities (GI), the Amex Oil Stock Index (XOI), 
and US Treasury Bonds (US, TY and ED) were utilized to build trade entry rule filters whereby a Crude Oil 
(CL) long position was only initiated if it was supported by rising price momentum (MOM > 0) in the 
positively correlated independent intermarkets and falling price momentum (MOM < 0) in the negatively 
correlated independent intermarkets. Conversely, a Crude Oil (CL) short position was only initiated if it 
was supported by falling price momentum (MOM < 0) in the positively correlated independent 
intermarkets and rising price momentum (MOM > 0) in the negatively correlated independent 
intermarkets. 
Volume: 
A volume confirmation filter was utilized to ensure that Crude Oil long and short positions were only 
initiated when there was high volume in the Crude Oil market (CL Volume Oscillator > 0) which suggests 
that there is enough market support to continue driving the Crude Oil price in the direction of the 
momentum trend. 
Qualitative Charting: 
Each individual Crude Oil trade identified by the intermarket strategy was analyzed from a qualitative 
charting perspective in order to filter out those trades not supported by a chart pattern or a trendline 
breakout. 
Therefore, 
Only initiate a Crude Oil (CL) long position if: 
The US Dollar Index (DX) MOM < 0  
The Australian Dollar (AD) MOM > 0 
The Canadian Dollar (CD) MOM > 0 
The South African Rand (RA) MOM > 0 
The Norwegian Krone (NOK) MOM > 0 
The Commodity Index (GI) MOM > 0 
The Amex Oil Stock Index (XOI) MOM > 0 
The 30 year US Treasury Bond (US) MOM > 0 
The 10 year US Treasury Note (TY) MOM > 0 
The Eurodollar (ED) MOM > 0 
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The Crude Oil (CL) Volume Oscillator (Volume Osc) > 0 and 
Finally, each individual long trade identified by the intermarket strategy was analyzed from a qualitative 
charting perspective in order to filter out those trades not supported by a chart pattern or a trendline 
breakout. 
Only initiate a Crude Oil (CL) short position if: 
The US Dollar Index (DX) MOM > 0  
The Australian Dollar (AD) MOM < 0 
The Canadian Dollar (CD) MOM < 0 
The South African Rand (RA) MOM < 0 
The Norwegian Krone (NOK) MOM < 0 
The Commodity Index (GI) MOM < 0 
The Amex Oil Stock Index (XOI) MOM < 0 
The 30 year US Treasury Bond (US) MOM < 0 
The 10 year US Treasury Note (TY) MOM < 0 
The Eurodollar (ED) MOM < 0 
The Crude Oil (CL) Volume Oscillator (Volume Osc) > 0 and 
Finally, each individual short trade identified by the intermarket strategy was analyzed from a qualitative 
charting perspective in order to filter out those trades not supported by a chart pattern or a trendline 
breakout. 
 
5.2.11.6 Trade Exit Rules 
The Crude Oil (CL) Momentum Indicator was used to signal trend reversals and the necessity to exit the 
trade position. 
In a long Crude Oil (CL) position: 
If the Crude Oil (CL) MOM crosses below the zero line, sell to close out the position. 
In a short Crude Oil (CL) position: 
If the Crude Oil (CL) MOM crosses above the zero line, buy to cover and close out the position. 
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5.2.11.7 Setting Up the Crude Oil Strategy TradeStation Workspace 
Intra-day 240-minute data charts of Crude Oil (CL), Australian Dollar (AD), Canadian Dollar (CD), the South 
African Rand (RA), Norwegian Krone (NOK), the Commodity Index (GI), the Amex Oil Stock Index (XOI), the 
US Dollar Index (DX), the 30 year US Treasury Bond (US), the 10 year US Treasury Note (TY), and the 
Eurodollar (ED) for the period April 26, 2002 – Present were inserted into a TradeStation workspace. 
A Crude Oil (CL) Volume Oscillator (Volume Osc) was applied in a sub-graph below the main chart, as 
illustrated by a snapshot of the TradeStation Workspace in Figure 5-9 below: 
 
Figure 5-9:   Crude Oil Strategy - TradeStation Workspace 
 
Source: TradeStation, 2013 
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 The 30 Year US Treasury Bond Trading Strategy 
US Treasury Bond intermarket relationships identified by Ruggiero (1997) were utilized to develop an 
Intermarket Momentum trading strategy for the 30 Year US Treasury Bond (US). 
 
5.2.12.1 The Trade Strategy Premise 
The first intermarket relationship discussed by Ruggiero is that between Bonds and Stocks - there is 
generally a positive correlation between US Treasury Bonds and the S&P 500 resulting from the beneficial 
influence of a low interest rate environment on corporate profits and thus share prices. As Bond prices 
rise, Bond yields and interest rates fall, consequently corporate profits and share prices rise thus lifting 
stock markets (S&P 500) in conjunction with the rising Bond prices. As noted by Ruggiero, this positive 
linkage only decouples in periods of extreme market stress where there is a capital flight to the safety of 
US Treasury Bonds and the US Dollar. For example, as stock markets worldwide plummeted during the 
2008 Financial Crisis, US Treasury Bonds and the US Dollar rallied. 
Eurodollars, which represent dollar denominated deposits outside of the United States, are an accurate 
measure of short-term interest rates and positively correlated to Treasury Bonds. Falling Bond yields 
resulting from rising Bond prices will increase the demand for the yield generated by offshore Eurodollar 
deposits therefore one can expect 30 Year US Treasury Bonds (US) and 10 Year US Treasury Notes (TY) to 
be positively correlated to Eurodollars (ED). 
As previously discussed, Treasury Bonds are positively correlated to Commodities (GI), Gold (GC), Crude 
Oil (CL) and foreign currencies, including the Japanese Yen (JY). 
Ruggiero (1997: 17) further illustrates a positive correlation between Utilities and Treasury Bonds by 
charting the Philadelphia Utility Index (UTY) versus the 30 Year US Treasury Bond. The Utility sector is the 
most well-known of the defensive sectors that investors turn to during economic downturns: utility 
companies are basically legal monopolies that are regulated by the government which guarantees them 
specific rates regardless of the state of the economy. Utilization rates are also immune to economic 
downturns and these factors combined with the high dividend payout ratios of utilities ensure investors 
of an attractive fixed income from utility company investments even during recessionary periods. The 
Philadelphia Utility Index (UTY) therefore demonstrates the same characteristics as US Treasury Bonds - 
during economic downturns investors will flee to the safety of the UTY and Treasury Bonds. 
Ruggiero (1997) also notes the inverse correlation between Copper and Lumber and Treasury Bonds. 
Copper and Lumber are materials used extensively in the home construction industry and are therefore 
accurate measures of economic activity since the housing sector is the most important barometer of the 
state of the economy. During economic upturns the demand for housing rises and this drives economic 
activity not only via the construction industry but also through ancillary demand for furniture, kitchen 
appliances, TV’s etc. Consequently, a booming housing sector will raise Copper and Lumber prices and 
additionally stimulate the Federal Reserve to raise interest rates in an effort to cool down the economy 
and curb impending inflation. This action will reduce investor demand for the fixed coupon nature of 
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Treasury Bonds, resulting in falling Bond prices and the consequent negative correlation to Copper (HG) 
and Lumber (LB). 
The afore-mentioned 30 Year US Treasury Bond (US) intermarket correlations were confirmed by the 
correlation lab software of CSI Commodity Systems Inc. as detailed below in Table 5-24: 
 
Table 5-24:   Correlation Coefficients - 30 Yr. US Treasury Bond Intermarket Relationships 
NO. OF YEARS BACK MARKET MARKET 
CORRELATION 
COEFFICIENT 
30 Years US SP +0.84 
15 Years US TY +0.96 
20 Years US ED +0.84 
15 Years US GI +0.82 
15 Years US GC +0.91 
15 Years US CL +0.81 
35 Years US JY +0.84 
25 Years US UTY +0.87 
2 Years US HG -0.15 
20 Years US LB -0.44 
Source: CSI Commodity Systems Inc. 
 
 
5.2.12.2 The Trade Data 
The above identified inter-market relationships form the dependent traded market and independent 
intermarket data utilized in the development of an Intermarket Momentum trading strategy for the 30 
Year US Treasury Bond (US) as detailed over-page in Table 5-25: 
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Table 5-25:   Traded Market and Intermarket Data - 30 Year US Treasury Bond Strategy 
DEPENDENT TRADED MARKET 
 
TRADESTATION 
SYMBOL 
INTRA-DAY 
HISTORICAL DATA 
30 Yr. US Treasury Bond Custom Continuous Futures Contract US As of 10/25/2002 
INDEPENDENT INTER-MARKET 
CURRENCIES 
TRADESTATION 
SYMBOL 
INTRA-DAY 
HISTORICAL DATA 
Japanese Yen Custom Continuous Contract JY As of 06/22/2001 
INDEPENDENT INTER-MARKET 
COMMODITIES 
TRADESTATION 
SYMBOL 
INTRA-DAY 
HISTORICAL DATA 
S&P GSCI Commodity Index GI As of 08/16/2001 
Copper Custom Continuous Contract HG As of 02/28/2002 
Lumber Custom Continuous Contract LB As of 10/21/2008 
Crude Oil Custom Continuous Contract CL As of 04/26/2002 
Gold Custom Continuous Contract GC As of 10/22/2002 
INDEPENDENT INTER-MARKET 
BONDS 
TRADESTATION 
SYMBOL 
INTRA-DAY 
HISTORICAL DATA 
10 Yr. US Treasury Note Custom Continuous Futures Contract TY As of 09/30/2002 
Eurodollar Custom Continuous Futures Contract ED As of 09/27/1994 
INDEPENDENT INTER-MARKET 
STOCKS 
TRADESTATION 
SYMBOL 
INTRA-DAY 
HISTORICAL DATA 
S&P 500 Custom Continuous Contract SP As of 03/08/2001 
Philadelphia Utility Sector Index UTY As of 01/08/2001 
Source: The Author, 2013 
 
5.2.12.3 The Data Sample Period 
Test set: Intra-day 240-minute data from October 25, 2002 – December 31, 2012 
Live set: Intra-day 240-minute data from January 1, 2013 – present 
 
5.2.12.4 The Trade Entry Rules 
Breakout and price trend movements in the dependent traded market were identified by the standard 
Momentum (MOM) Indicator trading rule whereby a buy (sell) signal is triggered when the MOM crosses 
the zero line from below (above). Therefore, the following long and short MOM based trade entry rules 
were developed for the 30 year US Treasury Bond (US): 
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Buy:  US MOM(t-1) < 0 and US MOM(t) > 0 
If the 30 year US Treasury Bond Momentum crosses over the zero line from below, initiate a long position 
(buy) the dependent traded market 30 year US Treasury Bond (US). 
Sell: US MOM(t-1) > 0 and US MOM(t) < 0 
If the 30 year US Treasury Bond Momentum crosses under the zero line from above, initiate a short 
position (sell short) the dependent traded market 30 year US Treasury Bond (US). 
 
5.2.12.5 Entry Rule Filters 
30 year US Treasury Bond intermarket correlations, volume confirmation and qualitative charting analysis 
were used to build trade entry rule filters to ensure that trades will only be entered into during those 
periods where 30 year US Treasury Bond price movement is supported by price trends in the independent 
intermarkets, high volume in the 30 year US Treasury Bond market and a supporting chart pattern or 
trendline breakout. 
Intermarket Correlations: 
Table 5-26:   Intermarket Correlation Coefficients – 30 year US Treasury Bond (US) 
 US JY GI HG LB CL GC TY ED SP UTY 
US 1.00           
JY +0.84 1.00          
GI +0.82 +0.68 1.00         
HG -0.15 +0.69 +0.95* 1.00        
LB -0.44 -0.10 -0.14 -0.08 1.00       
CL +0.81 +0.68 +0.99** +0.94 -0.14 1.00      
GC +0.91 +0.76 +0.92 +0.89 -0.15 +0.91 1.00     
TY +0.96* +0.70 +0.75 +0.64 -0.24 +0.74 +0.86 1.00    
ED +0.84 +0.58 +0.55 +0.45 -0.17 +0.55 +0.71 +0.89 1.00   
SP +0.84 +0.17 +0.34 +0.41 -0.12 +0.34 +0.16 +0.40 +0.19 1.00  
UTY +0.87 +0.38 +0.82 +0.81 -0.07 +0.82 +0.71 +0.45 +0.20 +0.77 1.00 
Source: CSI Commodity Systems Inc. 
 
As illustrated above in Table 5-26, the intermarket correlations between the 30 year US Treasury Bond 
(US) and the Japanese Yen (JY), Commodities (GI), Copper (HG), Lumber (LB), Crude Oil (CL), Gold (GC), US 
Treasury Bonds (TY and ED), the S&P 500 Stock Index (SP), and the Philadelphia Utility Index (UTY) were 
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utilized to build trade entry rule filters whereby a 30 year US Treasury Bond (US) long position was only 
initiated if it was supported by rising price momentum (MOM > 0) in the positively correlated independent 
intermarkets and falling price momentum (MOM < 0) in the negatively correlated independent 
intermarkets. Conversely, a 30 year US Treasury Bond (US) short position was only initiated if it was 
supported by falling price momentum (MOM < 0) in the positively correlated independent intermarkets 
and rising price momentum (MOM > 0) in the negatively correlated independent intermarkets. 
Volume: 
A volume confirmation filter was utilized to ensure that 30 year US Treasury Bond long and short positions 
were only initiated when there was high volume in the 30 year US Treasury Bond market (US Volume 
Oscillator > 0) which suggests that there is enough market support to continue driving the 30 year US 
Treasury Bond price in the direction of the momentum trend. 
Qualitative Charting: 
Each individual 30 year US Treasury Bond trade identified by the intermarket strategy was analyzed from 
a qualitative charting perspective in order to filter out those trades not supported by a chart pattern or a 
trendline breakout. 
Therefore, 
Only initiate a 30 year US Treasury Bond (US) long position if: 
The Japanese Yen (JY) MOM > 0 
The Commodity Index (GI) MOM > 0 
Copper (HG) MOM < 0 
Lumber (LB) MOM < 0 
Crude Oil (CL) MOM > 0 
Gold (GC) MOM > 0  
The 10 year US Treasury Note (TY) MOM > 0 
The Eurodollar (ED) MOM > 0 
The S&P 500 Stock Index (SP) MOM > 0 
The Philadelphia Utility Index (UTY) MOM > 0 
The 30 year US Treasury Bond (US) Volume Oscillator (Volume Osc) > 0 and 
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Finally, each individual long trade identified by the intermarket strategy was analyzed from a qualitative 
charting perspective in order to filter out those trades not supported by a chart pattern or a trendline 
breakout. 
 
Only initiate a 30 year US Treasury Bond (US) short position if: 
The Japanese Yen (JY) MOM < 0 
The Commodity Index (GI) MOM < 0 
Copper (HG) MOM > 0 
Lumber (LB) MOM > 0 
Crude Oil (CL) MOM < 0 
Gold (GC) MOM < 0  
The 10 year US Treasury Note (TY) MOM < 0 
The Eurodollar (ED) MOM < 0 
The S&P 500 Stock Index (SP) MOM < 0 
The Philadelphia Utility Index (UTY) MOM < 0 
The 30 year US Treasury Bond (US) Volume Oscillator (Volume Osc) > 0 and 
Finally, each individual short trade identified by the intermarket strategy was analyzed from a qualitative 
charting perspective in order to filter out those trades not supported by a chart pattern or a trendline 
breakout. 
 
5.2.12.6 Trade Exit Rules 
The 30 year US Treasury Bond (US) Momentum Indicator was used to signal trend reversals and the 
necessity to exit the trade position. 
In a long 30 year US Treasury Bond (US) position: 
If the 30 year US Treasury Bond (US) MOM crosses below the zero line, sell to close out the position. 
In a short 30 year US Treasury Bond (US) position: 
If the 30 year US Treasury Bond (US) MOM crosses above the zero line, buy to cover and close out the 
position. 
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5.2.12.7 Setting up the 30 year Treasury Bond Strategy TradeStation Workspace 
Intra-day 240-minute data charts of the 30 year US Treasury Bond (US), the S&P 500 (SP), Copper (HG), 
Lumber (LB), the Philadelphia Utility Index (UTY), the 10 year US Treasury Note (TY), the Eurodollar (ED), 
Crude Oil (CL), the Japanese Yen (JY), the Commodity Index (GI), and Gold (GC) for the period October 25, 
2002 – Present were inserted into a TradeStation workspace. 
A 30 year US Treasury Bond (US) Volume Oscillator (Volume Osc) was applied in a sub-graph below the 
main chart, as illustrated by a snapshot of the TradeStation Workspace in Figure 5-10 below: 
 
Figure 5-10:   30 Year US Treasury Bond Strategy - TradeStation Workspace 
 
Source: TradeStation, 2013 
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 Summary 
TradeStation provides an extensive historical database of up to 60 years of clean and accurate daily, 
intraday and tick data for Indices, Stocks, Options, Futures and Forex. 
The data was analyzed by utilizing Intermarket correlations, the Momentum trend Indicator, the Volume 
Oscillator Indicator and Qualitative Charting analysis to develop trade entry rules, trade entry filters, and 
trade exit rules for ten Intermarket Momentum strategies. 
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6 RESULTS 
 
 Trade List 
Each long (short) trade entry exhibited a strong upward (downward) price trend in the form of rising 
(falling) channels of support and resistance lines. Therefore, on the basis of a qualitative charting 
perspective, no trades were filtered out thereby removing the potential of subjective bias influencing the 
trade results. 
TradeStation’s strategy performance reports listed the following trades generated by the portfolio of ten 
Intermarket Momentum trading strategies as enumerated below in Tables 6-1 through 6-6. 
The details of each individual trade are tabulated, including the date and price of the trade entry and exit, 
the strategy generating the trade, the nature of the trade (long or short position), the number of Futures 
contracts, the gross profit, the broker commission and slippage incurred, the net profit after accounting 
for broker commission and slippage, and finally the cumulative portfolio capital balance. 
Table 6-1:   Trade List for the Year 2008 
TRADE  ENTRY STRATEGY TRADE PRICE CONTRACTS TRADE  EXIT TRADE  PRICE PROFIT  /   (LOSS) COMMISSION SLIPPAGE NET  PROFIT CUM.  PF  CAPITAL
$ 1, 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0
2 9 - Fe b- 0 8 S . A .  Ra nd Buy $ 1. 0 6 4 1 5 2 9 - Fe b- 0 8 S e l l $ 1. 0 4 4 4 4 9 , 3 7 5 . 0 0 16 . 0 0 10 0 . 0 0 4 9 , 4 9 1. 0 0 $ 9 5 0 , 5 0 9 . 0 0
2 8 - Fe b- 0 8 Commodi t y  I nde x Buy $ 9 0 4 . 2 0 2 0 5 - M a r - 0 8 S e l l $ 8 9 6 . 9 0 3 6 , 5 0 0 . 0 0 5 4 . 0 0 10 0 . 0 0 3 6 , 6 5 4 . 0 0 $ 9 13 , 8 5 5 . 0 0
13 - M a r - 0 8 S . A .  Ra nd Buy $ 1. 0 3 4 6 5 13 - M a r - 0 8 S e l l $ 1. 0 4 11 16 , 2 5 0 . 0 0 16 . 0 0 10 0 . 0 0 16 , 13 4 . 0 0 $ 9 2 9 , 9 8 9 . 0 0
13 - M a r - 0 8 Cr ude  Oi l Buy $ 10 8 . 5 7 15 17 - M a r - 0 8 S e l l $ 10 6 . 2 2 3 5 , 2 5 0 . 0 0 4 3 . 5 0 10 0 . 0 0 3 5 , 3 9 3 . 5 0 $ 8 9 4 , 5 9 5 . 5 0
14 - M a r - 0 8 S . A .  Ra nd Buy $ 1. 0 3 5 4 5 17 - M a r - 0 8 S e l l $ 0 . 9 9 11 110 , 6 2 5 . 0 0 16 . 0 0 10 0 . 0 0 110 , 7 4 1. 0 0 $ 7 8 3 , 8 5 4 . 5 0
2 8 - Fe b- 0 8 Ca na di a n Dol l a r Buy $ 0 . 9 9 7 6 7 5 19 - M a r - 0 8 S e l l $ 0 . 9 8 7 3 7 7 , 2 5 0 . 0 0 2 4 0 . 0 0 10 0 . 0 0 7 7 , 5 9 0 . 0 0 $ 7 0 6 , 2 6 4 . 5 0
2 2 - Apr - 0 8 Ca na di a n Dol l a r Buy $ 0 . 9 7 4 4 7 5 2 3 - Apr - 0 8 S e l l $ 0 . 9 6 2 6 8 8 , 5 0 0 . 0 0 2 4 0 . 0 0 10 0 . 0 0 8 8 , 8 4 0 . 0 0 $ 6 17 , 4 2 4 . 5 0
2 2 - Apr - 0 8 Cr ude  Oi l Buy $ 115 . 15 15 2 4 - Apr - 0 8 S e l l $ 114 . 10 15 , 7 5 0 . 0 0 4 3 . 5 0 10 0 . 0 0 15 , 8 9 3 . 5 0 $ 6 0 1, 5 3 1. 0 0
13 - M a r - 0 8 Nor we gi a n Kr one Buy $ 0 . 17 9 1 13 0 2 5 - Apr - 0 8 S e l l $ 0 . 17 8 4 18 , 9 8 0 . 0 0 4 16 . 0 0 10 0 . 0 0 19 , 4 9 6 . 0 0 $ 5 8 2 , 0 3 5 . 0 0
2 1- Apr - 0 8 S . A .  Ra nd Buy $ 1. 0 6 3 4 5 7 - M a y - 0 8 S e l l $ 1. 10 11 9 4 , 3 7 5 . 0 0 16 . 0 0 10 0 . 0 0 9 4 , 2 5 9 . 0 0 $ 6 7 6 , 2 9 4 . 0 0
2 6 - J un- 0 8 Commodi t y  I nde x Buy $ 1, 0 9 9 . 0 0 2 0 7 - J ul - 0 8 S e l l $ 1, 10 2 . 6 0 18 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 5 4 . 0 0 10 0 . 0 0 17 , 8 4 6 . 0 0 $ 6 9 4 , 14 0 . 0 0
2 7 - J un- 0 8 Cr ude  Oi l Buy $ 14 6 . 5 0 15 8 - J ul - 0 8 S e l l $ 14 6 . 14 5 , 4 0 0 . 0 0 4 3 . 5 0 10 0 . 0 0 5 , 5 4 3 . 5 0 $ 6 8 8 , 5 9 6 . 5 0
2 9 - Fe b- 0 8 Aust r a l i a n Dol l a r Buy $ 0 . 8 16 4 5 0 5 - Aug- 0 8 S e l l $ 0 . 8 0 8 5 3 9 , 5 0 0 . 0 0 16 0 . 0 0 10 0 . 0 0 3 9 , 7 6 0 . 0 0 $ 6 4 8 , 8 3 6 . 5 0
1- J ul - 0 8 Ca na di a n Dol l a r Buy $ 0 . 9 6 4 7 7 5 7 - Aug- 0 8 S e l l $ 0 . 9 4 0 4 18 2 , 2 5 0 . 0 0 2 4 0 . 0 0 10 0 . 0 0 18 2 , 5 9 0 . 0 0 $ 4 6 6 , 2 4 6 . 5 0
8 - S e p- 0 8 S . A .  Ra nd S e l l  S hor t $ 1. 0 8 0 9 5 18 - S e p- 0 8 Buy  t o Cov e r $ 1. 0 5 11 7 4 , 3 7 5 . 0 0 16 . 0 0 10 0 . 0 0 7 4 , 2 5 9 . 0 0 $ 5 4 0 , 5 0 5 . 5 0
7 - S e p- 0 8 Cr ude  Oi l S e l l  S hor t $ 117 . 9 4 15 18 - S e p- 0 8 Buy  t o Cov e r $ 10 8 . 8 6 13 6 , 2 0 0 . 0 0 4 3 . 5 0 10 0 . 0 0 13 6 , 0 5 6 . 5 0 $ 6 7 6 , 5 6 2 . 0 0
8 - S e p- 0 8 Commodi t y  I nde x S e l l  S hor t $ 8 9 1. 10 2 0 19 - S e p- 0 8 Buy  t o Cov e r $ 8 6 6 . 0 5 12 5 , 2 5 0 . 0 0 5 4 . 0 0 10 0 . 0 0 12 5 , 0 9 6 . 0 0 $ 8 0 1, 6 5 8 . 0 0
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Trade List for the Year 2008 (continued) 
TRADE  ENTRY STRATEGY TRADE PRICE CONTRACTS TRADE  EXIT TRADE  PRICE PROFIT  /   (LOSS) COMMISSION SLIPPAGE NET  PROFIT CUM.  PF  CAPITAL
$ 8 0 1, 6 5 8 . 0 0
1- Oc t - 0 8 Cr ude  Oi l S e l l  S hor t $ 110 . 4 6 15 1- Oc t - 0 8 Buy  t o Cov e r $ 110 . 6 7 3 , 15 0 . 0 0 4 3 . 5 0 10 0 . 0 0 3 , 2 9 3 . 5 0 $ 7 9 8 , 3 6 4 . 5 0
2 - Oc t - 0 8 Cr ude  Oi l S e l l  S hor t $ 10 9 . 10 15 8 - Oc t - 0 8 Buy  t o Cov e r $ 10 1. 9 6 10 7 , 10 0 . 0 0 4 3 . 5 0 10 0 . 0 0 10 6 , 9 5 6 . 5 0 $ 9 0 5 , 3 2 1. 0 0
9 - Oc t - 0 8 Cr ude  Oi l S e l l  S hor t $ 10 0 . 7 4 15 9 - Oc t - 0 8 Buy  t o Cov e r $ 10 0 . 8 7 1, 9 5 0 . 0 0 4 3 . 5 0 10 0 . 0 0 2 , 0 9 3 . 5 0 $ 9 0 3 , 2 2 7 . 5 0
9 - Oc t - 0 8 Cr ude  Oi l S e l l  S hor t $ 9 9 . 3 5 15 13 - Oc t - 0 8 Buy  t o Cov e r $ 9 8 . 6 5 10 , 5 0 0 . 0 0 4 3 . 5 0 10 0 . 0 0 10 , 3 5 6 . 5 0 $ 9 13 , 5 8 4 . 0 0
10 - Oc t - 0 8 Nor we gi a n Kr one S e l l  S hor t $ 0 . 14 8 5 13 0 14 - Oc t - 0 8 Buy  t o Cov e r $ 0 . 14 9 8 3 4 , 0 6 0 . 0 0 4 16 . 0 0 10 0 . 0 0 3 4 , 5 7 6 . 0 0 $ 8 7 9 , 0 0 8 . 0 0
9 - Oc t - 0 8 S . A .  Ra nd S e l l  S hor t $ 0 . 9 3 7 6 5 2 1- Oc t - 0 8 Buy  t o Cov e r $ 0 . 8 17 1 3 0 1, 2 5 0 . 0 0 16 . 0 0 10 0 . 0 0 3 0 1, 13 4 . 0 0 $ 1, 18 0 , 14 2 . 0 0
9 - Oc t - 0 8 Commodi t y  I nde x S e l l  S hor t $ 7 6 6 . 3 5 2 0 2 9 - Oc t - 0 8 Buy  t o Cov e r $ 6 6 9 . 8 0 4 8 2 , 7 5 0 . 0 0 5 4 . 0 0 10 0 . 0 0 4 8 2 , 5 9 6 . 0 0 $ 1, 6 6 2 , 7 3 8 . 0 0
15 - Oc t - 0 8 Nor we gi a n Kr one S e l l  S hor t $ 0 . 14 5 0 13 0 4 - Nov - 0 8 Buy  t o Cov e r $ 0 . 13 8 2 17 7 , 3 2 0 . 0 0 4 16 . 0 0 10 0 . 0 0 17 6 , 8 0 4 . 0 0 $ 1, 8 3 9 , 5 4 2 . 0 0
Source: TradeStation, 2013 
 
 
Table 6-2:   Trade List for the Year 2009 
TRADE  ENTRY STRATEGY TRADE PRICE CONTRACTS TRADE  EXIT TRADE  PRICE PROFIT  /   (LOSS) COMMISSION SLIPPAGE NET  PROFIT CUM.  PF  CAPITAL
$ 1, 8 3 9 , 5 4 2 . 0 0
2 0 - J a n- 0 9 Cr ude  Oi l S e l l  S hor t $ 7 0 . 3 2 2 5 2 6 - J a n- 0 9 Buy  t o Cov e r $ 6 9 . 8 6 $ 11, 5 0 0 . 0 0 $ 7 2 . 5 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 11, 3 2 7 . 5 0 $ 1, 8 5 0 , 8 6 9 . 5 0
Source: TradeStation, 2013 
 
 
Table 6-3:   Trade List for the Year 2010 
TRADE  ENTRY STRATEGY TRADE PRICE CONTRACTS TRADE  EXIT TRADE  PRICE PROFIT  /   (LOSS) COMMISSION SLIPPAGE NET  PROFIT CUM.  PF  CAPITAL
$ 1, 8 5 0 , 8 6 9 . 5 0
4 - Oc t - 10 Cr ude  Oi l Buy $ 9 0 . 4 3 2 5 7 - Oc t - 10 S e l l $ 9 0 . 4 3 $ 0 . 0 0 $ 7 2 . 5 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 17 2 . 5 0 $ 1, 8 5 0 , 6 9 7 . 0 0
4 - Oc t - 10 Commodi t y  I nde x Buy $ 5 8 5 . 10 3 5 15 - Oc t - 10 S e l l $ 5 9 9 . 8 0 $ 12 8 , 6 2 5 . 0 0 $ 9 4 . 5 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 12 8 , 4 3 0 . 5 0 $ 1, 9 7 9 , 12 7 . 5 0
4 - Nov - 10 Cr ude  Oi l Buy $ 9 4 . 5 3 2 5 8 - Nov - 10 S e l l $ 9 4 . 2 7 $ 6 , 5 0 0 . 0 0 $ 7 2 . 5 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 6 , 6 7 2 . 5 0 $ 1, 9 7 2 , 4 5 5 . 0 0
4 - Nov - 10 Nor we gi a n Kr one Buy $ 0 . 16 7 7 2 4 0 10 - Nov - 10 S e l l $ 0 . 16 4 3 $ 16 2 , 2 4 0 . 0 0 $ 7 6 8 . 0 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 16 3 , 10 8 . 0 0 $ 1, 8 0 9 , 3 4 7 . 0 0
4 - Nov - 10 Commodi t y  I nde x Buy $ 6 2 2 . 3 5 3 5 12 - Nov - 10 S e l l $ 6 14 . 4 0 $ 6 9 , 5 6 2 . 5 0 $ 9 4 . 5 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 6 9 , 7 5 7 . 0 0 $ 1, 7 3 9 , 5 9 0 . 0 0
Source: TradeStation, 2013 
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Table 6-4:   Trade List for the Year 2011 
TRADE  ENTRY STRATEGY TRADE PRICE CONTRACTS TRADE  EXIT TRADE  PRICE PROFIT  /   (LOSS) COMMISSION SLIPPAGE NET  PROFIT CUM.  PF  CAPITAL
$ 1, 7 3 9 , 5 9 0 . 0 0
3 - J a n- 11 Commodi t y  I nde x Buy $ 6 5 7 . 8 0 3 5 4 - J a n- 11 S e l l $ 6 4 7 . 0 5 $ 9 4 , 0 6 2 . 5 0 $ 9 4 . 5 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 9 4 , 2 5 7 . 0 0 $ 1, 6 4 5 , 3 3 3 . 0 0
3 - J a n- 11 Cr ude  Oi l Buy $ 9 9 . 0 4 2 5 4 - J a n- 11 S e l l $ 9 6 . 2 8 $ 6 9 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 $ 7 2 . 5 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 6 9 , 17 2 . 5 0 $ 1, 5 7 6 , 16 0 . 5 0
3 - J a n- 11 Nor we gi a n Kr one Buy $ 0 . 16 4 9 2 4 0 6 - J a n- 11 S e l l $ 0 . 16 13 $ 16 8 , 4 8 0 . 0 0 $ 7 6 8 . 0 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 16 9 , 3 4 8 . 0 0 $ 1, 4 0 6 , 8 12 . 5 0
17 - Fe b- 11 P l a t i num Buy $ 1, 8 9 1. 3 0 5 5 2 2 - Fe b- 11 S e l l $ 1, 8 8 3 . 10 $ 2 2 , 5 5 0 . 0 0 $ 15 9 . 5 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 2 2 , 8 0 9 . 5 0 $ 1, 3 8 4 , 0 0 3 . 0 0
18 - Fe b- 11 US  Tr e a sur y  Bond Buy $ 10 8 . 5 6 2 5 8 0 1- M a r - 11 S e l l $ 110 . 6 5 6 3 $ 16 7 , 5 0 0 . 0 0 $ 2 5 6 . 0 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 16 7 , 14 4 . 0 0 $ 1, 5 5 1, 14 7 . 0 0
7 - M a r - 11 Ca na di a n Dol l a r Buy $ 1. 0 0 6 7 13 5 7 - M a r - 11 S e l l $ 1. 0 0 2 8 $ 5 2 , 6 5 0 . 0 0 $ 4 3 2 . 0 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 5 3 , 18 2 . 0 0 $ 1, 4 9 7 , 9 6 5 . 0 0
7 - M a r - 11 Cr ude  Oi l Buy $ 10 7 . 7 6 2 5 8 - M a r - 11 S e l l $ 10 7 . 15 $ 15 , 2 5 0 . 0 0 $ 7 2 . 5 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 15 , 4 2 2 . 5 0 $ 1, 4 8 2 , 5 4 2 . 5 0
2 8 - Fe b- 11 Commodi t y  I nde x Buy $ 7 0 0 . 6 5 3 5 10 - M a r - 11 S e l l $ 7 14 . 9 5 $ 12 5 , 12 5 . 0 0 $ 9 4 . 5 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 12 4 , 9 3 0 . 5 0 $ 1, 6 0 7 , 4 7 3 . 0 0
3 1- M a r - 11 P l a t i num Buy $ 1, 8 12 . 4 0 5 5 1- Apr - 11 S e l l $ 1, 8 14 . 4 0 $ 5 , 5 0 0 . 0 0 $ 15 9 . 5 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 5 , 2 4 0 . 5 0 $ 1, 6 12 , 7 13 . 5 0
3 1- M a r - 11 US  Tr e a sur y  Bond Buy $ 111. 0 6 2 5 8 0 3 - Apr - 11 S e l l $ 111. 3 12 5 $ 2 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 $ 2 5 6 . 0 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 19 , 6 4 4 . 0 0 $ 1, 6 3 2 , 3 5 7 . 5 0
3 1- M a r - 11 Cr ude  Oi l Buy $ 10 7 . 7 6 2 5 5 - Apr - 11 S e l l $ 10 9 . 2 2 $ 3 6 , 5 0 0 . 0 0 $ 7 2 . 5 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 3 6 , 3 2 7 . 5 0 $ 1, 6 6 8 , 6 8 5 . 0 0
4 - Apr - 11 US  Tr e a sur y  Bond Buy $ 111. 6 2 5 0 8 0 5 - Apr - 11 S e l l $ 111. 15 6 3 $ 3 7 , 5 0 0 . 0 0 $ 2 5 6 . 0 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 3 7 , 8 5 6 . 0 0 $ 1, 6 3 0 , 8 2 9 . 0 0
3 1- M a r - 11 Commodi t y  I nde x Buy $ 7 2 9 . 9 5 3 5 12 - Apr - 11 S e l l $ 7 3 0 . 9 5 $ 8 , 7 5 0 . 0 0 $ 9 4 . 5 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 8 , 5 5 5 . 5 0 $ 1, 6 3 9 , 3 8 4 . 5 0
4 - Apr - 11 Ca na di a n Dol l a r Buy $ 1. 0 0 9 4 13 5 12 - Apr - 11 S e l l $ 1. 0 14 0 $ 6 2 , 10 0 . 0 0 $ 4 3 2 . 0 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 6 1, 5 6 8 . 0 0 $ 1, 7 0 0 , 9 5 2 . 5 0
2 5 - Apr - 11 Cr ude  Oi l Buy $ 111. 9 9 2 5 2 5 - Apr - 11 S e l l $ 112 . 3 5 $ 9 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 $ 7 2 . 5 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 8 , 8 2 7 . 5 0 $ 1, 7 0 9 , 7 8 0 . 0 0
2 5 - Apr - 11 Ca na di a n Dol l a r Buy $ 1. 0 2 3 9 13 5 2 5 - Apr - 11 S e l l $ 1. 0 2 4 2 $ 4 , 0 5 0 . 0 0 $ 4 3 2 . 0 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 3 , 5 18 . 0 0 $ 1, 7 13 , 2 9 8 . 0 0
2 6 - Apr - 11 Ca na di a n Dol l a r Buy $ 1. 0 2 8 5 13 5 2 7 - Apr - 11 S e l l $ 1. 0 2 4 0 $ 6 0 , 7 5 0 . 0 0 $ 4 3 2 . 0 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 6 1, 2 8 2 . 0 0 $ 1, 6 5 2 , 0 16 . 0 0
2 8 - Apr - 11 US  Tr e a sur y  Bond Buy $ 113 . 12 5 0 8 0 2 8 - Apr - 11 S e l l $ 113 . 0 0 0 0 $ 10 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 $ 2 5 6 . 0 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 10 , 3 5 6 . 0 0 $ 1, 6 4 1, 6 6 0 . 0 0
2 7 - Apr - 11 Cr ude  Oi l Buy $ 112 . 10 2 5 1- M a y - 11 S e l l $ 113 . 7 0 $ 4 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 $ 7 2 . 5 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 3 9 , 8 2 7 . 5 0 $ 1, 6 8 1, 4 8 7 . 5 0
2 9 - Apr - 11 Ca na di a n Dol l a r Buy $ 1. 0 3 5 0 13 5 2 - M a y - 11 S e l l $ 1. 0 3 0 8 $ 5 6 , 7 0 0 . 0 0 $ 4 3 2 . 0 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 5 7 , 2 3 2 . 0 0 $ 1, 6 2 4 , 2 5 5 . 5 0
2 5 - Apr - 11 Commodi t y  I nde x Buy $ 7 4 7 . 10 3 5 3 - M a y - 11 S e l l $ 7 4 8 . 2 0 $ 9 , 6 2 5 . 0 0 $ 9 4 . 5 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 9 , 4 3 0 . 5 0 $ 1, 6 3 3 , 6 8 6 . 0 0
2 9 - Apr - 11 P l a t i num Buy $ 1, 9 2 2 . 10 5 5 3 - M a y - 11 S e l l $ 1, 9 0 3 . 6 0 $ 5 0 , 8 7 5 . 0 0 $ 15 9 . 5 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 5 1, 13 4 . 5 0 $ 1, 5 8 2 , 5 5 1. 5 0
17 - Fe b- 11 S i l v e r Buy $ 3 1. 5 0 0 10 3 - M a y - 11 S e l l $ 4 0 . 2 5 0 $ 4 3 7 , 5 0 0 . 0 0 $ 2 9 . 0 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 4 3 7 , 3 7 1. 0 0 $ 2 , 0 19 , 9 2 2 . 5 0
3 - M a y - 11 Ca na di a n Dol l a r Buy $ 1. 0 3 3 5 13 5 3 - M a y - 11 S e l l $ 1. 0 2 8 0 $ 7 4 , 2 5 0 . 0 0 $ 4 3 2 . 0 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 7 4 , 7 8 2 . 0 0 $ 1, 9 4 5 , 14 0 . 5 0
2 8 - Fe b- 11 S . A .  Ra nd Buy $ 0 . 12 5 8 7 0 13 - M a y - 11 S e l l $ 0 . 12 8 7 $ 10 3 , 2 5 0 . 0 0 $ 2 2 4 . 0 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 10 2 , 9 2 6 . 0 0 $ 2 , 0 4 8 , 0 6 6 . 5 0
7 - Oc t - 10 Aust r a l i a n Dol l a r Buy $ 0 . 8 6 9 9 8 0 2 - J un- 11 S e l l $ 0 . 9 7 6 3 $ 8 5 1, 2 0 0 . 0 0 $ 2 5 6 . 0 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 8 5 0 , 8 4 4 . 0 0 $ 2 , 8 9 8 , 9 10 . 5 0
2 - J un- 11 Ca na di a n Dol l a r Buy $ 1. 0 0 4 1 13 5 2 - J un- 11 S e l l $ 1. 0 0 4 5 $ 5 , 4 0 0 . 0 0 $ 4 3 2 . 0 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 4 , 8 6 8 . 0 0 $ 2 , 9 0 3 , 7 7 8 . 5 0
2 - J un- 11 Nor we gi a n Kr one Buy $ 0 . 18 0 4 2 4 0 9 - J un- 11 S e l l $ 0 . 17 8 6 $ 8 6 , 4 0 0 . 0 0 $ 7 6 8 . 0 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 8 7 , 2 6 8 . 0 0 $ 2 , 8 16 , 5 10 . 5 0
8 - J un- 11 Commodi t y  I nde x Buy $ 7 0 5 . 3 5 3 5 13 - J un- 11 S e l l $ 7 0 1. 0 0 $ 3 8 , 0 6 2 . 5 0 $ 9 4 . 5 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 3 8 , 2 5 7 . 0 0 $ 2 , 7 7 8 , 2 5 3 . 5 0
13 - J ul - 11 P l a t i num Buy $ 1, 8 0 0 . 0 0 5 5 15 - J ul - 11 S e l l $ 1, 7 9 9 . 6 0 $ 1, 10 0 . 0 0 $ 15 9 . 5 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 1, 3 5 9 . 5 0 $ 2 , 7 7 6 , 8 9 4 . 0 0
2 5 - J ul - 11 P l a t i num Buy $ 1, 8 3 3 . 10 5 5 2 5 - J ul - 11 S e l l $ 1, 8 19 . 10 $ 3 8 , 5 0 0 . 0 0 $ 15 9 . 5 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 3 8 , 7 5 9 . 5 0 $ 2 , 7 3 8 , 13 4 . 5 0
2 6 - J ul - 11 Ca na di a n Dol l a r Buy $ 1. 0 4 0 0 13 5 2 7 - J ul - 11 S e l l $ 1. 0 3 2 7 $ 9 8 , 5 5 0 . 0 0 $ 4 3 2 . 0 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 9 9 , 0 8 2 . 0 0 $ 2 , 6 3 9 , 0 5 2 . 5 0
2 7 - J ul - 11 Cr ude  Oi l Buy $ 9 8 . 2 3 2 5 2 7 - J ul - 11 S e l l $ 9 7 . 7 6 $ 11, 7 5 0 . 0 0 $ 7 2 . 5 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 11, 9 2 2 . 5 0 $ 2 , 6 2 7 , 13 0 . 0 0
2 6 - J ul - 11 Aust r a l i a n Dol l a r Buy $ 1. 0 12 7 8 0 2 9 - J ul - 11 S e l l $ 1. 0 12 4 $ 2 , 4 0 0 . 0 0 $ 2 5 6 . 0 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 2 , 7 5 6 . 0 0 $ 2 , 6 2 4 , 3 7 4 . 0 0
12 - De c - 11 P l a t i num S e l l  S hor t $ 1, 5 2 1. 7 0 5 5 16 - De c - 11 Buy  t o Cov e r $ 1, 4 5 7 . 2 0 $ 17 7 , 3 7 5 . 0 0 $ 15 9 . 5 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 17 7 , 115 . 5 0 $ 2 , 8 0 1, 4 8 9 . 5 0
Source: TradeStation, 2013 
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Table 6-5:   Trade List for the Year 2012 
TRADE  ENTRY STRATEGY TRADE PRICE CONTRACTS TRADE  EXIT TRADE  PRICE PROFIT  /   (LOSS) COMMISSION SLIPPAGE NET  PROFIT CUM.  PF  CAPITAL
$ 2 , 8 0 1, 4 8 9 . 5 0
2 6 - J a n- 12 Cr ude  Oi l Buy $ 9 8 . 4 5 3 5 2 7 - J a n- 12 S e l l $ 9 7 . 5 6 $ 3 1, 15 0 . 0 0 $ 10 1. 5 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 3 1, 3 5 1. 5 0 $ 2 , 7 7 0 , 13 8 . 0 0
2 3 - Fe b- 12 P l a t i num Buy $ 1, 7 5 7 . 2 0 8 0 2 4 - Fe b- 12 S e l l $ 1, 7 4 2 . 0 0 $ 6 0 , 8 0 0 . 0 0 $ 2 3 2 . 0 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 6 1, 13 2 . 0 0 $ 2 , 7 0 9 , 0 0 6 . 0 0
2 8 - Fe b- 12 Commodi t y  I nde x Buy $ 7 0 0 . 10 5 0 2 9 - Fe b- 12 S e l l $ 6 9 7 . 0 5 $ 3 8 , 12 5 . 0 0 $ 13 5 . 0 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 3 8 , 3 6 0 . 0 0 $ 2 , 6 7 0 , 6 4 6 . 0 0
2 9 - Fe b- 12 Aust r a l i a n Dol l a r Buy $ 1. 0 2 5 5 12 0 2 9 - Fe b- 12 S e l l $ 1. 0 18 8 $ 8 0 , 4 0 0 . 0 0 $ 3 8 4 . 0 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 8 0 , 8 8 4 . 0 0 $ 2 , 5 8 9 , 7 6 2 . 0 0
2 8 - Fe b- 12 Ca na di a n Dol l a r Buy $ 0 . 9 9 18 2 0 0 2 - M a r - 12 S e l l $ 0 . 9 9 7 8 $ 12 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 $ 6 4 0 . 0 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 119 , 2 6 0 . 0 0 $ 2 , 7 0 9 , 0 2 2 . 0 0
2 8 - Fe b- 12 Nor we gi a n Kr one Buy $ 0 . 17 5 5 3 6 0 2 - M a r - 12 S e l l $ 0 . 17 4 0 $ 10 9 , 4 4 0 . 0 0 $ 1, 15 2 . 0 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 110 , 6 9 2 . 0 0 $ 2 , 5 9 8 , 3 3 0 . 0 0
2 3 - Fe b- 12 S i l v e r Buy $ 3 5 . 0 9 5 15 6 - M a r - 12 S e l l $ 3 2 . 9 4 0 $ 16 1, 6 2 5 . 0 0 $ 4 3 . 5 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 16 1, 7 6 8 . 5 0 $ 2 , 4 3 6 , 5 6 1. 5 0
2 7 - M a r - 12 Ca na di a n Dol l a r Buy $ 0 . 9 9 3 5 2 0 0 2 8 - M a r - 12 S e l l $ 0 . 9 8 9 4 $ 8 2 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 $ 6 4 0 . 0 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 8 2 , 7 4 0 . 0 0 $ 2 , 3 5 3 , 8 2 1. 5 0
4 - Apr - 12 Cr ude  Oi l S e l l  S hor t $ 9 8 . 7 0 3 5 9 - Apr - 12 Buy  t o Cov e r $ 9 8 . 7 3 $ 1, 0 5 0 . 0 0 $ 10 1. 5 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 1, 2 5 1. 5 0 $ 2 , 3 5 2 , 5 7 0 . 0 0
2 6 - Apr - 12 Cr ude  Oi l Buy $ 10 0 . 5 0 3 5 3 0 - Apr - 12 S e l l $ 9 9 . 8 0 $ 2 4 , 5 0 0 . 0 0 $ 10 1. 5 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 2 4 , 7 0 1. 5 0 $ 2 , 3 2 7 , 8 6 8 . 5 0
16 - M a y - 12 Cr ude  Oi l S e l l  S hor t $ 8 9 . 8 1 3 5 2 1- M a y - 12 Buy  t o Cov e r $ 8 8 . 7 7 $ 3 6 , 4 0 0 . 0 0 $ 10 1. 5 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 3 6 , 19 8 . 5 0 $ 2 , 3 6 4 , 0 6 7 . 0 0
2 2 - J un- 12 P l a t i num S e l l  S hor t $ 1, 4 5 7 . 3 0 8 0 2 5 - J un- 12 Buy  t o Cov e r $ 1, 4 6 3 . 6 0 $ 2 5 , 2 0 0 . 0 0 $ 2 3 2 . 0 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 2 5 , 5 3 2 . 0 0 $ 2 , 3 3 8 , 5 3 5 . 0 0
2 - Aug- 12 P l a t i num S e l l  S hor t $ 1, 4 0 8 . 10 8 0 3 - Aug- 12 Buy  t o Cov e r $ 1, 4 18 . 0 0 $ 3 9 , 6 0 0 . 0 0 $ 2 3 2 . 0 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 3 9 , 9 3 2 . 0 0 $ 2 , 2 9 8 , 6 0 3 . 0 0
19 - Aug- 12 P l a t i num Buy $ 1, 4 9 3 . 6 0 8 0 2 6 - Aug- 12 S e l l $ 1, 5 7 2 . 4 0 $ 3 15 , 2 0 0 . 0 0 $ 2 3 2 . 0 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 3 14 , 8 6 8 . 0 0 $ 2 , 6 13 , 4 7 1. 0 0
10 - S e p- 12 Commodi t y  I nde x Buy $ 6 7 7 . 9 0 5 0 17 - S e p- 12 S e l l $ 6 7 3 . 7 0 $ 5 2 , 5 0 0 . 0 0 $ 13 5 . 0 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 5 2 , 7 3 5 . 0 0 $ 2 , 5 6 0 , 7 3 6 . 0 0
Source: TradeStation, 2013 
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Table 6-6:   Trade List for the Year 2013 
TRADE  ENTRY STRATEGY TRADE PRICE CONTRACTS TRADE  EXIT TRADE  PRICE PROFIT  /   (LOSS) COMMISSION SLIPPAGE NET  PROFIT CUM.  PF  CAPITAL
$ 2 , 5 6 0 , 7 3 6 . 0 0
4 - J a n- 13 P l a t i num S e l l  S hor t $ 1, 5 6 0 . 7 0 8 0 6 - J a n- 13 Buy  t o Cov e r $ 1, 5 8 0 . 5 0 $ 7 9 , 2 0 0 . 0 0 $ 2 3 2 . 0 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 7 9 , 5 3 2 . 0 0 $ 2 , 4 8 1, 2 0 4 . 0 0
4 - J a n- 13 S i l v e r S e l l  S hor t $ 2 9 . 8 4 5 15 7 - J a n- 13 Buy  t o Cov e r $ 3 0 . 3 2 5 $ 3 6 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 $ 4 3 . 5 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 3 6 , 14 3 . 5 0 $ 2 , 4 4 5 , 0 6 0 . 5 0
2 4 - J a n- 13 P l a t i num S e l l  S hor t $ 1, 6 9 5 . 2 0 8 0 2 5 - J a n- 13 Buy  t o Cov e r $ 1, 7 0 5 . 9 0 $ 4 2 , 8 0 0 . 0 0 $ 2 3 2 . 0 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 4 3 , 13 2 . 0 0 $ 2 , 4 0 1, 9 2 8 . 5 0
2 4 - J a n- 13 S i l v e r S e l l  S hor t $ 3 1. 8 4 5 15 3 0 - J a n- 13 Buy  t o Cov e r $ 3 1. 6 5 0 $ 14 , 6 2 5 . 0 0 $ 4 3 . 5 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 14 , 4 8 1. 5 0 $ 2 , 4 16 , 4 10 . 0 0
18 - Fe b- 13 P l a t i num S e l l  S hor t $ 1, 7 0 4 . 7 0 8 0 18 - Fe b- 13 Buy  t o Cov e r $ 1, 7 0 9 . 9 0 $ 2 0 , 8 0 0 . 0 0 $ 2 3 2 . 0 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 2 1, 13 2 . 0 0 $ 2 , 3 9 5 , 2 7 8 . 0 0
11- Fe b- 13 S i l v e r S e l l  S hor t $ 3 1. 2 4 0 15 2 2 - Fe b- 13 Buy  t o Cov e r $ 2 8 . 8 3 5 $ 18 0 , 3 7 5 . 0 0 $ 4 3 . 5 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 18 0 , 2 3 1. 5 0 $ 2 , 5 7 5 , 5 0 9 . 5 0
4 - J a n- 13 Gol d S e l l  S hor t $ 1, 6 7 9 . 0 0 2 5 18 - M a r - 13 Buy  t o Cov e r $ 1, 6 2 6 . 9 0 $ 13 0 , 2 5 0 . 0 0 $ 7 2 . 5 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 13 0 , 0 7 7 . 5 0 $ 2 , 7 0 5 , 5 8 7 . 0 0
17 - Apr - 13 Aust r a l i a n Dol l a r S e l l  S hor t $ 1. 0 14 0 12 0 19 - Apr - 13 Buy  t o Cov e r $ 1. 0 14 1 $ 1, 2 0 0 . 0 0 $ 3 8 4 . 0 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 1, 6 8 4 . 0 0 $ 2 , 7 0 3 , 9 0 3 . 0 0
17 - Apr - 13 Ca na di a n Dol l a r S e l l  S hor t $ 0 . 9 6 8 4 2 0 0 19 - Apr - 13 Buy  t o Cov e r $ 0 . 9 7 0 4 $ 4 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 $ 6 4 0 . 0 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 4 0 , 7 4 0 . 0 0 $ 2 , 6 6 3 , 16 3 . 0 0
17 - Apr - 13 Cr ude  Oi l S e l l  S hor t $ 7 8 . 0 3 3 5 19 - Apr - 13 Buy  t o Cov e r $ 8 0 . 6 6 $ 9 2 , 0 5 0 . 0 0 $ 10 1. 5 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 9 2 , 2 5 1. 5 0 $ 2 , 5 7 0 , 9 11. 5 0
2 9 - Apr - 13 Cr ude  Oi l Buy $ 8 5 . 8 5 3 5 1- M a y - 13 S e l l $ 8 3 . 8 2 $ 7 1, 0 5 0 . 0 0 $ 10 1. 5 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 7 1, 2 5 1. 5 0 $ 2 , 4 9 9 , 6 6 0 . 0 0
10 - M a y - 13 Nor we gi a n Kr one S e l l  S hor t $ 0 . 17 0 2 3 6 0 13 - M a y - 13 Buy  t o Cov e r $ 0 . 17 0 6 $ 2 6 , 6 4 0 . 0 0 $ 1, 15 2 . 0 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 2 7 , 8 9 2 . 0 0 $ 2 , 4 7 1, 7 6 8 . 0 0
10 - M a y - 13 S i l v e r S e l l  S hor t $ 2 3 . 4 2 0 15 14 - M a y - 13 Buy  t o Cov e r $ 2 3 . 4 8 0 $ 4 , 5 0 0 . 0 0 $ 4 3 . 5 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 4 , 6 4 3 . 5 0 $ 2 , 4 6 7 , 12 4 . 5 0
10 - M a y - 13 P l a t i num S e l l  S hor t $ 1, 4 8 7 . 7 0 8 0 14 - M a y - 13 Buy  t o Cov e r $ 1, 5 0 1. 8 0 $ 5 6 , 4 0 0 . 0 0 $ 2 3 2 . 0 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 5 6 , 7 3 2 . 0 0 $ 2 , 4 10 , 3 9 2 . 5 0
10 - M a y - 13 Cr ude  Oi l S e l l  S hor t $ 8 7 . 4 7 3 5 14 - M a y - 13 Buy  t o Cov e r $ 8 6 . 3 6 $ 3 8 , 8 5 0 . 0 0 $ 10 1. 5 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 3 8 , 6 4 8 . 5 0 $ 2 , 4 4 9 , 0 4 1. 0 0
10 - M a y - 13 Ca na di a n Dol l a r S e l l  S hor t $ 0 . 9 8 3 1 2 0 0 16 - M a y - 13 Buy  t o Cov e r $ 0 . 9 7 9 3 $ 7 6 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 $ 6 4 0 . 0 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 7 5 , 2 6 0 . 0 0 $ 2 , 5 2 4 , 3 0 1. 0 0
13 - M a y - 13 US  Tr e a sur y  Bond S e l l  S hor t $ 14 2 . 4 0 6 3 6 5 16 - M a y - 13 Buy  t o Cov e r $ 14 2 . 8 7 5 0 $ 3 0 , 4 6 8 . 7 5 $ 2 0 8 . 0 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 3 0 , 7 7 6 . 7 5 $ 2 , 4 9 3 , 5 2 4 . 2 5
16 - M a y - 13 Gol d S e l l  S hor t $ 1, 3 9 2 . 8 0 2 5 17 - M a y - 13 Buy  t o Cov e r $ 1, 4 0 1. 4 0 $ 2 1, 5 0 0 . 0 0 $ 7 2 . 5 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 2 1, 6 7 2 . 5 0 $ 2 , 4 7 1, 8 5 1. 7 5
16 - M a y - 13 S i l v e r S e l l  S hor t $ 2 2 . 3 3 5 15 2 0 - M a y - 13 Buy  t o Cov e r $ 2 2 . 8 0 5 $ 3 5 , 2 5 0 . 0 0 $ 4 3 . 5 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 3 5 , 3 9 3 . 5 0 $ 2 , 4 3 6 , 4 5 8 . 2 5
16 - M a y - 13 P l a t i num S e l l  S hor t $ 1, 4 7 7 . 2 0 8 0 2 0 - M a y - 13 Buy  t o Cov e r $ 1, 4 9 4 . 3 0 $ 6 8 , 4 0 0 . 0 0 $ 2 3 2 . 0 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 6 8 , 7 3 2 . 0 0 $ 2 , 3 6 7 , 7 2 6 . 2 5
10 - M a y - 13 Aust r a l i a n Dol l a r S e l l  S hor t $ 0 . 9 8 5 6 12 0 2 0 - M a y - 13 Buy  t o Cov e r $ 0 . 9 6 8 0 $ 2 11, 2 0 0 . 0 0 $ 3 8 4 . 0 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 2 10 , 7 16 . 0 0 $ 2 , 5 7 8 , 4 4 2 . 2 5
15 - M a y - 13 Nor we gi a n Kr one S e l l  S hor t $ 0 . 16 9 3 3 6 0 2 1- M a y - 13 Buy  t o Cov e r $ 0 . 17 0 9 $ 12 1, 6 8 0 . 0 0 $ 1, 15 2 . 0 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 12 2 , 9 3 2 . 0 0 $ 2 , 4 5 5 , 5 10 . 2 5
2 2 - M a y - 13 Nor we gi a n Kr one S e l l  S hor t $ 0 . 17 0 4 3 6 0 2 3 - M a y - 13 Buy  t o Cov e r $ 0 . 16 9 5 $ 6 1, 9 2 0 . 0 0 $ 1, 15 2 . 0 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 6 0 , 6 6 8 . 0 0 $ 2 , 5 16 , 17 8 . 2 5
2 2 - M a y - 13 S i l v e r S e l l  S hor t $ 2 2 . 4 6 0 15 2 3 - M a y - 13 Buy  t o Cov e r $ 2 2 . 4 6 0 $ 0 . 0 0 $ 4 3 . 5 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 14 3 . 5 0 $ 2 , 5 16 , 0 3 4 . 7 5
2 2 - M a y - 13 P l a t i num S e l l  S hor t $ 1, 4 7 0 . 10 8 0 2 3 - M a y - 13 Buy  t o Cov e r $ 1, 4 6 1. 3 0 $ 3 5 , 2 0 0 . 0 0 $ 2 3 2 . 0 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 3 4 , 8 6 8 . 0 0 $ 2 , 5 5 0 , 9 0 2 . 7 5
10 - M a y - 13 S . A .  Ra nd S e l l  S hor t $ 0 . 10 6 6 10 0 2 4 - M a y - 13 Buy  t o Cov e r $ 0 . 10 19 $ 2 3 2 , 5 0 0 . 0 0 $ 3 2 0 . 0 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 2 3 2 , 0 8 0 . 0 0 $ 2 , 7 8 2 , 9 8 2 . 7 5
2 2 - M a y - 13 Aust r a l i a n Dol l a r S e l l  S hor t $ 0 . 9 5 5 2 12 0 2 4 - M a y - 13 Buy  t o Cov e r $ 0 . 9 5 4 4 $ 9 , 6 0 0 . 0 0 $ 3 8 4 . 0 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 9 , 116 . 0 0 $ 2 , 7 9 2 , 0 9 8 . 7 5
2 2 - M a y - 13 Ca na di a n Dol l a r S e l l  S hor t $ 0 . 9 5 8 4 2 0 0 2 4 - M a y - 13 Buy  t o Cov e r $ 0 . 9 6 3 9 $ 110 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 $ 6 4 0 . 0 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 110 , 7 4 0 . 0 0 $ 2 , 6 8 1, 3 5 8 . 7 5
2 2 - M a y - 13 Commodi t y  I nde x S e l l  S hor t $ 6 12 . 7 0 5 0 3 0 - M a y - 13 Buy  t o Cov e r $ 6 10 . 8 5 $ 2 3 , 12 5 . 0 0 $ 13 5 . 0 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 2 2 , 8 9 0 . 0 0 $ 2 , 7 0 4 , 2 4 8 . 7 5
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Trade List for the Year 2013 (continued) 
TRADE  ENTRY STRATEGY TRADE PRICE CONTRACTS TRADE  EXIT TRADE  PRICE PROFIT  /   (LOSS) COMMISSION SLIPPAGE NET  PROFIT CUM.  PF  CAPITAL
$ 2 , 7 0 4 , 2 4 8 . 7 5
3 0 - M a y - 13 S i l v e r Buy $ 2 2 . 8 10 15 3 1- M a y - 13 S e l l $ 2 2 . 3 0 0 $ 3 8 , 2 5 0 . 0 0 $ 4 3 . 5 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 3 8 , 3 9 3 . 5 0 $ 2 , 6 6 5 , 8 5 5 . 2 5
3 0 - M a y - 13 P l a t i num Buy $ 1, 4 9 0 . 8 0 8 0 3 - J un- 13 S e l l $ 1, 4 7 1. 9 0 $ 7 5 , 6 0 0 . 0 0 $ 2 3 2 . 0 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 7 5 , 9 3 2 . 0 0 $ 2 , 5 8 9 , 9 2 3 . 2 5
6 - J un- 13 S i l v e r Buy $ 2 2 . 6 7 0 15 7 - J un- 13 S e l l $ 2 2 . 0 6 0 $ 4 5 , 7 5 0 . 0 0 $ 4 3 . 5 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 4 5 , 8 9 3 . 5 0 $ 2 , 5 4 4 , 0 2 9 . 7 5
6 - J un- 13 P l a t i num Buy $ 1, 5 3 4 . 7 0 8 0 7 - J un- 13 S e l l $ 1, 5 11. 0 0 $ 9 4 , 8 0 0 . 0 0 $ 2 3 2 . 0 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 9 5 , 13 2 . 0 0 $ 2 , 4 4 8 , 8 9 7 . 7 5
2 0 - J un- 13 Aust r a l i a n Dol l a r S e l l  S hor t $ 0 . 9 0 9 4 12 0 2 4 - J un- 13 Buy  t o Cov e r $ 0 . 9 0 7 8 $ 19 , 2 0 0 . 0 0 $ 3 8 4 . 0 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 18 , 7 16 . 0 0 $ 2 , 4 6 7 , 6 13 . 7 5
2 0 - J un- 13 S i l v e r S e l l  S hor t $ 2 0 . 110 15 2 4 - J un- 13 Buy  t o Cov e r $ 19 . 8 6 0 $ 18 , 7 5 0 . 0 0 $ 4 3 . 5 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 18 , 6 0 6 . 5 0 $ 2 , 4 8 6 , 2 2 0 . 2 5
2 0 - J un- 13 Cr ude  Oi l S e l l  S hor t $ 8 6 . 13 3 5 2 5 - J un- 13 Buy  t o Cov e r $ 8 6 . 15 $ 7 0 0 . 0 0 $ 10 1. 5 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 9 0 1. 5 0 $ 2 , 4 8 5 , 3 18 . 7 5
2 1- J un- 13 S . A .  Ra nd S e l l  S hor t $ 0 . 0 9 5 6 10 0 2 5 - J un- 13 Buy  t o Cov e r $ 0 . 0 9 8 3 $ 13 2 , 5 0 0 . 0 0 $ 3 2 0 . 0 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 13 2 , 9 2 0 . 0 0 $ 2 , 3 5 2 , 3 9 8 . 7 5
2 0 - J un- 13 Ca na di a n Dol l a r S e l l  S hor t $ 0 . 9 6 2 5 2 0 0 2 6 - J un- 13 Buy  t o Cov e r $ 0 . 9 4 8 9 $ 2 7 2 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 $ 6 4 0 . 0 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 2 7 1, 2 6 0 . 0 0 $ 2 , 6 2 3 , 6 5 8 . 7 5
2 4 - J un- 13 US  Tr e a sur y  Bond S e l l  S hor t $ 13 3 . 4 0 6 3 6 5 2 6 - J un- 13 Buy  t o Cov e r $ 13 2 . 8 4 3 8 $ 3 6 , 5 6 2 . 5 0 $ 2 0 8 . 0 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 3 6 , 2 5 4 . 5 0 $ 2 , 6 5 9 , 9 13 . 2 5
2 0 - J un- 13 Nor we gi a n Kr one S e l l  S hor t $ 0 . 16 7 4 3 6 0 2 7 - J un- 13 Buy  t o Cov e r $ 0 . 16 4 2 $ 2 2 6 , 8 0 0 . 0 0 $ 1, 15 2 . 0 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 2 2 5 , 5 4 8 . 0 0 $ 2 , 8 8 5 , 4 6 1. 2 5
2 1- J un- 13 Commodi t y  I nde x S e l l  S hor t $ 6 0 5 . 2 5 5 0 2 7 - J un- 13 Buy  t o Cov e r $ 6 0 9 . 3 5 $ 5 1, 2 5 0 . 0 0 $ 13 5 . 0 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 5 1, 4 8 5 . 0 0 $ 2 , 8 3 3 , 9 7 6 . 2 5
2 0 - J un- 13 P l a t i num S e l l  S hor t $ 1, 4 0 6 . 0 0 8 0 2 8 - J un- 13 Buy  t o Cov e r $ 1, 3 3 5 . 3 0 $ 2 8 2 , 8 0 0 . 0 0 $ 2 3 2 . 0 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 2 8 2 , 4 6 8 . 0 0 $ 3 , 116 , 4 4 4 . 2 5
2 1- J un- 13 Gol d S e l l  S hor t $ 1, 3 16 . 10 2 5 1- J ul - 13 Buy  t o Cov e r $ 1, 2 7 4 . 0 0 $ 10 5 , 2 5 0 . 0 0 $ 7 2 . 5 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 10 5 , 0 7 7 . 5 0 $ 3 , 2 2 1, 5 2 1. 7 5
11- J ul - 13 S i l v e r Buy $ 19 . 9 8 5 15 12 - J ul - 13 S e l l $ 19 . 9 3 5 $ 3 , 7 5 0 . 0 0 $ 4 3 . 5 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 3 , 8 9 3 . 5 0 $ 3 , 2 17 , 6 2 8 . 2 5
11- J ul - 13 Aust r a l i a n Dol l a r Buy $ 0 . 9 0 7 4 12 0 12 - J ul - 13 S e l l $ 0 . 9 0 6 8 $ 7 , 2 0 0 . 0 0 $ 3 8 4 . 0 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 7 , 6 8 4 . 0 0 $ 3 , 2 0 9 , 9 4 4 . 2 5
11- J ul - 13 Ca na di a n Dol l a r Buy $ 0 . 9 6 0 1 2 0 0 12 - J ul - 13 S e l l $ 0 . 9 5 8 0 $ 4 2 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 $ 6 4 0 . 0 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 4 2 , 7 4 0 . 0 0 $ 3 , 16 7 , 2 0 4 . 2 5
11- J ul - 13 Cr ude  Oi l Buy $ 9 1. 7 1 3 5 16 - J ul - 13 S e l l $ 9 2 . 0 0 $ 10 , 15 0 . 0 0 $ 10 1. 5 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 9 , 9 4 8 . 5 0 $ 3 , 17 7 , 15 2 . 7 5
11- J ul - 13 P l a t i num Buy $ 1, 4 0 8 . 2 0 8 0 17 - J ul - 13 S e l l $ 1, 4 2 1. 7 0 $ 5 4 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 $ 2 3 2 . 0 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 5 3 , 6 6 8 . 0 0 $ 3 , 2 3 0 , 8 2 0 . 7 5
17 - J ul - 13 Aust r a l i a n Dol l a r Buy $ 0 . 9 13 0 12 0 18 - J ul - 13 S e l l $ 0 . 9 0 6 4 $ 7 9 , 2 0 0 . 0 0 $ 3 8 4 . 0 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 7 9 , 6 8 4 . 0 0 $ 3 , 15 1, 13 6 . 7 5
17 - J ul - 13 Ca na di a n Dol l a r Buy $ 0 . 9 5 6 2 2 0 0 18 - J ul - 13 S e l l $ 0 . 9 5 9 4 $ 6 4 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 $ 6 4 0 . 0 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 6 3 , 2 6 0 . 0 0 $ 3 , 2 14 , 3 9 6 . 7 5
2 3 - J ul - 13 P l a t i num Buy $ 1, 4 4 1. 8 0 8 0 2 3 - J ul - 13 S e l l $ 1, 4 3 2 . 9 0 $ 3 5 , 6 0 0 . 0 0 $ 2 3 2 . 0 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 3 5 , 9 3 2 . 0 0 $ 3 , 17 8 , 4 6 4 . 7 5
16 - J ul - 13 Commodi t y  I nde x Buy $ 6 4 3 . 3 0 5 0 2 4 - J ul - 13 S e l l $ 6 4 6 . 10 $ 3 5 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 $ 13 5 . 0 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 3 4 , 7 6 5 . 0 0 $ 3 , 2 13 , 2 2 9 . 7 5
19 - J ul - 13 S i l v e r Buy $ 19 . 5 2 0 15 2 4 - J ul - 13 S e l l $ 2 0 . 2 8 0 $ 5 7 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 $ 4 3 . 5 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 5 6 , 8 5 6 . 5 0 $ 3 , 2 7 0 , 0 8 6 . 2 5
2 2 - Aug- 13 Cr ude  Oi l S e l l  S hor t $ 9 3 . 13 3 5 2 2 - Aug- 13 Buy  t o Cov e r $ 9 3 . 2 9 $ 5 , 6 0 0 . 0 0 $ 10 1. 5 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 5 , 8 0 1. 5 0 $ 3 , 2 6 4 , 2 8 4 . 7 5
9 - S e p- 13 Cr ude  Oi l Buy $ 9 3 . 7 6 3 5 9 - S e p- 13 S e l l $ 9 3 . 5 3 $ 8 , 0 5 0 . 0 0 $ 10 1. 5 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 8 , 2 5 1. 5 0 $ 3 , 2 5 6 , 0 3 3 . 2 5
18 - S e p- 13 P l a t i num S e l l  S hor t $ 1, 4 2 3 . 3 0 8 0 18 - S e p- 13 Buy  t o Cov e r $ 1, 4 5 7 . 10 $ 13 5 , 2 0 0 . 0 0 $ 2 3 2 . 0 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 13 5 , 5 3 2 . 0 0 $ 3 , 12 0 , 5 0 1. 2 5
18 - S e p- 13 Cr ude  Oi l Buy $ 9 4 . 19 3 5 2 0 - S e p- 13 S e l l $ 9 3 . 3 8 $ 2 8 , 3 5 0 . 0 0 $ 10 1. 5 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 2 8 , 5 5 1. 5 0 $ 3 , 0 9 1, 9 4 9 . 7 5
11- Oc t - 13 Cr ude  Oi l Buy $ 9 3 . 7 4 3 5 14 - Oc t - 13 S e l l $ 9 4 . 0 8 $ 11, 9 0 0 . 0 0 $ 10 1. 5 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 11, 6 9 8 . 5 0 $ 3 , 10 3 , 6 4 8 . 2 5
9 - Oc t - 13 S i l v e r S e l l  S hor t $ 2 1. 8 7 0 15 15 - Oc t - 13 Buy  t o Cov e r $ 2 1. 3 8 5 $ 3 6 , 3 7 5 . 0 0 $ 4 3 . 5 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 3 6 , 2 3 1. 5 0 $ 3 , 13 9 , 8 7 9 . 7 5
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Trade List for the Year 2013 (continued) 
16 - Oc t - 13 P l a t i num S e l l  S hor t $ 1, 3 8 6 . 5 0 8 0 16 - Oc t - 13 Buy  t o Cov e r $ 1, 3 9 9 . 7 0 $ 5 2 , 8 0 0 . 0 0 $ 2 3 2 . 0 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 5 3 , 13 2 . 0 0 $ 3 , 0 8 6 , 7 4 7 . 7 5
16 - Oc t - 13 S i l v e r S e l l  S hor t $ 2 1. 16 5 15 16 - Oc t - 13 Buy  t o Cov e r $ 2 1. 3 5 0 $ 13 , 8 7 5 . 0 0 $ 4 3 . 5 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 14 , 0 18 . 5 0 $ 3 , 0 7 2 , 7 2 9 . 2 5
17 - Oc t - 13 Cr ude  Oi l Buy $ 9 4 . 6 7 3 5 17 - Oc t - 13 S e l l $ 9 3 . 9 0 $ 2 6 , 9 5 0 . 0 0 $ 10 1. 5 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 2 7 , 15 1. 5 0 $ 3 , 0 4 5 , 5 7 7 . 7 5
17 - Oc t - 13 Gol d Buy $ 1, 3 3 4 . 9 0 2 5 18 - Oc t - 13 S e l l $ 1, 3 3 1. 4 0 $ 8 , 7 5 0 . 0 0 $ 7 2 . 5 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 8 , 9 2 2 . 5 0 $ 3 , 0 3 6 , 6 5 5 . 2 5
17 - Oc t - 13 P l a t i num Buy $ 1, 4 3 7 . 5 0 8 0 2 1- Oc t - 13 S e l l $ 1, 4 3 5 . 9 0 $ 6 , 4 0 0 . 0 0 $ 2 3 2 . 0 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 6 , 7 3 2 . 0 0 $ 3 , 0 2 9 , 9 2 3 . 2 5
17 - Oc t - 13 Ca na di a n Dol l a r Buy $ 0 . 9 7 0 6 2 0 0 2 1- Oc t - 13 S e l l $ 0 . 9 7 0 3 $ 6 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 $ 6 4 0 . 0 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 6 , 7 4 0 . 0 0 $ 3 , 0 2 3 , 18 3 . 2 5
17 - Oc t - 13 Aust r a l i a n Dol l a r Buy $ 0 . 9 6 0 0 12 0 2 2 - Oc t - 13 S e l l $ 0 . 9 6 2 7 $ 3 2 , 4 0 0 . 0 0 $ 3 8 4 . 0 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 3 1, 9 16 . 0 0 $ 3 , 0 5 5 , 0 9 9 . 2 5
17 - Oc t - 13 S i l v e r Buy $ 2 1. 9 2 5 15 2 4 - Oc t - 13 S e l l $ 2 2 . 7 3 0 $ 6 0 , 3 7 5 . 0 0 $ 4 3 . 5 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 6 0 , 2 3 1. 5 0 $ 3 , 115 , 3 3 0 . 7 5
17 - Oc t - 13 S . A .  Ra nd Buy $ 0 . 10 11 10 0 2 8 - Oc t - 13 S e l l $ 0 . 10 0 9 $ 10 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 $ 3 2 0 . 0 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 10 , 4 2 0 . 0 0 $ 3 , 10 4 , 9 10 . 7 5
17 - Oc t - 13 Nor we gi a n Kr one Buy $ 0 . 16 8 3 3 6 0 3 1- Oc t - 13 S e l l $ 0 . 16 8 0 $ 18 , 7 2 0 . 0 0 $ 1, 15 2 . 0 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 19 , 9 7 2 . 0 0 $ 3 , 0 8 4 , 9 3 8 . 7 5
8 - Nov - 13 Commodi t y  I nde x S e l l  S hor t $ 6 0 7 . 6 5 5 0 11- Nov - 13 Buy  t o Cov e r $ 6 15 . 0 5 $ 9 2 , 5 0 0 . 0 0 $ 13 5 . 0 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 9 2 , 7 3 5 . 0 0 $ 2 , 9 9 2 , 2 0 3 . 7 5
8 - Nov - 13 Cr ude  Oi l S e l l  S hor t $ 9 0 . 6 0 3 5 11- Nov - 13 Buy  t o Cov e r $ 9 1. 18 $ 2 0 , 3 0 0 . 0 0 $ 10 1. 5 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 2 0 , 5 0 1. 5 0 $ 2 , 9 7 1, 7 0 2 . 2 5
11- Nov - 13 Cr ude  Oi l S e l l  S hor t $ 9 0 . 7 1 3 5 11- Nov - 13 Buy  t o Cov e r $ 9 1. 13 $ 14 , 7 0 0 . 0 0 $ 10 1. 5 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 14 , 9 0 1. 5 0 $ 2 , 9 5 6 , 8 0 0 . 7 5
8 - Nov - 13 US  Tr e a sur y  Bond S e l l  S hor t $ 13 1. 7 5 0 0 6 5 12 - Nov - 13 Buy  t o Cov e r $ 13 1. 7 8 13 $ 2 , 0 3 1. 2 5 $ 2 0 8 . 0 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 2 , 3 3 9 . 2 5 $ 2 , 9 5 4 , 4 6 1. 5 0
8 - Nov - 13 Ca na di a n Dol l a r S e l l  S hor t $ 0 . 9 5 2 4 2 0 0 13 - Nov - 13 Buy  t o Cov e r $ 0 . 9 5 4 6 $ 4 4 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 $ 6 4 0 . 0 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 4 4 , 7 4 0 . 0 0 $ 2 , 9 0 9 , 7 2 1. 5 0
8 - Nov - 13 S . A .  Ra nd S e l l  S hor t $ 0 . 0 9 6 2 10 0 13 - Nov - 13 Buy  t o Cov e r $ 0 . 0 9 6 9 $ 3 3 , 7 5 0 . 0 0 $ 3 2 0 . 0 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 3 4 , 17 0 . 0 0 $ 2 , 8 7 5 , 5 5 1. 5 0
8 - Nov - 13 P l a t i num S e l l  S hor t $ 1, 4 4 2 . 0 0 8 0 13 - Nov - 13 Buy  t o Cov e r $ 1, 4 3 6 . 7 0 $ 2 1, 2 0 0 . 0 0 $ 2 3 2 . 0 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 2 0 , 8 6 8 . 0 0 $ 2 , 8 9 6 , 4 19 . 5 0
8 - Nov - 13 Aust r a l i a n Dol l a r S e l l  S hor t $ 0 . 9 3 5 1 12 0 13 - Nov - 13 Buy  t o Cov e r $ 0 . 9 3 4 5 $ 7 , 2 0 0 . 0 0 $ 3 8 4 . 0 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 6 , 7 16 . 0 0 $ 2 , 9 0 3 , 13 5 . 5 0
8 - Nov - 13 S i l v e r S e l l  S hor t $ 2 1. 3 4 5 15 14 - Nov - 13 Buy  t o Cov e r $ 2 0 . 7 4 0 $ 4 5 , 3 7 5 . 0 0 $ 4 3 . 5 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 4 5 , 2 3 1. 5 0 $ 2 , 9 4 8 , 3 6 7 . 0 0
8 - Nov - 13 Nor we gi a n Kr one S e l l  S hor t $ 0 . 16 2 1 3 6 0 15 - Nov - 13 Buy  t o Cov e r $ 0 . 16 3 1 $ 7 5 , 6 0 0 . 0 0 $ 1, 15 2 . 0 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 7 6 , 8 5 2 . 0 0 $ 2 , 8 7 1, 5 15 . 0 0
15 - Nov - 13 Cr ude  Oi l Buy $ 9 1. 8 1 3 5 17 - Nov - 13 S e l l $ 9 1. 5 9 $ 7 , 7 0 0 . 0 0 $ 10 1. 5 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 7 , 9 0 1. 5 0 $ 2 , 8 6 3 , 6 13 . 5 0
18 - Nov - 13 Cr ude  Oi l Buy $ 9 1. 5 1 3 5 18 - Nov - 13 S e l l $ 9 1. 7 4 $ 8 , 0 5 0 . 0 0 $ 10 1. 5 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 7 , 8 4 8 . 5 0 $ 2 , 8 7 1, 4 6 2 . 0 0
2 - De c - 13 S i l v e r S e l l  S hor t $ 19 . 5 0 15 4 - De c - 13 Buy  t o Cov e r $ 19 . 8 2 $ 2 3 , 6 2 5 . 0 0 $ 4 3 . 5 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 2 3 , 7 6 8 . 5 0 $ 2 , 8 4 7 , 6 9 3 . 5 0
8 - Nov - 13 Gol d S e l l  S hor t $ 1, 2 9 9 . 5 0 2 5 5 - De c - 13 Buy  t o Cov e r $ 1, 2 5 1. 10 $ 12 1, 0 0 0 . 0 0 $ 7 2 . 5 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 12 0 , 8 2 7 . 5 0 $ 2 , 9 6 8 , 5 2 1. 0 0
10 - De c - 13 Gol d Buy $ 1, 2 5 7 . 0 0 2 5 12 - De c - 13 S e l l $ 1, 2 3 6 . 5 0 $ 5 1, 2 5 0 . 0 0 $ 7 2 . 5 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 5 1, 4 2 2 . 5 0 $ 2 , 9 17 , 0 9 8 . 5 0
12 - De c - 13 US  Tr e a sur y  Bond S e l l  S hor t $ 12 9 . 3 1 6 5 13 - De c - 13 Buy  t o Cov e r $ 12 9 . 6 3 $ 2 0 , 3 12 . 5 0 $ 2 0 8 . 0 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 2 0 , 6 2 0 . 5 0 $ 2 , 8 9 6 , 4 7 8 . 0 0
13 - De c - 13 Ca na di a n Dol l a r S e l l  S hor t $ 0 . 9 3 6 1 2 0 0 13 - De c - 13 Buy  t o Cov e r $ 0 . 9 4 0 2 $ 8 2 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 $ 6 4 0 . 0 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 8 2 , 7 4 0 . 0 0 $ 2 , 8 13 , 7 3 8 . 0 0
13 - De c - 13 Aust r a l i a n Dol l a r S e l l  S hor t $ 0 . 8 8 5 9 12 0 16 - De c - 13 Buy  t o Cov e r $ 0 . 8 8 7 9 $ 2 4 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 $ 3 8 4 . 0 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 2 4 , 4 8 4 . 0 0 $ 2 , 7 8 9 , 2 5 4 . 0 0
19 - De c - 13 S i l v e r S e l l  S hor t $ 19 . 3 6 0 15 2 3 - De c - 13 Buy  t o Cov e r $ 19 . 3 9 0 $ 2 , 2 5 0 . 0 0 $ 4 3 . 5 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 2 , 3 9 3 . 5 0 $ 2 , 7 8 6 , 8 6 0 . 5 0
19 - De c - 13 P l a t i num S e l l  S hor t $ 1, 3 2 8 . 9 0 8 0 2 3 - De c - 13 Buy  t o Cov e r $ 1, 3 3 6 . 6 0 $ 3 0 , 8 0 0 . 0 0 $ 2 3 2 . 0 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 3 1, 13 2 . 0 0 $ 2 , 7 5 5 , 7 2 8 . 5 0
3 0 - De c - 13 Cr ude  Oi l Buy $ 9 2 . 9 6 3 5 3 1- De c - 13 S e l l $ 9 2 . 5 7 ( $ 13 , 6 5 0 . 0 0 ) $ 10 1. 5 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 13 , 8 5 1. 5 0 $ 2 , 7 4 1, 8 7 7 . 0 0
3 1- De c - 13 Aust r a l i a n Dol l a r Buy $ 0 . 8 8 7 4 12 0 3 1- De c - 13 S e l l $ 0 . 8 8 8 7 $ 15 , 6 0 0 . 0 0 $ 3 8 4 . 0 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 15 , 116 . 0 0 $ 2 , 7 5 6 , 9 9 3 . 0 0
3 1- De c - 13 Ca na di a n Dol l a r Buy $ 0 . 9 3 7 8 2 0 0 3 1- De c - 13 S e l l $ 0 . 9 4 0 0 $ 4 4 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 $ 6 4 0 . 0 0 $ 10 0 . 0 0 $ 4 3 , 2 6 0 . 0 0 $ 2 , 8 0 0 , 2 5 3 . 0 0
Source: TradeStation, 2013 
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 Performance Summary 
The trade by trade details enumerated in Tables 6-1 through 6-6 enabled the synthesis of aggregate 
summary performance statistics over the entire data sample period from January 1, 2008 to December 
31, 2013 as listed below in Table 6-7: 
Table 6-7:   Summary Performance Statistics 
TOTAL TRADES
WINNING TRADES 34
LOSING TRADES 58
PERCENT PROFITABLE
LONG TRADES
PERCENT PROFITABLE
SHORT TRADES
PERCENT PROFITABLE
AVERAGE TRADE NET PROFIT
AVERAGE WINNING TRADE
AVERAGE LOSING TRADE
RATIO AVERAGE WIN : AVERAGE LOSS
MAX CONSECUTIVE WINNING TRADES
MAX CONSECUTIVE LOSING TRADES
MAXIMUM TRADE DRAWDOWN
MAXIMUM DRAWDOWN %
STANDARD DEVIATION OF RETURNS
VALUE AT RISK
SKEWNESS
KURTOSIS
TOTAL NET PROFIT
GROSS PROFIT
GROSS LOSS
PROFIT FACTOR
TOTAL RETURN ON INITIAL CAPITAL
ANNUALIZED RATE OF RETURN
($182,590.00)
$102,956.52 $131,553.75 $76,041.49
($46,681.10) ($54,060.90) ($40,446.44)
2.21 2.43 1.85
4
8
180.03%
18.72%
-53.38%
$117,232.36
3.18
16.91
$1,800,253.00
$6,795,130.50
($4,994,877.50)
1.36
$311,590.31
$10,406.09 $19,268.35 $2,603.45
96 64 32
33.33% 32.81% 34.38%
77 17 60
44.16% 64.71% 38.33%
38.15% 39.51% 36.96%
COMBINED SET TEST SET  LIVE SET 
1/1/2008 - 12/31/2013 1/1/2008 - 12/31/2012 1/1/2013 - 12/31/2013
173 81 92
32
49
66
107
Source: TradeStation, 2013 and later amended by The Author 
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 Number of Trades 
As detailed in Table 6-7, the Intermarket Momentum portfolio generated 173 trades over the entire data 
sample period from January 1, 2008 to December 31, 2013 with the trades evenly distributed between 
the Test set (January 1, 2008 to December 31, 2012) and the Live set (January 1, 2013 to December 31, 
2013). 
Trend following momentum based strategies are dependent upon market volatility to generate the 
substantial price movements required to trigger trades. The relatively large number of trades experienced 
during the Live set is testimony to the high market volatility in 2013 resulting from the Federal Reserve’s 
unprecedented $ 1 trillion a year quantitative easing (QE) bond buying program, the market’s continuing 
speculation as to whether the Federal Reserve will begin to taper QE or not, and the Bank of Japan (BOJ) 
following the lead of their US counterparts by embarking on a similar groundbreaking $ 70 billion a month 
bond purchasing program in an effort to reinvigorate the Japanese economy. 
The single trade outlier in the year 2009 was due to the low market volatility experienced in the aftermath 
of the 2008 Financial Market Crisis. Removing that single trade outlier from the analysis generated an 
average of 34 trades a year, or approximately 3 trades a month which is of sufficient frequency to keep 
the trader engaged. Prolonged flat periods out of the market, such as that experienced in 2009, severely 
test the discipline and patience of the trader to stay the course and remain true to the strategy. 
 
 Profitability 
In order to be profitable, a strategy requires either a high winning percentage above 50% or a high average 
win to average loss ratio. The Intermarket Momentum portfolio had a low 38.15% winning percentage 
but the average winning trade ($ 102 956.52) was more than double the average losing trade ($ 46 681.10) 
resulting in its overall profitability with a 2.21 average win : average loss ratio. The portfolio also traded 
on both the long and the short side, with the short trades slightly more profitable (44.16%) than the long 
trades (33.33%). 
As an indication of a strategy’s robustness and ability to trade profitably in the future, there should be no 
significant deterioration in performance from the Test set to the Live set. The Intermarket Momentum 
portfolio performed remarkably well in the Live set, almost matching the Test set winning percentage 
whilst exceeding the Test set winning percentage on long trades, and experiencing a positive reduction in 
the size of the average losing trade. There was however a slight deterioration in the size of the average 
trade net profit, the winning percentage on short trades and the average winning trade. 
 
 Risk Management 
To avoid the risk of ruin, the maximum drawdown (defined as the maximum peak to trough decline in 
trading capital measured as a percentage) should not exceed the threshold of 40% of initial capital. The 
Intermarket Momentum portfolio experienced a $ 533 753.50 drawdown, equivalent to 53.38% of the 
initial capital, within the first three quarters of the data sample period between January 1 and August 7, 
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2008. This drawdown suggests that a prudent level of starting capital to trade the portfolio with a trade 
size equal to 10% of capital, would be $ 1.5 million resulting in a much safer 36% maximum drawdown. 
Unfortunately, strategies with a low winning percentage and a consequently high number of consecutive 
losing trades will have the disadvantage of suffering large drawdowns, therefore the prevalent need to 
manage this risk. Chande (2001) in his study of 80 mutual and hedge funds, found a relationship exhibited 
between volatility (as represented by the standard deviation of returns) and the maximum drawdown, 
under the assumption that more volatile fund managers produced larger drawdowns. As a rule of thumb, 
Chande found that three to five times the standard deviation of historical returns is an accurate predictor 
of the future maximum drawdown, and that at least one drawdown in the region of three to five times 
the standard deviation should be expected in every rolling five-year interval. 
The Intermarket Momentum portfolio had a $ 117 232.36 standard deviation of returns, thereby implying 
a possible future maximum drawdown of approximately $ 586 000.00. This corresponds to the historical 
maximum drawdown of $ 533 753.50 experienced on August 7, 2008 and confirms the prudent risk 
management requirement of $ 1.5 million in trading capital to avoid the risk of ruin. 
An additional risk management technique is the Value at Risk (VAR) measure, which indicates the 
maximum portfolio loss to be expected with a given level of confidence over a given time period12. Using 
the ending Intermarket Momentum Portfolio value of $ 2 800 253.00, the average daily return of 0.36%, 
a 95% confidence level, and the standard deviation of daily returns equal to 7.15%, the VAR is calculated 
to be $ 311 590.31. The VAR indicates that with a 95% level of confidence, one can expect a maximum 
loss of $ 311 590.31 on a given day. This translates to 11.13% of the ending portfolio value and magnifies 
the importance of the individual trade size risk management parameter of not exceeding 10% of capital 
on any individual trade. 
Adhering to strict risk management guidelines is also necessary to mitigate the substantial portfolio 
damage that can be inflicted by surprise “Black Swan” events13 such as the September 2001 terrorist 
attacks in the US, the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy in September 2008, Black Monday on October 19, 
1987 and the Flash Crash of May 6, 2010. These “Black Swan” events are impossible to predict and have 
major impacts on stock markets and portfolios, thereby exacerbating the need for strict risk management 
guidelines that limit the portfolio capital exposure to any one event. 
 
 Kurtosis 
The Intermarket Momentum portfolio exhibited a trading characteristic of multiple small losing trades 
interjected by infrequent large winning trades resulting in a high positive kurtosis value of 16.91, which 
indicates that the distribution of returns is more peaked in the center around the mean relative to a bell- 
shaped normal distribution. This leptokurtic property of the Intermarket Momentum portfolio is essential 
as it means that large positive returns occur more often than they should and explains its profitability. 
                                                          
12 Source:www.investopedia.com 
13 Source: www.wikipedia.org 
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 Skewness 
Skewness refers to the degree of asymmetry around the mean, with a normal distribution being perfectly 
symmetrical and having a skewness value of zero. The Intermarket Momentum portfolio returns exhibited 
a positive skewness of 3.18 which indicates an asymmetric longer or fatter tail to the right of the mean 
and signifies that returns are more skewed toward positive values, a vital property for a profitable 
strategy. 
 
 Return 
The profit factor is measured by dividing the gross profit by the gross loss and is defined as the amount of 
profit per unit of risk, with values greater than one indicating a profitable system. Importantly, the 
Intermarket Momentum portfolio had a profit factor of 1.36 and generated a total net profit over the 
entire data sample period of $ 1 800 253.00. 
The total return on the initial portfolio capital of $ 1 million was 180.03% which translated into a 
respectable annualized return of 18.72%. 
 
 Comparative Total Return Analysis 
Figure 6-1 over-page graphs the total return on initial capital of the Intermarket Momentum portfolio over 
the entire data sample period from January 1, 2008 to December 31, 2013 relative to the total return 
earned as of January 1, 2008 by the major asset classes – Stocks (as represented by the S&P 500 stock 
index and the Global Dow international stock index); Bonds (represented by the 30 year US Treasury 
Bond); Commodities (represented by the S&P Goldman Sachs Commodity Index and Gold); and Currencies 
(as represented by the Dollar Index). 
Although the Intermarket Momentum portfolio initially underperformed the other major asset classes 
during the first three quarters of the data sample period where it also suffered its maximum drawdown, 
Figure 6-1 clearly depicts how it outperformed all the other major asset classes thereafter. 
By comparison, at the end of the sample period the Intermarket Momentum portfolio had returned 
180.03% relative to: 
 The US Treasury Bond (38.77%) 
 S&P 500 (34.52%) 
 Gold (9.46%) 
 The Dollar Index (-4.24%) 
 The Global Dow (-9.42%) and 
 The S&P Goldman Sachs Commodity Index (-27.85%). 
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Figure 6-1:   Comparative Total Return Analysis 
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 Jensen’s Alpha 
Following Jensen (1967) and Malkiel (1995), the risk-adjusted portfolio excess performance can be 
measured through the traditional CAPM model: 
𝑹𝑰𝑷 − 𝑹𝑭 = α + 𝜷 ( 𝑹𝑴𝑲𝑻− 𝑹𝑭 ) + ε   (6.1) 
where: 
 
 𝑹𝑰𝑷 
𝑹𝑰𝑷 is the return on the Intermarket Momentum Portfolio and measured by average quarterly returns as 
listed over-page in Figure 6-2. 
𝑹𝑰𝑷 is therefore equal to 7.46%. 
 
 𝑹𝑴𝑲𝑻 
𝑹𝑴𝑲𝑻 is the return on the market benchmark represented by the S&P 500 Stock Index (SP) and measured 
by average quarterly returns as listed over-page in Figure 6-2. 
The S&P 500 Stock Index is globally the most liquid and highly traded stock market and therefore is the 
universal benchmark utilized to represent the market return and provide a basis of comparison in 
performance studies. 
𝑹𝑴𝑲𝑻 is therefore equal to 1.47%. 
 
 𝑹𝑭 
𝑹𝑭 is the risk-free rate of return and represents the level of interest an investor would expect from a risk-
free investment over a given period of time14. Due to a lack of consensus as to its interpretation and 
measurement, the rate of return on a US Government Treasury Bond is the industry standard as a proxy 
for the risk-free rate as the risk of default is practically negligible. 
Following Malkiel (1995), the risk-free rate of return is represented by the average 3 month US Treasury 
Bill yield15 over the data sample period. Historical Treasury Bill interest rate statistics may be retrieved 
from the data and charts center of the US Department of the Treasury website: www.treasury.gov  
𝑹𝑭 is therefore calculated as 0.32% 
                                                          
14 Source: http://www.wikipedia.org 
15 Source: http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/interest-rates 
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Figure 6-2:   Comparative Quarterly Return Analysis 
 
Source: TradeStation, 2013 and later amended by The Author 
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 𝜷 
𝜷 is the Intermarket Momentum Portfolio Beta which measures the volatility of the portfolio relative to 
the market as a whole and describes the systematic risk of the portfolio. Beta is calculated as: 
𝜷 =
𝑪𝒐𝒗𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆(𝑹𝑰𝑷  ,𝑹𝑴𝑲𝑻)
𝑽𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆(𝑹𝑴𝑲𝑻)
   (6.2) 
therefore, 
𝜷 =
−𝟎. 𝟎𝟏𝟎𝟖𝟔𝟗𝟗
𝟎. 𝟎𝟎𝟗𝟏𝟏𝟑𝟐
 
and, 
𝜷 = -1.19 
 
 ε 
ε is the random error term. 
As detailed by Jensen (1967), 𝜷 will only be an efficient estimate of the systematic risk if the random error 
term has an expected value of zero: 𝑬(𝜺𝒕 )= 0, and is uncorrelated to the market. 
If a manager has superior forecasting ability, he will tend to select stocks that result in : 𝜺𝒕 > 0, and his 
portfolio will earn returns in excess of the normal risk premium. Allowance is made for this forecasting 
ability by assuming the expected value of the random error term to be zero: 𝑬(𝜺𝒕 )= 0, in addition to its 
non-correlation to the market. The estimated regression is now no longer constrained to pass through the 
origin, and the intercept now represents the forecasting ability and performance of the manager (Jensen, 
1967). 
 
 Alpha (α) 
α is the intercept and designates Jensen’s Alpha16, simply abbreviated as Alpha. A positive Alpha (α) 
implies risk-adjusted performance in excess of the market that can be attributed to the portfolio manager. 
A naïve buy-and-hold policy can be expected to yield an Alpha (α) of zero and a manager underperforming 
the market will yield a negative Alpha (α). 
 
 
                                                          
16 The eponymous Jensen’s Alpha was first used as a measure of mutual fund performance by Harvard Business School professor Michael 
Jensen in 1967. 
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 Calculating Alpha 
𝑹𝑰𝑷 − 𝑹𝑭 = α + 𝜷 ( 𝑹𝑴𝑲𝑻− 𝑹𝑭 ) + ε   (6.3) 
therefore, 
 α = (𝑹𝑰𝑷  −  𝑹𝑭)  −   𝜷 ( 𝑹𝑴𝑲𝑻− 𝑹𝑭 )  +  𝛆  
 α = (𝟕. 𝟒𝟔%− 𝟎. 𝟑𝟐%) – (-1.19) (𝟏. 𝟒𝟕%.− 𝟎. 𝟑𝟐%)) + ε  
and, 
α = 8.52% 
 
 Test of Significance 
Testing the statistical significance of Jensen’s Alpha resulted in the following data analyses: 
 
 Time Series Price Data 
The time series price data for the Intermarket Momentum Portfolio was generated by the Trades List 
tables which showed the cumulative Portfolio Balance at each trade exit date. 
The intra-day 240-minute time series data for the market benchmark S&P 500 Index at the trade exit dates 
was generated by the TradeStation historical database. 
 
 Actual Daily Return Time Series 
The actual daily return time series for the Intermarket Momentum Portfolio and the market benchmark 
S&P 500 Index were extracted from the price series data by taking the natural logarithm of the ratio of 
successive prices: 
𝐥𝐧
𝑷𝒓𝒊𝒄𝒆𝒕
𝑷𝒓𝒊𝒄𝒆𝒕−𝟏
   (6.4) 
 
 Initial Estimated Returns 
Assuming a constant dummy value of 0.5% for the daily alpha, initial estimated returns for the Intermarket 
Momentum Portfolio were calculated utilizing the following equation: 
 
𝑹𝑰𝑷 = α + 𝑹𝑭  + β[𝑹𝑴𝑲𝑻 − 𝑹𝑭]    (6.5) 
where, 
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𝑹𝑰𝑷 = Daily Intermarket Momentum Portfolio Estimated Return 
α = Daily dummy Alpha = 0.5% 
𝑹𝑭 = Daily Risk Free Rate of Return, where the average 3 month US Treasury Bill yield
17 over the data 
sample period of 0.32% is converted into a daily rate by the following formula: 
(𝟏 + 𝟎. 𝟑𝟐%)
𝟏
𝟗𝟎 − 𝟏   therefore, 
𝑹𝑭 = 0.0035% 
𝜷 is the Intermarket Momentum Portfolio Beta which measures the volatility of the portfolio relative to 
the market as a whole and describes the systematic risk of the portfolio. Beta is calculated utilizing the 
actual daily return time series for the Intermarket Momentum Portfolio and the market benchmark S&P 
500 Index as follows: 
𝜷 =
𝑪𝒐𝒗𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆(𝑹𝑰𝑷  , 𝑹𝑴𝑲𝑻)
𝑽𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆(𝑹𝑴𝑲𝑻)
 
therefore, 
𝜷 =
−𝟎. 𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟒𝟎𝟏𝟏𝟐
𝟎. 𝟎𝟎𝟏𝟖𝟗𝟗𝟐𝟐
 
and, 
𝜷 = -0.21 
𝑹𝑴𝑲𝑻 = Actual Daily Return Time Series for the market benchmark S&P 500 Index. 
 
 Sum of Squared Differences 
At each data point, the squared difference between the actual returns and initial estimated returns of the 
Intermarket Momentum Portfolio are calculated according to the following formula: 
𝑺𝒒𝒖𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝑫𝒊𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 =  (𝑨𝒄𝒕𝒖𝒂𝒍 𝑹𝒆𝒕𝒖𝒓𝒏 − 𝑬𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒎𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝑹𝒆𝒕𝒖𝒓𝒏)𝟐   (6.6) 
The sum of the squared differences across all data points is then calculated. 
 
 Alpha Estimated Using the Least Squares Method (LSM) 
Excel’s Solver function then utilizes LSM to estimate the Daily Alpha by minimizing the sum of squared 
differences via a change in the Daily Estimated Alpha. 
                                                          
17 Source: http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/interest-rates 
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The Solver function converged to a solution by minimizing the sum of squared differences, resulting in a 
Daily Estimated Alpha = 0.67% and thereby generating a new time series of estimated returns for the 
Intermarket Momentum Portfolio. 
The Daily Estimated Alpha is converted into an Annualized Estimated Alpha (α) by the following formula: 
𝑨𝒏𝒏𝒖𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒅 𝑬𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒎𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝑨𝒍𝒑𝒉𝒂 =  (𝟏 + 𝑫𝒂𝒊𝒍𝒚 𝑬𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒎𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝑨𝒍𝒑𝒉𝒂)𝟐𝟓𝟐 − 𝟏   (6.7) 
𝑨𝒏𝒏𝒖𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒅 𝑬𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒎𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝜶 =  (𝟏 + 𝟎. 𝟔𝟕%)𝟐𝟓𝟐 − 𝟏 
𝑨𝒏𝒏𝒖𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒅 𝑬𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒎𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝜶 =  𝟒𝟑𝟖. 𝟐𝟔% 
 
 Statistical Significance Test of Alpha 
The ratio of the Annualized Estimated Alpha to the Annualized Standard Error of the Regression is known 
as the t-statistic. If the absolute value of the t-statistic > 1.96 (the critical value of the t-statistic at the 5% 
significance level), then it may be concluded that Alpha is different from zero and that it is statistically 
significant, therefore 
𝒕 − 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒄 =  
𝑨𝒏𝒏𝒖𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒅 𝑬𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒎𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝑨𝒍𝒑𝒉𝒂
𝑨𝒏𝒏𝒖𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒅 𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒓𝒅 𝑬𝒓𝒓𝒐𝒓⁄   (6.8) 
where, 
𝑨𝒏𝒏𝒖𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒅 𝑬𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒎𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝑨𝒍𝒑𝒉𝒂 (𝜶) = 𝟒𝟑𝟖. 𝟐𝟔% 
and 
𝑨𝒏𝒏𝒖𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒅 𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒓𝒅 𝑬𝒓𝒓𝒐𝒓 = 𝑫𝒂𝒊𝒍𝒚 𝑽𝒐𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚 𝒙 √𝟐𝟓𝟐 
where, 
𝑫𝒂𝒊𝒍𝒚 𝑽𝒐𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚 =  𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒓𝒅 𝑫𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 (𝑨𝒄𝒕𝒖𝒂𝒍 − 𝑬𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒎𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝑹𝒆𝒕𝒖𝒓𝒏𝒔), therefore 
𝑫𝒂𝒊𝒍𝒚 𝑽𝒐𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚 =  𝟕. 𝟎𝟖𝟕𝟑%   and  
𝑨𝒏𝒏𝒖𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒅 𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒓𝒅 𝑬𝒓𝒓𝒐𝒓 = 𝟕. 𝟎𝟖𝟕𝟑% 𝒙 √𝟐𝟓𝟐 
𝑨𝒏𝒏𝒖𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒅 𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒓𝒅 𝑬𝒓𝒓𝒐𝒓 = 𝟏𝟏𝟐. 𝟓𝟏% 
The absolute value of the t-statistic was therefore calculated as follows: 
𝒕 − 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒄 =  
𝑨𝒏𝒏𝒖𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒅 𝑬𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒎𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝑨𝒍𝒑𝒉𝒂
𝑨𝒏𝒏𝒖𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒅 𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒓𝒅 𝑬𝒓𝒓𝒐𝒓⁄   (6.9) 
𝒕 − 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒄 =  𝟒𝟑𝟖. 𝟐𝟔% 𝟏𝟏𝟐. 𝟓𝟏%⁄  
𝒕 − 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒄 =  𝟑. 𝟗𝟎 
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t − statistic =  3.90 > 1.96  (the critical value of the t-statistic at the 5% significance level), therefore it 
may be concluded that the Intermarket Momentum Portfolio Alpha is different from zero and that it is 
statistically significant at the 5% level. 
 
 Hypothesis Testing 
 
 The Null Hypothesis 
The Null Hypothesis supports the Weak-Form EMH by stating, given all publicly available historical 
information, that an alpha less than or equal to zero indicates a portfolio of Intermarket strategies cannot 
generate returns in excess of the market, thereby implying that the developed country capital markets 
are Weak-Form efficient: 
𝑯𝟎 : α ≤ 0 
 
 The Alternative Hypothesis 
The Alternative Hypothesis states that a significantly positive Alpha α indicates risk-adjusted performance 
in excess of the market which implies that the developed country capital markets are not Weak-Form 
efficient: 
𝑯𝟏 : α > 0 
The positive Alpha of 8.52% is > 0 and significant at the 5% level (t-statistic of 3.90 > the 1.96 critical value). 
This indicates that the positive Alpha generated by the Intermarket Momentum Portfolio is unlikely to 
have occurred by chance alone and that there is less than a 5% probability of erroneously rejecting the 
Null Hypothesis. 
This allows the rejection of the Null Hypothesis and the acceptance of the Alternative Hypothesis that the 
developed country capital markets are not Weak-Form efficient. 
 
 Summary 
The trade by trade details generated by the TradeStation strategy performance reports enabled the 
synthesis of aggregate summary performance statistics over the entire data sample period from January 
1, 2008 to December 31, 2013. 
This allowed the calculation and test of significance of the Alpha generated by the portfolio of Intermarket 
Momentum trading strategies and the consequent testing of the Null Hypothesis. 
The conclusions based on these results are presented next in Chapter 7. 
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7 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The results show that the portfolio of Intermarket Momentum trading strategies generated returns in 
excess of the market with a significantly positive Alpha of 8.52% that allowed the rejection of the Null 
Hypothesis and the acceptance of the Alternative Hypothesis that the developed country capital markets 
are not Weak-Form efficient, thereby refuting the widely accepted EMH. 
This outperformance utilizing simple technical analysis rules formulated literally decades ago answered 
the research question as to why the majority of investment fund managers stubbornly persist in utilizing 
the apparently worthless endeavor of technical analysis and why investment banks and mutual funds 
continue to pay their fund managers multi-million-dollar compensation packages to pursue the practice 
of technical analysis in their trading strategies. 
The study results also solved the research problem by eliminating the methodological weaknesses in prior 
academic EMH studies which severely handicapped the profit generating potential of technical analysis 
and resulted in the erroneous acceptance of the Null Weak-Form market efficiency hypothesis. 
The research objective of utilizing high frequency intra-day data, the combination of qualitative and 
quantitative techniques and volume signals to develop Intermarket Momentum technical analysis 
strategies that generate significant excess profits and consequently show that contrary to prior research 
findings, the developed country capital markets are not Weak-Form efficient, was thus also achieved. 
Importantly, the data period from January 1, 2008 to December 31, 2013 also encompassed the 
unprecedented bear market of 2008 resulting from the world financial crisis (the S&P 500 crashed -58.8% 
during this period), and the 2009 – 2013 central bank liquidity-fueled bull market that followed the market 
bottom in March 2009 where the S&P 500 rallied 207.3%. These extreme bull and bear market cycles 
imbedded in the six-year study data period presented a stern test of the robustness and ability of the 
Intermarket Momentum trading strategies to generate returns in excess of the market and thereby refute 
the EMH. Additionally, this variety of market environments enhanced the applicability of the results to 
diverse market conditions. 
 
 Significance of the Results 
The study results show that the developed country capital markets are not Weak-Form efficient and this 
is significant on a number of levels: 
 
 Modern Finance Theory 
The building blocks of the Modern Finance Theory paradigm created over the past 50 years are the EMH 
(which states that prices fully reflect all available information and that the markets are an efficient 
mechanism in driving prices to their intrinsic equilibrium levels), the CAPM - Capital Asset Pricing Model 
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(which describes the relationship between the risk and return of capital assets, in that the return of an 
asset is determined by its sensitivity to non-diversifiable systematic market risk over and above the risk-
free rate, and consequently that a portfolio of non-correlated assets could diversify away all firm-specific 
risk), the M&M – Modigliani-Miller theorem (which states that under certain assumptions, the level of 
leverage has no effect on the firms value), and the Black-Scholes-Merton option pricing model (which 
shows that it is possible to construct a riskless portfolio through the dynamic hedging strategy of taking 
positions in cash, options and the underlying security). The EMH is the cornerstone of Modern Finance 
Theory and the underlying assumption upon which all the theories are based (Caldentey and Vernengo, 
2010). 
Caldentey and Vernengo (2010); Moosa, (2010); and Volcker (2011) also opine that faith in the EMH and 
Modern Finance Theory led to a deregulation of the financial markets and a global explosion in the 
financial services industry based on the development of diversified portfolio investment vehicles and 
option / derivative based investment products. 
As a result of this success, the unrealistic assumptions and empirical weakness of the core Modern Finance 
theories were viewed as acceptable anomalies (Frankfurter, 2007). However, the apparent failure of 
Modern Finance Theory during the recent 2008 Global Financial crisis has now brought its validity into the 
forefront and raised the question as to whether Behavioral Finance, which attempts to explain market 
efficiency anomalies in terms of investor behavior and cognitive biases such as over-reaction, under-
reaction, overconfidence and loss aversion, has now replaced EMH as the predominant theory of financial 
markets (Ball, 2009). 
Ball (2009: 15) however argues that “it takes a theory to beat a theory” and since behavioral finance has 
no anomalies of its own, it is simply a set of disjointed ideas that attempt ex post to explain EMH anomalies 
and is therefore not a theory. Malkiel (2011: 53) also dealt a blow to Behavioral Finance (BF) by noting 
that “BF does not argue that the behavioral biases of investors make the market beatable”. Ball (2009: 
16) concludes therefore that in the absence of a practical alternative the EMH is “efficient enough” and 
will continue to be durable in the future.  
Despite its theoretical weakness, the EMH survives on the practical application of the hypothesis that no 
market participant should be able to consistently generate excess returns and the lack of empirical 
evidence to the contrary. Significant evidence against Weak-Form capital market efficiency via 
consistently profitable technical trading strategies will drive a stake through the EMH by additionally 
rendering the EMH nugatory from a practical point of view. This would encourage future research in 
Behavioral Finance and strengthen the case for a paradigm shift in price formation theory. 
 
 Bank Regulation 
Critics (Fox, 2009; Lowenstein, 2009; Moosa, 2010; Caldentey and Vernengo, 2010; and Volcker 2011) 
have blamed the recent 2008 financial crisis on an unjustified faith in efficient markets and the ability of 
market forces to regulate prices and risk that led to laissez faire capitalism and the deregulation of the 
banking industry in the 1990’s. 
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Volcker (2011) additionally attributes the deregulation of the banking sector to the explosive growth of a 
shadow banking system – hedge funds, money market funds and other unregulated entities – that 
developed toxic and opaque Collateralized Debt Obligation (CDO) investment instruments, and to the 
build-up in massive levels of leverage undertaken by financial institutions in their greed to invest in these 
(at the time) lucrative investment vehicles. However, the bursting of the housing bubble led to the 
unexpected mass default of the risky sub-prime mortgages underlying the CDO’s, and left the world’s 
banking system on the brink of collapse. 
In response to the financial crisis and in an effort to prevent another crisis and resultant government 
bailout, the US Congress passed the controversial Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act in 2010, and 
concurrently the international Basel III Accord was also passed which introduced new stringent global 
regulatory standards on bank capital, liquidity and leverage requirements (Tropeano, 2011). 
The leaders of most global banking institutions, the most vocal being JP Morgan CEO Jamie Dimon, have 
harshly criticized the Dodd-Frank and Basel III reforms, asserting that the reforms have not only increased 
uncertainty and stifled bank lending and innovation, but are also ultimately responsible for the slow 
economic recovery since the financial crisis (Gao, 2011). 
Empirical evidence of market efficiency (or inefficiency) will play a major role in this ongoing debate 
between government bureaucrats and banking industry leaders regarding the necessary level of banking 
industry regulation and its overall significant effect on the economy. 
 
 Allocation of Resources 
As noted by Fama (1970:383), “the primary role of the capital market is allocation of ownership of the 
economy’s capital stock.” However, the optimal allocation of the economy’s capital stock can only occur 
in an efficient market where prices fully reflect all available information and send accurate signals to 
private and institutional investors regarding their capital investment decisions amongst the nation’s 
private and public companies, and ensure that firms receive accurate price signals to guide their strategic 
production and investment decisions. 
Efficient capital markets ensure that investors purchase shares in firms that are more productive thereby 
offering higher returns, and allow firms to acquire capital at a cost that is commensurate with the riskiness 
of those firms. This results in stock market growth which feeds into economic growth (McGowan, 2011). 
An inefficient capital market will result in the sub-optimal allocation of the nation’s resources which will 
have a significant detrimental long term effect on economic growth and prosperity. 
 
 Long-Term Investment Strategy 
The life expectancy in developed countries is expected to rise by two years every decade due to 
improvements in medical science and hospital care, healthier nutritional choices, active lifestyles which 
include more physical exercise, and a drastic reduction in smoking (Roxby, 2011). 
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For young adults, this imparts an enormous significance to investment choices in building a retirement 
portfolio that can realistically be required to support retirees for 30 years beyond the retirement age of 
65. Investment choices also need to be designed to accommodate the likelihood of prolonged bear 
market periods and unpredictable market crashes. 
If the global capital markets are shown to be efficient, then the prudent investment choice would be to 
avoid high cost mutual and hedge funds as they will not be able to generate returns in excess of the market 
or a naïve buy-and-hold strategy. In fact, many funds will underperform the market even gross of the high 
upfront fees and commissions. In the case of investment funds, you get what you don’t pay for - in other 
words, try and avoid upfront fees because they erode away any potential excess return generated by the 
fund. In a scenario of efficient global capital markets, the optimal investment choice would simply be a 
low cost, passive Index fund that tracks the market. 
If the global capital markets are shown to be inefficient, then it would be a wise choice to select a 
professional investment manager that is able to capitalize on global market inefficiencies by diversifying 
and trading internationally. Investing is a skill and those managers that consistently demonstrate the 
ability to earn returns in excess of the market deserve to be adequately rewarded by performance based 
fees for generating alpha18 and a much needed larger nest egg upon retirement for their clients. 
 
 Business Leadership 
The EMH as the cornerstone of Modern Finance Theory and technical analysis as an intensively and 
widely used investment analysis technique, together constitute vital elements of Financial Management 
which remains a core foundation course of all Master of Business Administration (MBA) programs19. In 
addition, top business schools place more than 40% of their MBA graduates in the finance industry – 
former Merrill Lynch CEO’s John Thain and Stanley O’Neal, Lehman Brothers CEO Richard Fuld, and ex 
Citigroup CEO Vikram Pandit are all card-carrying MBA graduates (Holland, 2009). 
The banking and investment banking industry are the lifeblood of an economy, the failure of which 
would pose a systemic risk to which the 2008 world financial crisis bears testimony. Not surprisingly, 
financial industry executives are the preeminent business leaders in our society responsible for guiding 
the economy through a constantly changing global business environment. 
 
 Recommendations for Future Research 
Following on one of the premises of this study which utilized high frequency intra-day data, significant 
advancements in computer technology and high speed data communications have stimulated a new 
trading niche known as high frequency algorithmic trading, whose algorithms detect pricing inefficiencies 
                                                          
18 Alpha is defined as a measure of the risk-adjusted return on an investment in excess of the commensurate risk, and is thus the return that can 
be attributable to the investment manager skill. 
19 Source: www.wikipedia.org 
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at a millisecond level and generate millions of trades per day with the objective of simply earning one cent 
profit per trade. 
Anecdotal evidence indicates that over the past 18 months, a number of these high frequency algorithmic 
trading firms have yet to experience a losing month and have consistently outperformed the market. 
Cliff and Northrup (2012) examined the role played by high speed algorithmic trading in the May 6, 2010 
Flash Crash where in the space of one hour, the Dow crashed 1000 points and then miraculously recovered 
narrowly avoiding a global market sell-off contagion. This unprecedented market volatility was due to the 
simultaneous large order executions by high speed algorithms, or as described by Cliff and Northrup 
(2012: 23) “a sudden and dramatic failure in an ultra-large-scale software-intensive socio-technical system 
(the US financial markets)”. They propose an investment intensive, global scale simulation model initiative 
as one approach for assessing and controlling systemic risk in the financial markets, in addition to calling 
for further research to develop appropriate tools for the management of reliable ultra-large-scale 
complex socio-technical systems resulting from technological advancement and the role played by high 
speed algorithmic trading. 
Future research is therefore necessary to determine the impact of high speed algorithmic trading on not 
only the EMH and price formation theory, but also market volatility and liquidity. 
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9 GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
 
Advanced Emerging Market: Under the FTSE definition, advanced emerging markets are classified as 
upper or lower middle Gross National Income countries with advanced market infrastructures. 
Alexandrian Filter Rules: Trend following trading range breakout filter rule developed by Sydney 
Alexander in 1961. 
Alpha:    Alpha is defined as a measure of the risk-adjusted return on an 
investment in excess of the commensurate risk, and is thus the return that can be attributable to the 
investment manager skill. 
Bank of Japan:   The Central Bank of Japan 
BOJ:    Abbreviation for the Bank of Japan 
Bond:    Fixed Income Security issued by a company (Corporate Bond) or 
government (Government or Treasury Bond) that borrows the funds for a defined period of time at a fixed 
interest rate (coupon). 
Bourse:    Stock market in a non-English speaking country, specifically France. 
BOVESPA:   Index of 50 stocks trading in Brazil on the Sao Paulo Stock, Mercantile and 
Futures Exchange. 
BRIC:    Acronym representing the emerging markets of Brazil, Russia, India and 
China. 
Broker Commission:  Stock broker commission charged per trade to place and execute buy and sell 
orders. 
 
BSE-100 Index:   Index of the top 100 large cap stocks trading in India on the Bombay Stock 
Exchange. 
Buy-and-hold:   Naïve investment strategy where the investor buys stocks and holds them 
for an indefinite period of time. 
Buy to cover:   Buy order on a stock that closes out an existing short position. 
Candlestick:   Style of bar chart where the body of the candle and upper and lower wick 
describe the opening, closing, high, low and price direction during a time period. 
CAPM:    The Capital Asset Pricing Model – describes the relationship between risk 
and expected return of securities. 
CBOE:    Chicago Board Options Exchange. 
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Close:    The final price at which a security is traded in a given time period. 
CMT:    Chartered Market Technician – professional designation awarded by the 
Market Technicians Association (MTA) that confirms proficiency in technical analysis. 
Collateralized Debt Obligation (CDO): Structured security backed by a pool of bonds, loans, and other 
assets. 
Commission:   See broker commission 
Commodity:   Basic good used in commerce as an input in the production of goods and 
services. 
Commodity Index:  Index that tracks a basket of commodities to measure their performance. 
Commodity Currencies:  Currencies of countries whose economies depend heavily upon the 
export of raw materials. 
Correlation:   Mutual relationship or connection between two or more variables. 
Covariance:   Measure of the degree to which returns on two risky assets move in 
tandem. 
Currency:   Generally accepted medium of exchange in use in a country and issued 
by a government. 
Depression:   Severe and prolonged downturn in economic activity. 
Developed Market:  High income country that is most developed in terms of its economy and 
capital markets, and includes ease of capital movement, and efficiency of market institutions. 
DJIA:    Dow Jones Industrial Average – index of 30 significant blue chip stocks 
traded on the New York Stock Exchange. 
DMI:    Directional Movement Index – an indicator developed to identify a 
definable trend. 
Drawdown:   The peak to trough decline during a specific period of an investment. 
Dollar Index:   Measure of the value of the US Dollar relative to a basket of six major 
foreign currencies: Canadian Dollar, British Pound, Euro, Swiss Franc, Swedish Krone, and the Japanese 
Yen. 
Dow:    See Dow Jones Industrial Average. 
EIA:    U.S. Energy Information Administration. 
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EMA:    Exponential Moving Average – moving average where more weight is 
allocated to the latest data. 
Eurodollar:   U.S. Dollar denominated deposits held in banks outside of the United 
States. 
ex ante:   Beforehand, or before the event – term that refers to future events. 
ex post:   After the fact. 
“Fair Game”:   The expected return of a security at time t+1 based on the current 
information set at time t, is equal to zero. 
Federal Reserve:  Central Bank of the United States, often referred to as the “Fed”. 
Federal Funds Rate:  Interest rate at which banks trade funds maintained at the Federal 
Reserve (known as federal funds) overnight with each other. 
Forex:    The market in which currencies are traded. 
Frontier Emerging Market: Frontier Emerging markets have a lower market capitalization and 
liquidity than the more developed traditional emerging markets. 
Fundamental Analysis:  Method that analyzes the financial statements of a business in order to 
predict its intrinsic value under the premise that the market price of an asset will eventually tend to move 
toward its true intrinsic value. 
Futures:    Financial contract obligating the buyer to purchase an asset (or the seller 
to sell an asset) at a predetermined future date and price. 
GDP:    Gross Domestic Product - monetary value of all final goods and services 
produced within a country’s borders within a specific time period, usually one year. 
Global Dow:   An index of 150 international blue chip stocks selected by senior editors 
of the Wall Street Journal. 
Gold:    As one of the precious metal commodities, Gold derives its value from 
not only its industrial use in jewelry and electronics, but also as a hedge against inflation and a store of 
value in times of economic and political uncertainty. 
Hang Seng:   The Hang Seng Index (HSI) is a market capitalization weighted index of 
the 40 largest companies that trade on the Hong Kong Exchange. 
High:    The highest price traded by a stock within a specific time period. 
i.e.:    Abbreviation of the Latin term id est which basically means “that is”. 
Index (plural: Indices):   Portfolio of securities representing a particular market or portion of it. 
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Interest Rate:    Interest earned on trading capital while not actively in a trade. 
Intermarket Analysis:  The analysis of one or more related markets (inter-markets) in order to 
determine the strength or weakness of the market being considered (traded market). 
Intrinsic Value:   Present value of all expected future net cash flows to the company. 
Jensen’s Alpha:   Risk-adjusted performance measure that represents the average return 
on a portfolio in excess of the return predicted by the CAPM, given the portfolio’s beta and the average 
market return. 
JSE:    Johannesburg Stock Exchange. 
KOSPI:    Korean Composite Stock Price Index. 
Law of Large Numbers:  Statistical principle which states that as the sample size increases, the 
mean of the sample will approach the average of the population. 
Long Position:   The buying of a stock, commodity or currency with the expectation that 
it will rise in value. 
Low:    The lowest price traded by a stock within a specific time period. 
MACD:    Moving Average Convergence Divergence – trend following indicator that 
is calculated by subtracting the 26 day exponential moving average (EMA) from the 12 day EMA. 
Martingale:   Stochastic process whereby the best prediction of a future price is the 
current price. 
MBA:    Master of Business Administration. 
MOM:    Momentum Indicator – trend following indicator that shows the 
difference between today’s closing price and the closing price n days ago. 
Moving Average:  The n day moving average is a simple rolling average of the past n days of 
prices. 
MSCI:    Morgan Stanley Capital International – each MSCI Index measures a 
different aspect of global stock market performance. 
MTA:    Market Technicians Association. 
NASDAQ:   Global electronic marketplace for buying and selling securities, and the 
benchmark index for U.S. technology stocks. 
Nikkei 225:   Price weighted index of Japan’s top 225 blue chip companies trading on 
the Tokyo Stock Exchange. 
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NYSE:    New York Stock Exchange – largest equities based exchange in the world. 
Open:    The price at which a security first trades upon the opening of an exchange 
on a given trading day, or at the start of a specific time period. 
Option:    The right, but not the obligation, to buy or sell a specific amount of a given 
security at a specified price during a specified period of time. 
P/E Ratio:   Price Earnings ratio, is a valuation ratio defined as the market price per 
share divided by the annual earnings per share. 
Platinum:   Precious metal commodity. 
Precious Metals:  Classification of metals that are considered rare and have a high 
economic value. 
Predictive Correlation:  Mutual relationship between two variables, with one variable leading and 
predictive of the other. 
QE1, QE2, QE3 & QE4:  Monetary policy in which a central bank purchases government bonds in 
order to stimulate the economy by lowering interest rates and increasing the money supply. 
Random Walk:   Theory that stock price changes are independent of each other, such that 
past price movements cannot be used to predict future price movements. 
Recession:   Prolonged economic decline characterized by two or more successive 
quarters of negative GDP growth. 
Rentes:    Government security of France, or the annual income from a capital 
investment. 
RSI:    Relative Strength Indicator – technical oscillator that indicates 
overbought and oversold levels. 
S&P 500:   Standard & Poor’s 500 stock index – most commonly used benchmark for 
the overall U.S. stock market. 
S&P GSCI:   Standard & Poor’s Goldman Sachs Commodity Index comprises 24 
commodities from all commodity sectors and is the benchmark of overall commodity performance. 
SEC:    Securities and Exchange Commission – government commission created 
by the U.S. Congress to regulate the securities markets. 
Secondary Emerging Market: According to the FTSE classification, these emerging markets include low, 
low middle, upper middle and high income GNI countries with reasonable market infrastructures. 
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Sell Short:   In anticipation that a stock price will fall, the process of selling a borrowed 
security in order to buy it back in the future at a lower price. 
Short Position:   The sale of a borrowed security with the expectation that it will fall in 
value. 
Silver:    Precious metal commodity used in coinage and jewelry – like gold, it 
derives its value as an inflation hedge and a store of value. 
Slippage:   Slippage refers to the difference in price between the time an order is 
placed and when it is actually executed due to the time lag experienced before another trader takes the 
other side of a buy or sell trade, and effectively fills the order. Positive slippage occurs when the final 
execution price is better than the requested price, but in most cases, slippage is negative and results in 
disadvantageous prices. It is therefore built in as a cost per trade. 
 
SMA:    Simple Moving Average – see Moving Average. 
Stochastic:   Also known as a random process, is a collection of random values. 
Stock:    Type of security that signifies ownership in a company. 
Stock Index:   Typically a weighted average of selected stocks in order to measure the 
value of a section of the stock market. 
TARP:    Troubled Asset Relief Program - $ 700 billion program created in October 
2008 by the U.S. Treasury to stabilize the country’s financial system in the wake of the 2008 Financial 
Crisis. 
Technical Analysis:  Quantitative and qualitative analysis of historical prices in order to 
extrapolate future price movement. 
Transaction Costs:  Expenses incurred when buying or selling securities – include brokerage 
commissions and spreads. 
TRB:    Trading Range Breakout – a stock price breaking above (below) its 
previous n day trading range is an indication of positive (negative) momentum. 
TWSE:    Taiwan Stock Exchange. 
U.K.:    United Kingdom. 
UTY:    Philadelphia Utility Index. 
Variance:   Measures the variability or spread from the mean and is therefore an 
indication of volatility and risk. Calculated as the average of the sum of the squared differences from the 
mean. 
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vice versa:   Derived from Latin for “in reverse order”. 
Wall Street:   Street in lower Manhattan that is the original home of the New York Stock 
Exchange. 
XAU:    Philadelphia Gold and Silver Index – market capitalization index of the 
leading precious metal mining companies. 
XOI:    Amex Oil Index – price weighted index of the leading companies involved 
in the exploration, production, and development of petroleum. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
